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Abstract
In this thesis, we present efficient techniques for satisfiability modulo theories-
based model checking (SMT-based MC) of software where the model is too large
or complicated to analyse; real-world software once represented as a mathematical
model faces the danger of the state-explosion problem where the size of the model
grows exponentially, thus analysing the whole model becomes a challenge.
The SMT reasoning framework is one of the most successful approaches nowa-
days to deal with the state explosion problem when commonly combining ad-
ditional techniques like symbolic algorithms, bounded model checking (BSMC),
incremental modelling and reasoning, abstraction and counterexample-guided ab-
straction refinement (CEGAR). These approaches construct a model of the soft-
ware with its specifications as a first-order formula while expressing domain-
specific knowledge with first-order theories, thus creating smaller and simple mod-
els than with propositional logic modelling. The simplicity of the models improves
the performance of the verification process and allows for reusing the model anal-
ysis for other tasks. However, finding a model that is sufficiently high-level to
prevent reasoning from becoming prohibitively expensive but expressive enough
to capture the software behaviour required for correctness, is a non-trivial task.
We describe novel SMT-based MC approaches in which a model of a software
system is automatically analysed using these techniques to verify if the model sat-
isfies its specifications or to find a real counterexample. The verification process is
incremental through SMT summaries based on the structure of the program. The
summaries are either Craig interpolants of previous successful verification tasks
or user-defined. To avoid spurious counterexamples, each of the approaches in-
troduces a refinement technique that deals with the over-approximative nature of
modelling software in SMT framework. The LB-CEGAR algorithm uses lattices
for efficient representation of library functions and gradual refinement of this rep-
resentation; the CEGAR-based theory refinement algorithm uses the partial order
according to precision between SMT theories to gradually refine program state-
ments required for proving correctness; and the function summarization modulo
theories algorithm uses summaries between different theories when verifying a
software with many requirements.
We evaluate our approaches on benchmarks in C taken from SV-COMP (soft-
ware verification competition), the robotics community, unimib (the University of
Milano-Bicocca benchmarks), FunFrog tool benchmarks (the University of Lugano
benchmarks), and our own. Our experimental results demonstrate that we can
verify instances that existing model checking approaches failed to verify.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software nowadays is part of every aspect of our lives, from small personal de-
vices to large industrial machinery and vehicles; now more than ever, there is
a need to deal with errors, failures, faults, and vulnerabilities of software sys-
tems [All07, And11, Var15, Nes18, Boe19, Pat19, Top19]. Software is put through
hours of testing to improve it to the point of acceptable risk for practical reasons.
However, assuring a piece of software satisfies its requirements is still a complex
and resource-consuming task. In this thesis, we explore ways to perform this
non-trivial yet important task via software model checking framework, efficiently.
Model checking techniques [EC80, CE82, QS82, CES86, CGP99] verify a sys-
tem against its requirements automatically and have been successfully applied for
verification of protocols, controllers, and embedded software, already for several
decades (e.g. [CLM91, CGH+93, BVWW09, JR11, LVB+12, GDH14, WDF+15,
Bon16, FBZ+18]). The model checking framework, given a specification (safety
properties), constructs a finite-state model of the system and checks if the model
satisfies its specifications or finds a real counterexample. Software model checking
often requires additional techniques to deal with performance and the represen-
1
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tation of a non-finite state model of the task in hand. The performance and
representation issues are resulting from two known problems: the state explo-
sion problem in which the size of the model grows exponentially, and the halting
problem that determines the termination of a software program and an input.
The satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) [DNS05] reasoning framework for
model checking [BCCZ99, BCC+99, AMP06, GG06, AMP09] extends this ca-
pability by using a high-level description of the model and is one of the most
successful approaches today to deal with the state explosion problem in model
checking. This approach was presented originally with Boolean decision proce-
dures and a bounded model checker (BMC) [BCCZ99, BCC+99, BCC+03] for
symbolic model checking [BCM+92, McM93a, BCCZ99, BCC+99] as a scalable
verification approach for larger systems, and in general, follows the same princi-
ple; the bounded model (that is, all loops and recursion calls are unwound to a
given bound) is encoded and conjoined with the negation of a safety property to
a first-order formula. The solver checks the satisfiability of this formula, and if
there is no satisfying assignment, then no valid counterexample exists in the given
bound, and the property holds in this bound. Since this approach constructs only
finite formulas, it can deal with both problems, the state explosion problem and
the halting problem. The effectiveness of SMT-based approaches in addressing
the state-explosion problem depends on the verification problem and the theory
in use.
A complementary task of the verification task in model checking is generating
a counterexample when a property does not hold in the model; in software model
checking, a counterexample is an execution of the program which violated this
property. However, as we do model checking of the high-level description of the
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system, a counterexample can be found in the model but does not necessarily
exist in the system, in which case, we found a spurious counterexample.
A common way to deal with spurious counterexamples in the model is by re-
finement [CGJ+00, CCK+02, CGJ+03, CKSY05, GS05, KKNP09, RNO14]. The
refinement replaces the high-level description of the model (part or all of it) with
a more detailed description to avoid spurious counterexamples. The challenge
is finding the balance between a high-level description of the problem and the
required details for proving safety. One of the most successful refinement tech-
niques in model checking is the counterexample-guided abstraction refinement
(CEGAR) [CGJ+00, CGJ+03]: an automatic technique for refinement, which is
guided by spurious counterexamples iteratively and has already been integrated
into SMT-based model checking frameworks [HWZ08, Arm09, BW12, CNR13,
LMN15, CGI+17b, CGI+18b].
In this thesis, I present four different CEGAR-based techniques, each of which
uses additional techniques for constructing simpler models for efficient verifica-
tion of the software with its properties via symbolic bounded model checking. We
do incremental verification by using SMT function summaries to speed-up the
current verification task and deal better with the state explosion problem. For
each safety property, we construct a different model with the required details for
this property only. We use function summaries of already verified code to avoid
verification of the same part of the code twice; the SMT function summaries are
Craig interpolants [Cra57] or user-defined [AAC+17] and can be more general and
less architecture-specific. The initial modelling is done using Equality and Unin-
terpreted Functions (EUF) or extensions of EUF as uninterpreted functions and
Linear Integer Arithmetic (UFLIA) and Uninterpreted Functions and Linear Real
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Arithmetic (UFLRA). Thus, we construct a higher-level description by modelling
with EUF than with propositional logic even if both are essentially the same.
These refinement techniques deal with the problem occurs when modelling
software with EUF and SMT function summaries where the initial model is too
simple and insufficient to prove the correctness of a property or find a real coun-
terexample. We present four different refinement techniques to deal with each of
the following cases.
1. The summary refinement algorithm handles the over-approximation nature
of SMT function summaries.
2. The LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm and the LB-CEGAR algorithm refine al-
gebraic and mathematical functions (represented in the code as library func-
tions).
3. The counterexample-guided theory refinement algorithm deals with local re-
finement of operators at the bit-vector level.
4. Last, the theory-aware summary refinement algorithm allows performing
incremental verification with SMT function summaries of different theories.
The combination of these techniques helps to make reasoning efficient (time
and space), the outputs (summaries and error trace) readable, and the model
small and generalised while still being able to prove the correctness of the code
by applying different refinement techniques if the model is too general. The gen-
eral flow of the tool is sketched in Fig. 1.1. In this sketch, the model checking
verifies each property separately via the assertion traversal component iteratively.
Initially, the model checker encodes the software and a safety property in EUF
with summaries (that is, the high-level model). Only if refinement is required, the
model checker constructs a refined model (via the refiner engine and the encoder).
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Figure 1.1: SMT-based incremental BMC with refinement (general flow).
We developed a novel SMT-based bounded model checker tool HiFrog for
high-level incremental verification of software with refinement. The open-source
tool HiFrog is available at https://scm.ti-edu.ch/projects/hifrog/
[Git19b].
1.1 Contributions of the Thesis
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows.
◦ SMT-based incremental model checker tool called HiFrog1 (the first SMT-
based model checker that applied incremental verification with SMT sum-
maries, Chap. 4).
1HiFrog is an open-source SMT-based model checker under the ownership of Università della
Svizzera italiana (USI). The author of this thesis was part of the team that initially designed
and developed the tool.
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◦ Abstraction refinement techniques for efficient SMT-based incremental
model checking to handle each of the following cases:
– The over-approximation nature of SMT function summaries (Summary
Refinement, Chap. 4).
– Algebraic and mathematical functions in code (LB-CEGAR with lat-
tices of guarded literals, Chap. 5 and Chap. 6).
– Operators at a bit-vector level (Theory refinement, Chap. 7).
– Efficient use of different theories in incremental verification with SMT
summaries (Theory-aware summary refinement, Chap. 8).
◦ Evaluation of efficiency per refinement technique on sets of non-trivial
benchmarks (our experimental results demonstrate that we can verify in-
stances that existing model checking approaches failed to, Chap. 4-8).
1.2 Thesis Statement
In this thesis, the research direction hypothesis proposes to model the verification
problem in different logics to use of SMT speeds-up calculation for scaling the
model checking applications to process more complex and larger projects. The
main challenge in this research direction relies on the ability to find a model that is
expressive enough to capture relevant software behaviour while being sufficiently
high-level to prevent prohibitively expensive reasoning. Failing to find such a
model, results in either reporting spurious counterexamples due to abstractions or
leading to instances that are too large to solve efficiently. In this thesis, I suggest
handling this problem with abstraction refinement, present several refinement
techniques for different verification tasks and unifying the different refinement
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approaches here into one CEGAR loop, which is mainly relevant to future work.
I explore in this thesis the claim that:
Modelling the verification problem in different SMT logics while incorporat-
ing smart and novel refinement techniques into the model checking process,
is capable of verifying complex and larger software while dealing efficiently
with both possible outcomes: all properties hold and a property violation.
To test and explore the above claim, we created a new SMT-based model
checker, HiFrog. It uses the CPROVER framework and converts a C program
into a symbolic execution of the unwound program to create an instance of the
verification problem as a first-order formula. I was participating in the develop-
ment of the HiFrog tool in the first 3 years of my PhD studies with a significant
contribution2.
This research was done in collaboration with the USI Formal Verification and
Security group to achieve the best research results; I present in Chap. 5 and
Chap. 6 the main contribution of this thesis, namely, the concept of lattice-based
refinement with its extension to a general algorithm for library function refine-
ment, the LB-CEGAR algorithm. In Chap. 7 and Chap. 8, I describe other
contributions, the theory refinement and the theory-aware summary refinement,
which resulted from the collaborative work with the team at USI.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows.
2See the git repository report at https://scm.ti-edu.ch/projects/hifrog/repository/
statistics for more details.
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I provide the theoretical background for this thesis in Chap. 2 and Chap. 3.
I describe and review model checking approaches for software, and provide ad-
ditional details about symbolic model checking and examples of the translation
of code into the static single assignment (SSA) [CFR+89]. I provide details of
the modelling phase in the context of incremental verification with function sum-
maries and the encoding into a first-order formula for the SMT solver. I specify
the techniques and tools I am using during the solving phase. Last, I discuss
abstraction refinement techniques and provide the theoretical foundation of the
refinement techniques I present in this thesis.
I present the function-summarization-based bounded model checker HiFrog
in Chap. 4. I introduce the tool architecture and its various features. The features
include the support to different encoding precisions, user-defined summaries, slic-
ing, assertion optimisation, interpolation for function summaries and incremental
verification. I evaluate the tool performance against SAT-based bounded model
checking.
I describe and evaluate the effect on the performance and the ability to prove
correctness (or to find a counterexample) of different refinement techniques, in
Chap. 4, Chap. 5, Chap. 6, Chap. 7 and Chap. 8. I also give details on the initial
encoding via EUF or extensions of EUF that each technique uses.
In Chap. 4, I describe in general the summary refinement algorithm, which
takes place during the SMT encoding with summaries stage, and the interaction
of the summary refiner component with other components of HiFrog in the ar-
chitecture of the tool. This refinement technique refers in general to any SMT
encoding and not specifically to EUF; later I show how to use this technique (com-
bined with another refinement technique) when initially encoding the summaries
with EUF in chapter 8.
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In Chap. 5, I suggest using a lattice with properties of a mathematical function
in the context of bounded model checking to model library functions in programs
with EUF or extensions of EUF. I formalise a refinement process of the initial
high-level description of the function for different sub-domains of the input till
modelling with the function’s full definition based on the lattice structure. I
propose an algorithm for refinement based on lattices traversals in BMC (the LB-
CEGAR-BMC algorithm) and an algorithm for constructing a lattice of literals
from a set of properties. In Chap. 6, I present the LB-CEGAR algorithm, a full
and generalised algorithm of the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm. The algorithm
represents a function efficiently via a lattice of literals (as first-order formulas)
and gradually refines the current representation of this function according to the
partial order of literals where I do not necessarily have or use the full definition of
this function; I describe additional techniques and heuristics to deal efficiently with
this scenario. I present an evaluation of the lattice-based refinement algorithms
with several mathematical functions and with different SMT encodings.
In Chap. 7, I present the counterexample-guided theory refinement approach.
I describe a CEGAR-based algorithm that uses the partial order according to pre-
cision between SMT theories to gradually refine statements of a program up to the
bit-level precision. However, the algorithm refines only the statements required
for proving the correctness of the model, guided by spurious counterexamples and
the location of a statement in the code. I describe the notation for and formalise
the communication between two SMT theories in the context of software model
checking. I present several heuristics with an evaluation of the effect of the re-
finement order of statements in the code on the time and memory performance of
the algorithm.
In Chap. 8, I present the theory-aware summary refinement approach. The
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approach allows for using function summaries between different theories for fully-
automated incremental verification of software with many requirements. I present
an algorithm that combines summary refinement with theory-aware refinement
over an incremental verification framework, and I formalize the conversion that is
carried out between different SMT encodings of the same function summary. To
demonstrate the efficiency of the automated SMT-based incremental model check-
ing framework, I provide a comparison with our semi-automated model checker
(the initial version of HiFrog, Chap. 4) and CBMC model checker.
Last, I describe future work and conclude in Chap. 9. The last chapter also
contains the list of publications used to compile this thesis.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we provide all required formalisms for the techniques we describe
in chapters 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. This chapter covers several topics: (i) lattices
and sub-posets definitions and examples, (ii) modelling software for verification
with a discussion regarding approximations and abstractions as part of the mod-
elling process, (iii) satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) problem description with
its usage and the required logical foundation, (iv) model checking in software
with its general architecture and additional techniques for efficiency as symbolic
model checking, bounded model checking (BMC), and SMT-based model checking,
(v) further techniques that required their own section as incremental verification,
function summaries and abstraction refinement. Topics (ii)-(v) are required for
understanding this thesis in general, while topic (i) is required only for under-
standing Chap. 5 and Chap. 6.
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2.1 Lattices
2.1.1 Partially ordered sets
A partially ordered set (poset) is a set with a binary relation where some pairs
of elements in the set have a certain order, thus an element may precede another.
However, not every pair of elements in the set are comparable.
Two elements in a poset X are comparable if either eRbe′ or e′Rbe holds for
a poset 〈X,Rb〉 and e, e′ ∈ X where X is a set of elements and Rb is a binary
relation.
Example 1. Given a set of items {1, 2, 3}, the set of all its subsets (its powerset)
S = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}} and the binary relation ⊆ is the
poset 〈S,⊆〉 where only some of the pairs of elements are comparable, for example,
elements {3} and {1, 2} are not comparable, and elements {1, 3} and {1, 2, 3} are
comparable.
A poset is a chain if every two elements in the poset are comparable.
Example 2. The set of real numbers R and the binary relation ≤ is a chain (and
also a totally ordered set).
A maximal element of a poset 〈X,Rb〉 is an element e ∈ X, thus
¬∃e′ ∈ (X \ {e}).eRbe′.
Example 3. The maximal element of the poset 〈S,⊆〉, where S = {{1}, {2}, {3},
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}, is {1, 2, 3} since there is no other element in the
poset thus e′ ∈ (S \ {{1, 2, 3}}) and {1, 2, 3} ⊆ e′.
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For given sets X1, X2, a poset 〈X1, Rb1〉 is a subposet of 〈X2, Rb2〉 where Rb1
and Rb2 are binary relations, and X1 ⊆ X2, if
∀e, e′ ∈ X1.eRb1e′
def= eRb2e′.
An example of a subposet is illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
{ 1 } 
{ 1,2 } 
{ 2 } 
 
{ 3 } 
{ 1,3 } { 2,3 } 
{ 1,2,3 } { 1 } 
{ 1,2 } 
{ 2 } 
 
{ 3 } 
{ 1,3 } { 2,3 } 
{ 1 } 
{ 1,2 } 
{ 2 } 
 
{ 3 } 






Figure 2.1: Poset A and two reduced posets: B and C. Only poset B is a subposet
of poset A.
In Fig. 2.1, poset B (upper-right) is a subposet of poset A (left) since any two
elements in the subposet maintain the same partial order as poset A (left). How-
ever, poset C (lower-right) is not a subposet of poset A (left), since for example,
the element {1} proceeds the element {1, 3} in poset A (left) but does not proceed
the element {1, 3} in poset C (lower-right).
For a poset 〈X,Rb〉, let Y ⊆ X and l ∈ X. Element l is a lower bound of
the set Y if ∀y ∈ Y.lRby. The element l is the greatest lower bound of Y if
∀e ∈ X.(∀y ∈ Y.eRby) =⇒ eRbl. For a poset 〈X,Rb〉, let Y ⊆ X and u ∈ X.
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Element u is a upper bound of the set Y if ∀y ∈ Y.yRbu. The element u is the
least upper bound of Y if ∀e ∈ X.(∀y ∈ Y.yRbe) =⇒ uRbe.
We define the greatest lower bound and the least upper bound as the meet (u)
and join (t) operators on a poset X. We use these operators to define a lattice.
2.1.2 Lattices and semi-lattices
Lattice. A partially ordered set is a lattice if it has a meet (u) and a join (t)
for any subset of its elements.
In Fig. 2.2, Lattice A is a lattice of all natural numbers ordered by <. Lattice
B contains two elements {⊥,>} when > proceeds ⊥. Lattice C is a lattice of all
divisors of 30 ordered by divisors of each element, thus if a divides b then a is a

















Figure 2.2: Examples of lattices.
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Finite lattice. A finite lattice has a greatest element > and a least element
⊥ thus every element in the lattice is between ⊥ to >. In Fig. 2.2, Lattice A is
not a finite lattice. Lattice B and Lattice C are finite lattices.
Semi-lattice. A meet semi-lattice is a partially ordered set that has a u
for any subset of its elements (but not necessarily t). A join semi-lattice is a
partially ordered set that has a t for any subset of its elements (but not necessarily
u). In Fig. 2.1, poset B is a meet semi-lattice; we present its u and t operators in
the next paragraph when we discuss subset lattices. For the general definition of
semi-lattices, which is not required for understand this thesis, we refer the reader
to [Gar15], Chap. 5.
Subset lattice. For a given set X, the family of all subsets of X, partially
ordered by the inclusion operator, forms a subset lattice L(X). The u and t
operators are defined on L(X) as intersection and union, respectively. The top
element > is the whole set X, and the bottom element ⊥ is the empty set ∅. The
height of the subset lattice L(X) is |X|+ 1, and all maximal chains have exactly
|X|+ 1 elements. We note that L(X) is a De-Morgan lattice [Bir67], as meet and
join distribute over each other. In Fig. 2.1, Poset A is a subset lattice as it is a
lattice of all the subsets of {1, 2, 3}, while Poset B is its reduce meet semi-lattice.
In this thesis, we consider only lattices where X is a finite set and only meet
semi-lattices S(X) that are reduced semi-lattices of L(X) ordered by the inclusion
operator. For general definitions, additional explanations and examples regarding
lattices, we refer the interested reader to [Gar15].
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2.2 Modelling Software, Abstractions and Ap-
proximations
A model of the program under verification aims to represent the relevant part of
the software system for proving the correctness of its specification by abstracting
irrelevant parts of the code. An approximation of the actual behaviours of the
program is a common way of abstraction. An over-approximation of the program
contains all the program’s behaviours (and possibly other additional behaviours),
while an under-approximation of the program contains only the program’s be-
haviours (but not necessarily all of them).
In the context of software verification, a model which is an over-approximation
of a program can include behaviours that violate the specification that do not exist
in the actual program; however, because the model is an over-approximation of
the actual code, it always includes all the behaviours of the program, including
those which violate the specification1. Therefore, we say that if no behaviour that
violates the specification was found in the model, then there is no such behaviour
in the program. However, a model that is an under-approximation of the program
includes some of the behaviours that violate the specification in the program (but
the program’s under-approximation can only include behaviours that exist in the
actual program). Hence, any behaviour that violates the specification found in
this model exists in the program, but we may require a refined model to detect
all such behaviours.
In this thesis, we focus on modelling C code for bounded model checking, where
all the behaviour of a program is all its possible executions. We use initially the
1In this thesis, we consider only safety properties as our specification. We describe the input
and output of our approach in Sec. 2.4, Bounded Model Checking paragraph.







Figure 2.3: Models of a program for verification of a specification
Unwound Single Static Assignment (USSA) form while constructing an under-
approximation of the number of recursive function calls and loop-iterations in the
program (see Sec. 2.4), and then we use different SMT logics to construct a first-
order formula that is an over-approximation of the loop-free program (see Sec. 2.3
and Sec. 2.4.2).
2.3 Satisfiability Modulo Theories
The satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) decision problem of formulas is a problem
of determining whether a formula’s variables have a satisfying assignment with
respect to combinations of background theories expressed in first-order logic.
The SMT decision problem is an extension of the original Boolean Satisfia-
bility Problem (SAT). The problem of determining whether a propositional logic
formula (Boolean expression) is evaluated to true by finding an assignment to all
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its Boolean variables (each of which is either true or false); this assignment is
called a satisfying assignment, and the formula is satisfiable. This formula can
contain Boolean variables, the constants true and false, and ∧,∨, and ¬ operators,
and unlike first-order logic has no non-logical symbols nor quantifiers.
As the focus of this thesis is using first-order theories for software verification,
we describe next the first-order logic that also contains the formal definitions
required for propositional logic.
2.3.1 First-order logic
In this thesis, we express the verification problem in first-order logic; we briefly
describe its syntax and semantics; for full definitions and examples see [Lin06].
The syntax is a collection of symbols that are valid in a formula in a first-order
logic, and the semantics determine the formula interpretation in first-order logic.
A formula in general is a sequence of symbols: logical symbols and a sig-
nature’s symbols. Logical symbols are the quantifiers (∀,∃), logical connectives
(∧,∨,¬, =⇒ , ⇐⇒ ), punctuation symbols (brackets, comma, etc.), equality
symbol (=), and variables. A signature, Σ = (C,F ,P , ar), is a union of non-
logical symbols of C, F , and P , which is a pairwise disjoint sets of constants C
(functions with arity 0), function symbols F and predicate (relation) symbols P ,
and the arity function, ar, that is defined for all functions and predicates (that
is, ar : Σ→ N).
To describe a first-order formula, we require the following rules;
Sort. A sort is a set of constants. For example, the Boolean sort B = {>,⊥}
consists of the Boolean constants, true and false.
Terms are defined inductively, where
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Function Mapping. Given a set of sorts {Tret, T1, . . . , Tn}, a function op :
T1 × . . . × Tn → Tret maps a (possibly empty) sequence of constants v1, . . . , vn
such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, vi ∈ Ti to a return value vret ∈ Tret.
Variables and Constants. variables are V = {vi|i ∈ N} and are not part of
Σ. Constants are the symbols in C in Σ.
In this thesis, we use the definition below when describing the results in Chap. 7
to be consistent with OpenSMT2’s definitions. Thus, functions mapping empty
sequences are variables and are constants if the return value is fixed.
Terms. A set of terms RΣ is defined inductively, thus a term is either a constant,
a variable, or an application of a function op(t1, . . . , tn) where ti are, recursively,
terms with a return value in the sort Ti and ar(op) = n. These rules are captured
by the following grammar:
term ::= const
| var
| f(term, . . . , term)
where const ∈ C is a constant, var is a variable, and f ∈ F is a function symbol
with arity equal to the number of terms in parentheses.
Equalities. Given two terms t and t′ with a value from sort T and sort T ′
respectively, an equality between two terms is t = t′.
Atomic Formulas. An atomic formula is either an equality between two terms
or a predicate expression over terms p(t1, . . . , tm) where p ∈ P , ti are, recursively,
terms with a value from sort Ti, and ar(p) = m.
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Literals. A literal is an atomic formula or its negation.
Note that, an "‘atomic formula"’ is as defined in the paragraph above, that is,
equalities or predicates only.
Using the above we define a first-order formula inductively.
Binary connectives. Given first-order formulas φ and ψ, any of the following
formulas are also a first-order formula (e.g.,): φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ, φ =⇒ ψ, and
φ ⇐⇒ ψ.
Quantified Formula. Given a first-order formula φ and a variable x, ∀xφ and
∃xφ are first-order formulas.
First-order Formulas. A first-order formula is either a literal, a formula of a
binary logical connective between two first-order formulas, or a quantified formula.
Quantifier-free Formulas. In this thesis, we use only quantifier-free first-order
formula (QFF); QFFs are either literals or formulas of a binary logical connective
between two QFFs. Formally, a set of such formulas SΣ is built inductively using
the following grammar:
formula ::= Bvar
| p(term, . . . , term)
| term = term | > | ⊥ | ¬formula
| formula ∧ formula | formula ∨ formula
where Bvar is a Boolean variable, p ∈ P is a predicate symbol with arity equalling
to the number of terms in parentheses, and > and ⊥ are Boolean constants de-
noting true and false respectively.
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In most cases in this thesis we use the usual infix notation together with paren-
theses to express the well-known arithmetic and logical functions.
Free Variables. Given a formula φ and a variable x, we say that v is a free
variable if there exists an occurrence of v that is not bound by any quantifier in
φ.
Example 4. For the formula ∀x.∃y.x = a ∧ y! = b with V = {a, b, x, y}, the
variables a and b are free variables since both are not bound by ∀ nor ∃ in x =
a ∧ y! = b.
Formally we define x to be a free variable in φ if φ is an atomic formula; or
(closure) if φ is φ1φ2 ( is any of the Binary connectives) and x is free in either
φ1 or φ2; if φ is ¬ψ and x is free in ψ; if φ is ∀y.ψ, x is free in ψ and y is a different
variable than x; and if φ is ∃y.ψ, x is free in ψ and y is a different variable than
x.
Sentences. A formula φ is a sentence if φ has no free variables.
Given a signature Σ, first-order theories and quantifier-free first-order theories
are defined as follows;
First-order Theories. A first-order theory T of Σ is a set of sentences in first-
order logic consisting of symbols from Σ, thus, if T |= φ then φ ∈ T , for sentences
φ over Σ.
Quantifier-free First-order Theories. In this thesis, we use only QFF’s hen-
ce, we also define a quantifier-free first-order theory TΣ ⊆ SΣ as a set of formulas
defined over the signature Σ. When T is clear from the context, we call a formula
from SΣ a Satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) instance. We model verification
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problems in the next chapters with the quantifier-free SMT theories of equality and
uninterpreted functions (EUF), fixed-size bit-vectors (BV), linear real arithmetic
(LRA), linear integer arithmetic (LIA), and non-linear arithmetic over the real
numbers (NRA), and with theory combination of EUF with LIA (UFLIA) and
EUF with LRA (UFLRA).
To define the semantics meaning via interpretation of formulas and terms,
we use the following definitions (relevant to QFFs, as we use only quantifier-free
theories here).
First-order Structures. Given Σ, a structure M = (D, I) is the domain of
discourse D that is a non-empty set and the interpretation I of the set of con-
stants in C, (written as: cM1 , ..., cMk ), functions in F , (written as: fM1 , ..., fMl ), and
predicates in P , (written as: pM1 , ..., pMm ) in D, where XM is the interpretation of
X (a constant, a function or a predicate) in M .
Assignments. A variable assignment µv associates each variable with an ele-
ment in D, that is, a function µv : {vi|i ∈ N} → D. Then the assignment is
extended to assignment µ to all terms in Σ, adding the closure of the evaluation
of the set of functions with all terms that have been evaluated to elements in D
and constants.
Formula Evaluation. Each formula φ is evaluated to either true or false under
µ in M . (atomic formula) If φ is an equality between two terms t and t′, then
φ is true if and only if µ(t) = µ(t′); or if φ is an n−place predicate p(t1, .., tn),
then φ is true if the evaluation < ev1, .., evn > of its terms < t1, .., tn > is in its
interpretation (that is, < ev1, .., evn >∈ pM); and (closure) if φ is φ1  φ2 ( is
any of the Binary connectives) or φ is ¬φ1, then φ is evaluated according to the
truth table of each the logical connectives.
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Satisfiable Formula. In general, if ψ is evaluated to true underM , we say that
M satisfies ψ and use the notationM |= ψ. A QFF ψ is T −satisfiable if and only
if there exists a structure M such as that T ∪ ψ is satisfiable (SAT). However,
T ∪ ψ is unsatisfiable (UNSAT) if and only if there is no such structure M .
2.3.2 Craig interpolation
We extract a function summary from a solver’s proof (UNSAT case) via Craig
interpolation [Cra57]. We use Craig interpolation theorem to create an inter-
polant (a formula) from the solver’s proof. An interpolant for a formula exists
if the formula can be partitioned into two parts with common symbols in both
partitions, and every non-logical symbol in the interpolant occurs in both of them.
Each interpolant is described (with some changes) as a function summary in the
verifier. These are reusable for other closely related verification tasks (Sec. 2.5)
and over-approximation representations (Sec. 2.2) of part of the code (e.g., func-
tion’s code). We describe function summaries with their usage in model checking
in Sec. 2.5.1.
Given a pair of formulas (A,B) where the formula A ∧ B is UNSAT, the
definition of an interpolant I for a pair (A,B) is as follows;
Interpolant. Craig interpolant of (A,B) is a formula I such that,
• A⇒ I.
• I ∧B is still UNSAT.
• V ars(I) ⊆ (V ars(A) ∩ V ars(B)) that is I is defined over the common
symbols of A and B.
V ars(F ) is the set of symbols (variables) in formula F .




Figure 2.4: Interpolant I of formula A ∧B.
We describe the relations between A,B and I schematically in Fig. 2.4, thus
every state reachable from A is also reachable from I, and in that sense, we say
that I is an over-approximation of A.
In this thesis, we compute interpolants from resolution refutations via the
labelled interpolation system (LIS) framework; we use the implementation in
OpenSMT2 as is. A refutation is a proof that no counterexample is reachable
in k or fewer steps in a model, for some k ∈ N. The labelled interpolation
system (LIS) framework computes an interpolant I, given a refutation of A ∧B
and a labelling function [Pud97, McM05, DKPW10, RAF+13].
The labelling function maps variables in a refutation’s clauses to a set of labels
{a, b, ab}. The labelling function maps an A’s local variable to ′a′, a B’s local
variable to ′b′, and an A and B’s shared variable to one of the items in {a, b, ab}.
Different labelling functions have a different mapping of the shared variables. A
shared variable occurs in A and in B, and a local variable occurs in either one of
them.
Interpolants of different strength and size can be computed for the pair (A,B)
by choice of the labelling function. Given two interpolants I and I ′ for the pair
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(A,B), if I ⇒ I ′ then we say that the interpolant I is stronger than an interpolant
I ′ and that the interpolant I ′ is weaker than an interpolant I; Fig. 2.5 presents
different strength of interpolants, where I is a stronger interpolant than I ′ and
I ′′. The size of an interpolant depends on the structural size of the formula itself




Figure 2.5: Different strength of interpolants (I, I ′, and I ′′) of formula A ∧B.
Application. In the context of this thesis, unsatisfiable formulas originate from
bug-free programs, and thus the summaries express that no trace allowed by the
function body leads to a violation of the considered safety specification. We define
the loop-free instance of the program as A and the violated property (an assert)
as B, then from the UNSAT proof of f = A ∧B, we construct interpolant I via
the labelled interpolation system (LIS) framework. We store the interpolant after
compressing and generalizing it as a summary.
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We describe in Sec. 4.2.5 the mechanism of obtaining summaries by interpo-
lation in HiFrog.
2.3.3 Tools
SMT solvers are usually built on SAT solver (e.g., MiniSAT2 [ES04]) with the
addition of theory solvers. A query to the solvers is given in the SMT-LIB language
(using currently the SMT-LIB2 format [BST10]). The SMT-LIB language is the
syntax of the SMT-LIB standard that is a common standard for SMT systems
in general [Sat19]. The formula is parsed, simplified, translated into CNF form,
and transformed from an SMT problem into a SAT formula (by replacing atomic
formulas in Boolean variables). A formula is in conjunctive normal form (CNF) if
and only if it is a conjunction of disjunctions of literals. Then the solver repeatedly
tries to find a satisfying valuation for the SAT formula and check consistency
under the domain-specific theory via its theory solver (usually via the DPLL(T)
framework [GHN+04, NO05, NOT06] or via other lazy or eager approaches).
All results in this thesis require the OpenSMT2 SMT solver. For solving
with theory combination, we use the Z3 SMT solver required for some of the
algorithms described in Chap. 5 and Chap. 6.
OpenSMT2. We briefly describe the structure and logic of the OpenSMT2
SMT solver (see [HMAS16] for a detailed description). The solver supports read-
ing an SMT-LIB2 file and interacting through an application-program-interface
(API). The problem is converted into an SMT formula ϕ and simplified into
ϕs, both on the propositional level, for example flattening nested conjunctions
and removing Boolean constraints, and on the theory level, where for instance
asserted equalities are used to compute variable substitutions. The formula ϕs
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is then translated into conjunctive normal form ϕCNF , which is provided as an
input to the SAT solver. The SAT solver provides the theory solvers with as-
signments satisfying ϕCNF . If the assignment is discovered to be unsatisfiable by
the theory solver, the theory solver returns a clause that prevents the SAT solver
from producing similar inconsistent assignments. The standard SAT solving al-
gorithm involves producing learned clauses and resolution guided by the conflict
graph [SS99]. The process terminates when either ϕCNF becomes unsatisfiable,
or when the SAT solver finds a theory-consistent truth assignment. We query the
solver only via its C/C++ binary API.
Z3. We briefly describe additional relevant details in the Z3 solver for this thesis,
see [DMB08b] for a general and detailed description. The Z3 solver has a rich
front-end support; in our implementation, we query the solver through either
an SMT-LIB2 textual format or the C/C++ binary API. We do not store any
information back from the Z3 solver for later use (e.g., function summaries via
interpolation). The Z3 solver is a DPLL-based SAT solver and uses a model-
based theory combination method to incrementally reconcile models maintained
by each theory [dMB08a]. In the implementation of HiFrog, we query with
theory combination of EUF with LIA and EUF with LRA, with a core theory
solver to handle equalities and uninterpreted functions and a linear arithmetic
solver (a satellite solver based on the algorithm used in Yices [DdM06]) to handle
linear arithmetic.
2.3.4 Incremental solving
Incremental solving is a general approach in SAT and SMT solvers that allows
altering the constraints in the solver via push and pop operations between two dif-
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ferent checks for satisfiability. Incremental solving for verification is particularly
useful during the refinement of an over-approximating formula of the verifica-
tion problem when a relatively small part of the formula is changed between two
different checks for satisfiability. In this thesis, we use a semi-incremental or a
non-incremental solving mode in the OpenSMT2 SMT solver, and an incremen-
tal solving mode in the Z3 SMT solver.
2.4 Software Model Checking
One of the common and successful approaches for software verification is model
checking. Model checking automatically and systematically explores a finite-state-
model of software or hardware to determine whether the system meets all its re-
quirements. The requirements are given as a specification, in this thesis, as a set
of safety properties. As the focus of this thesis is verification of software, these
properties express that none of the error states is reachable during the execution
of the program. Examples of safety properties in software include buffer under-
and over-flow, division by zero, index array out of bounds, NULL pointer derefer-
encing, memory leaks, and race-conditions. Model checkers, given a specification,
can present a real counterexample when the model violates a safety property.
Software model checking often requires additional techniques to deal with per-
formance and the representation of real-world problems when represented as a
mathematical model. In this thesis, we represent the verification problem as a
finite formula, via SMT-based symbolic bounded model checking techniques. We
handle the state-explosion problem via abstraction and abstraction refinement
techniques for scaling the model checking applications to process much complex
and larger projects. The state explosion problem is the problem in which the size
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of the model grows exponentially. We describe the general flow in Fig. 2.6 and
dedicate the next sections to describing and defining each part in detail (Sec. 2.4.1
and Sec. 2.4.2); in Sec. 2.4.3, we describe the symbolic execution representation
and give details regarding the symbolic compiler we use in HiFrog.
Symbolic Compiler












✗ Property Violated 
+ Error Trace
? Unknown
Figure 2.6: SMT-based symbolic bounded model checker (general architecture).
2.4.1 Symbolic model checking
The formalism of symbolic model checking was presented originally with Binary
Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [BCM+92, McM93a] and later with SAT procedures
[BCCZ99, BCC+99], for a compact modelling of the verification problem. SAT
procedures with bounded model checking (BMC) for checking linear temporal logic
(LTL) formulas deals with the state-explosion problem in BDD-based symbolic
model checking by reducing the problem into propositional logic [BCCZ99].
We represent hardware or software system implicitly as a formula (e.g., in
temporal logic or first-order logic) based on the labelled transition system (LTS)
of the system represented as a Kripke structure [Kri59].
Kripke Structure. Let AP be the set of atomic propositions. A Kripke struc-
ture M = (S, I, R, L) represents the transition system, where
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• S is a finite set of the reachable states in the system.
• I is a subset of states in S that are initial states.
• R is a set of state transitions between states in S, thus R ⊆ S × S.
• L is a labelling function thus L : S → 2AP .
Note that, (i) the set of atomic propositions AP represents properties in the
system; (ii) the labelling function L maps the set of atomic propositions that
are true in s, for each s ∈ S; (iii) we represent the set of atomic propositions
as a Boolean function L : S → 2AP , where S are states in M and 2AP is a
Boolean string of 0s and 1s; and (iv) a path in M is an infinite sequence of states





Figure 2.7: A sketch to describe schematically the Kripke structure in Ex. 5.
Example 5. Fig. 2.7 describes an example of M = (S, I, R, L) with AP = {p, q}
and I = {s0}, S = {s0, s1, s2}, R = {(s0, s1), (s0, s2), (s1, s2), (s2, s2)}, and L maps
s0 to "01", s1 to "10", and s2 to "11".
Chapter 2 Preliminaries 31
In BDD-based symbolic model checking, we use temporal logic to model the
formula representing the system; in SAT-based symbolic model checking, we use
propositional logic with bounded model checking semantics instead. We define
the bounded model checking problem and discuss the reduction from BDD-based
symbolic model checking to SAT-based symbolic model checking in the next para-
graph; in Sec. 2.4.2 we describe SMT-based symbolic model checking, based on
SAT-based symbolic model checking. See Sec. 2.3.1 for the definition of first-order
logic; propositional logic is included in first-order logic but excludes non-logical
symbols, predicates about non-logical symbols, and quantifiers.
Bounded Model Checking. In Bounded Model Checking (BMC), we convert
a program P to a loop-free program P by unwinding all loops and recursive
calls up to a given bound. The approach constructs a model that is an under-
approximation of the behaviour of the program P . It is an under-approximation,
as bound model checking can only verify that the specification holds in the given
bound and not in general. In this thesis, we use the bounded model checking to
verify safety properties (assert statements) in C programs.
The bounded model checking problem is defined as follows; let P be a loop-free
program, k a predefined bound (k ∈ N), and t a safety property. We represent
P as a transition system M . The bounded model checking problem amounts
to determining whether all states of P , reachable within a predefined bound k,
satisfy t.
The BMC problem is determined by solving the BMC formula, which is the
problem’s encoding as a formula to a SAT solver. The BMC formula in proposi-
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R(si−1, si) ∧ (¬t). (2.1)
The first part of the formula in Eq. 2.1 represents the set of all execution of length
k in P . The second part of the formula in Eq. 2.1 is the negation of the safety
property, t. The reduction from Kripke structure for LTL formula to SAT-based
symbolic BMC is described in [BCCZ99], where LTL formula in bounded model
checking represents all possible path up to depth k, that is, all k-length prefixes.
A satisfying assignment of the BMC formula (from a SAT solver) is a concrete
example of a k-length execution path that violates t at some point. The bounded
model checker terminates once finds a counterexample, that is, a bounded ex-
ecution of P that falsifies t, or proves the absence of such executions within
the bound, that is, there is no satisfying assignment. Bounded model checkers
commonly repeat the checking with a larger k (k ∈ N) until either finding a real
counterexample or proving the specification holds in general. In our tool HiFrog,
this part can only be done manually.
The current implementation of HiFrog allows controlling the value of k as
an input only and offers no such automatic iterative deepening depth-first search
(DFS). We define the transition system for function summarization bounded
model checking in Sec. 2.5.1; the basic definition of the bounded model check-
ing problem stays the same. Next, we describe symbolic model checking with
SMT reasoning (instead of SAT).
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2.4.2 SMT-based symbolic model checking
The SMT-based model checking approach verifies the first-order formula and is
successful in verifying software in a scalable way. In this approach, the model
checker encodes all bounded executions of P as an SMT formula, conjoins it with
the negation of t as before (Eq. 2.1), and invokes an SMT solver to check the
satisfiability of the resulting formula. We describe P , a loop-free program and t
a safety property in first-order logic. That is, P is represented as a quantifier-free
first-order formula and t is a first-order formula over the variables of P . The
description of the state transition system M does not require now a Boolean
encoding of the states in S2, and AP is a set of literals based on predicates in
first-order logic.
In case that a first-order formula is deemed unsatisfiable, the program is safe,
that is, P satisfies t. Otherwise, a satisfying assignment found by the SMT solver
is used to build a concrete counterexample. Depending on the theory used by
the SMT solver, an abstract counterexample can also be spurious, that is, not
corresponding to any concrete execution. This situation arises when the theory
is too abstract, and hence the resulting over-approximation of the behaviours of
the program is too coarse as discussed in Sec. 2.2. In this case, the program is
re-verified with a different theory, a combination of theories or additional literals.
2.4.3 The static single assignment form
The Static Single Assignment (SSA) form [CFR+89, CFR+91] is a way to represent
code such that each variable is assigned exactly once. If a variable is declared
without any assignment, we refer its value as a non-deterministic value according
2We can represent the states and the initial states in the system as quantifier-free first-order
formulas.
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to its data-type. If a variable has been assigned more than once in the code, we
create several (enumerated) instances of the variable. For example, if an integer
variable ‘a’ first set as ‘5’ and then (later on) as ‘6’, we represent it as two different
assignments each is with a different enumerated instance of ‘a’: a#0 = 5; and a#1
= 6;. The symbol # states which instance of x it is in HiFrog. Other tools can
have a different symbol to represent the instance number.
In HiFrog, we use the USSA (Unwound Static Single Assignment) approx-
imation by converting the symbolic execution of the unwound program (up to
some bound) to its SSA representation. The symbolic execution is an interme-
diate goto-program, where all the loops and recursion calls are unwound to the
pre-determined number of iterations. The goto-program is created via the Goto-
CC symbolic compiler provided by the CPROVER framework [CKL04, cpr19]
and is an input usually to other verification tools as HiFrog. The Goto-CC
symbolic compiler [got19] supports the ANSI-C language (as it is in gcc compiler).
1 i n t main ( )
2 {
3 i n t a ;
4 whi le (1 )
5 {
6 a s s e r t ( a !=5) ;




Figure 2.8: Code example of a simple C program.
To demonstrate the different stages of encoding in HiFrog, we use a simple
C code in Fig. 2.8, with –unwind 4. The GOTO program in Fig. 2.9 and the
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USSA form in Fig. 2.10, are both tree-like expressions in HiFrog3, the printed
representation is merely for giving a general idea about each stage encoding.
main /* main */
signed int a;
1: IF !(1 != 0) THEN GOTO 2
ASSERT a != 5





Figure 2.9: The GOTO program of the code in Fig. 2.8.
/* Partition 1 */
|main::1::a!0#2| = |main::1::a!0#1| - 5
|main::1::a!0#3| = |main::1::a!0#2| - 5






Figure 2.10: The SSA representation of the code in Fig. 2.8 with USSA approx-
imation with unwind parameter equal to 4.
HiFrog prints a GOTO program representation by using the –show-program
option and the SSA representation in SMT-LIB2 [BST10] style by setting the
compilation flag DEBUG_SSA_PRINT to true.
2.5 Incremental Verification
In this thesis, we use incremental verification approach to verify different compo-
nents in the system in an incremental manner, wherein each cycle we prove the
3Since we first unwind the loops and then perform the function calls analysis (callee-caller).
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system correctness for a subset of components. Incremental verification allows us
to find a violation of the specification faster and to consume fewer resources by
re-verifying each cycle only part of the system.
We represent the specification as a set of safety properties t1, ..., tn. In each
cycle, we verify a single property and re-verify only the necessary components
for this property. That is, we construct from the symbolic execution a first-order
formula with the components required for proving the correctness of a safety prop-
erty ti (a single property from the set of properties). We replace any pre-visited
components with its over-approximation description, that is, with its function
summary. We verify each of the formulas for all properties, t1, ..., tn, and avoid re-
verification of components required for more than one property by using function
summaries. We describe function summaries in the next section.
Note that, we use the mechanism of function summary for incremental verifi-
cation in the thesis. Other techniques can be used instead of function summaries.
We discuss additioanl techniques in the context of incremental verification in
Chap. 3.
We use function summaries with the USSA approximation as a mean of incre-
mental verification in HiFrog, where each call of a recursion-free function is a
unique component in the system, and each assert statement is a single property.
Incremental verification in HiFrog includes the following steps:
• The specification of the software system is represented as a set of safety
properties, {t1, ..., tn}.
• We represent each function call with its function description as a component
in the system. We refer to each component as a partition.
• During each cycle, per safety property ti ∈ {t1, ..., tn}, we
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Solver


































Figure 2.11: SMT-based symbolic incremental bounded model checking archi-
tecture used in HiFrog.
– Update the representation of the software system to contain only the
required components for verifying ti (Fig. 2.11, Encoder). We apply
SSA slicing on the original symbolic execution to keep only the cur-
rently required components. SSA slicing retains only the variables in
the SSA representation with syntactic dependence on the variables in
ti.
– Check which components have a function summary (for pre-visited
components) and whether these components are affected. That is,
whether the function summary of each of these components is still
valid in the sliced SSA representation when trying to verify if ti holds
in P . The summary refiner in HiFrog discards any invalid function
summary and replaces it with the original description (Fig. 2.11, Re-
finer Engine). It is then necessary to re-verify each of the affected
components.
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– Verify new components and re-verify affected comportments with re-
spect to ti. We avoid re-verification of unaffected components by using
their valid function summaries (Fig. 2.11, Interpolating SMT Solver).
The steps above describe the main cycle in Fig. 2.11, that is, parser-encoder-
solver for each of the properties ti ∈ {t1, ..., tn}. The inner cycle encoder-solver-
refiner presents another aspect of incrementally in HiFrog, where we incremen-
tally and gradually adjust the representation of the current verification problem
(i.e., verifying whether ti holds in P ) via a counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement (CEGAR) framework. We discuss the inner cycle in more details in
Sec. 2.6.
2.5.1 Function summaries
Function summarization is a generic technique for abstracting programs. A func-
tion summary describes a component in the system. In software, it is usually a
function or a function call in the code. The summary is a formula on the input
and output conditions of the function that is reused and replaces the analysis of
pre-visited code to reduce time and space complexity of the code analysis.
In this thesis, we use function summaries as a mean of performing incremental
verification or abstraction of known or common (in a specific system) functions.
The verification task can be broken down as a sequence of smaller closely related
tasks, to cope better with the state explosion problem and to speed-up the current
verification task. The verification tasks are assert-statements in the code. The
summaries can be extracted from an unsatisfiable SMT formula of a successful
verification task and can be over-approximations of the actual behaviour of the
functions. We can then use these extracted function summaries for other verifi-
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cation tasks instead of analysing their code again. We describe this process in
HiFrog with a refinement of over-approximated summaries in Chap. 4, Sec. 4.2.
Modelling Programs with Function Summaries. In HiFrog, we model
programs in the context of (i) bounded model checking (we model only loop-
free programs) and (ii) satisfiability modulo theories (we need to support any
SMT theory) with functions summaries. It raises two major limitations: (a) the
functions summaries generated with HiFrog cannot represent functions with
infinite loops or recursions, and (b) we avoid defining new functions in SMT in
order to support theories other than EUF and its extensions. That is, we can still
use functions given as part of each theory, for example, it is still possible to use
"+" between two integers in LIA, but we cannot introduce new functions to LIA.
A solution for (b) is to assume all functions have no arguments and use global
variables instead, defined uniquely to each occurrence.
Example 6. To understand better the limitation and solution of (b), we use the
following code example.
1 i n t foo ( i n t inpu t )
2 {
3 r e tu rn ( inpu t < 0) ? 0 : inpu t++;
4 }
5
6 i n t main ( )
7 {
8 i n t x ;
9 i n t a=foo ( x ) ;
10 i n t b=foo ( a ) ;
11 a s s e r t ( b > 0) ;
12 }
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By using LIA, we prove the assert holds and thus, our function summary is in LIA.
However, pushing a definition of function foo to the solver, which is (declare-fun
|foo#0| (Int) Int), would only allow summaries expressed with a theory combina-
tion; in this example is EUF (to be able to define new functions) with LIA (to be able
to express < and +).
Our choice of implementation does not include theory combination.4 Instead, we
define input_#1 and input_#2 as global variables because we have two calls to function
foo. We set input_#1 to be x and input_#2 to be a (after the assignment on line 9).
We define function summaries in the context of SMT-based BMC as follows;
a loop-free program is a tuple P = (F,main), such that F is a finite set of non-
recursive functions, and main ∈ F is an entry point. Let set F̂ gather all function
calls from F , where f̂ is a call of function f . In F̂ we distinguish different calls
to the same function f by enumerating them as f̂1, . . . , f̂n. The set of state
transitions in the system is a subset of F̂ × F̂ and it models the function calls
relations (caller-callee relation) in the loop-free program P .
A summary of a function f is a relation over the input and output variables of
f that over-approximates the precise behaviour of f . That is, if a formula fprecise
encodes the body of f , and fsum encodes its summary, then fprecise =⇒ fsum
must hold.
We give a high-level description of function summaries and usage in HiFrog in
Chap. 4, Sec. 4.2. We formalize the description of function summaries and pro-
grams in more details in Chap. 8, Sec. 8.3.
4From my conversations with OpenSMT2’s developers, it is clear that theory combination
does not currently supported in OpenSMT2 and they were not sure whether this will be im-
plemented in the near future.
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2.5.2 User-defined function summaries
User-defined function summaries are encoded in SMT-LIB2 format for light-weight
theories (e.g., EUF, LRA and LIA) and use the easy-to-read by human nature of
SMT encoding to create high-level summaries to unsupported or complicated to
describe functions. Several examples of these functions can be isnan(), isinf()
or even % in C, which have no straight-forward support in SMT. Other examples
can contain more complicated functions, as trigonometric functions or math.h
implementation of other common mathematical functions.
The user-defined function summary can be described once and used later many
times as needed. The summaries shall be updated only if the definition or the
implementation of the function changes or if a summary refinement within the
theory (as we discuss in Chap. 4) or between theories (as we discuss in Chap. 8)
is required.
User-defined summaries can contain the actual definition of the function or an
over-approximation of it. For example, Fig. 2.12 is a user-defined summary of an
over-approximation of the expression of a property of the trigonometric functions





(|c::nonlin::?retval| Real) ) Bool
(= 1 |c::nonlin::?retval|)
)
Figure 2.12: UDS for sin2(x) + cos2(x) (over-approximated).
An example of a user-defined summary without approximation is shown in
Fig. 2.13, and is a user-defined summary of an expression of a property of the
trigonometric function cos: cos (−x) = cos x, where |_cos#0| is a function.





(|cos_neg::?retval| Int) ) Bool
(let ((?def274 |cos_neg::?retval|))
(let ((?def275 (= (|_cos#0| |cos_neg::a|) ?def274)))
(let ((?def276 (= (|_cos#0| (- |cos_neg::a|)) ?def274)))
(let ((?def277 (and ?def275 ?def276)))
?def277
)))))
Figure 2.13: UDS for cos (−x) = cos x.
We describe the usage of user-defined summaries in HiFrog in Chap. 4, extend
it to a library of summaries in Chap. 5, and further extend it to formulate a system
with a set of guarded literals based on these libraries in Chap. 6. Some examples
of user-defined summaries are available on HiFrog’s webpages [HiF17b, HiF19].
2.6 Abstraction Refinement in Model Checking
Abstraction is one of the most common approaches today for achieving efficiency
and better complexity in both modelling and solving of a verification task. The
abstraction aims to keep in the model only the relevant parts for proving the
correctness of a program and hence are capable of creating simpler and smaller
models at the cost of loss of information. These techniques may construct an
abstract description that is not expressive enough to determine the correctness of
a program as we discuss in Sec. 2.2. We use refinement to deal with this problem.
2.6.1 Counterexample-guided abstraction refinement
One of the most common approaches for dealing with an approximative model
is the Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) approach
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[CGJ+00, CGJ+03]. The CEGAR framework begins with verifying an approx-
imative model while iteratively refining it, until eliminating all spurious coun-
terexamples results. During each refinement iteration, the algorithm checks the
current model and performs a feasibility check of the current counterexample
whenever a violation is found. An infeasible counterexample is called spurious
counterexample and requires additional iterations of refinement; a feasible or a















Figure 2.14: General CEGAR loop.
In the SMT-based model checking approach followed in this thesis, the CEGAR
loop contains the following steps:
• Construct a first-order formula in EUF of the current verification problem,
that is, a program P with a safety property t (Fig. 2.14, construct a formula
stage during the first iteration of the refinement loop).
• Verify t in P via an SMT solver; the result is either UNSAT or SAT with
a counterexample CEX 5 (Fig. 2.14, check stage).
5The result can also be unknown; in that case, we treat it as SAT result with a spurious
counterexample and continue with the refinement.
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• Employ a feasibility check of the current counterexample each time the
solver reports a SAT result with a counterexample (Fig. 2.14, check feasibil-
ity stage); the check stage and the check feasibility stage can use a different
solver and different SMT theories to complete their tasks.
• Terminate the refinement once the solver returns UNSAT (that is, t
holds in P ) or once a counterexample passed the feasibility check (Fig. 2.14
reporting SAFE in green colour or Error trace in red colour). In the latter
case, the CEGAR algorithm generates an error trace based on the feasible
current counterexample.
• Continue the refinement as long as spurious counterexamples still ex-
ist (Fig. 2.14, refine stage) by constructing a refined first-order formula
(Fig. 2.14, construct a formula stage).
In the next chapters, we apply several abstraction techniques; we do symbolic
bounded model checking (Sec. 2.4), use function summaries for a modular descrip-
tion of components common to several tasks (Sec. 2.5.1), adapt SMT reasoning
framework for a high-level description of a model of the program (Sec. 2.3), and
often choose to abstract any non-elementary operators and functions description
from the model (Sec. 2.4.2). We then describe different techniques to refine the
first-order formula we initially construct based on the general steps above.
Chapter 3
Background
In this chapter, we discuss related work in the area of software verification and
model checking relevant to the work in this thesis in general. We start with a
review of the evolution of efficient model checking approaches (BDDs, symbolic
model checking, SAT solvers, and SMT solvers). Then we discuss in more details
the main techniques used in this thesis, as incremental approaches in verification,
function summaries for verification and abstraction refinement techniques in ver-
ification. We include a related work section to discuss the background of each of
the refinement techniques in Chap. 6, Chap. 7, and Chap. 8.
Model checking [EC80, CE82, QS82, CES86, CGP99] was developed inde-
pendently in the 1980s by Clarke and Emerson [EC80, CE82], and by Quielle
and Sifakis [QS82]. Different classes of methods of model checking have been
developed since then to better deal with the state explosion problem [CGJ+01,
CKNZ12] and with the computability problem [CGP99] in software model check-
ing [QS82, LP85, CES86, Cla97, JM09]. These have included various methods
and techniques for checking, modelling and specification.
In model checking, we can describe the specification (or system requirements)
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with a logical formula. Initially, the temporal model-checking algorithm [CE82,
QS82] used temporal logic specification [MO81, Boc82, KdR85, CES86, FCSM93]
for describing the requirements of the system. With the appearance of model
checking algorithms without BDDs [BCCZ99, BCC+99, BCC+03] originally with
SAT solvers and later on, with SMT solvers [DNS05]. The input for model check-
ing algorithms has described the specification in temporal logic, propositional logic
and first-order logic. In this thesis, the system requirements are safety properties
and are encoded as a first-order formula.
The original model checking algorithm was an explicit state algorithm [CES86,
CGP99, CG18], usually for hardware verification, though the method has also
been applied for software verification [HL91, Hol97, Ios01, ELLL04, JM04,
BBČ+06b, BEG+07, Hol11, vRAR11, BBH+13, CPR13].
Symbolic model checking was introduced later to handle the state explosion
problem better and has been able to perform model checking tasks with a large
number of states (initially, 1020 states and beyond) [BCM+92, McM93b]. The
algorithm [BCM+92, McM93a] was originally presented with Binary Decision Di-
agrams (BDDs) [Bry86]; e.g., the SMV model checker [McM93a], IBM’s model
checker RuleBase [BBEL96, BBDE+97], Bebop [BR00], Moped [ES01], Up-
paal2k [DA02] (with BDD’s extension for real-time systems), and Rabbit model
checker [BLN03]. Symbolic model checking without BDDs proposed using SAT
solvers instead of BDDs and presented the idea of SAT-based bounded model
checking in the late 90s [BCCZ99, BCC+99, CBRZ01, BCC+03] and SMT-based
bounded model checking almost a decade later [AMP06, AMP09]. An interest-
ing research direction of SAT-based symbolic model checking was investigating the
benefits of integration with BDDs [CCG+02, CGP+02] and presenting unbounded
symbolic model checking [McM02].
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In this thesis, we have used model checking techniques and created a model
checker described in Chap. 4 with all the additional refinement approaches we
introduced in Chap. 5-8 in the context of SMT-based symbolic bounded model
checking. We focus in the next paragraphs only on the related work in symbolic
bounded model checking and additional techniques for efficient software verifica-
tion. To better understand the scope of research related to software verification,
we discuss the verification tasks in software before that, briefly.
Model checking has been applied successfully to create reliable systems for
different verification problems in hardware [BCMD90, CLM91, CGH+93, JR11,
Bon16], embedded software [CC97, God97, SS01, DA02, BLN03, CFMS12] as real-
time systems [CC97, DA02, BLN03], satellite onboard software [AV14, GDH14],
robotic systems [God97, LVB+12, FBZ+18] and aviation [Cla97, GH02, TB08,
BVWW09, CGH+15], and general algorithmic software problems.
General algorithmic software [WSH+08, Com19, lib19, The19b] has been
linked to a wide range of software verification tasks such as software veri-
fication of concurrency and parallelism [QS82, LP85, CES86, GW93, Pel96,
BGP99, RDH03, AQR+04, QR05, RG05, BAM06, BBC+06a, WBKW07, VYY09,
MMN+12, AKT13, WKO13, Hua15, GKQT18], data structures and data-types
(e.g., arrays, bit-vectors, strings, integers and floats, and heaps) [BGP99, Ios01,
RDH03, IYG+05, PW05, JM07, KST+08, BB09, KST+09, VYY09, ABG+12,
CFMS12, KT14, CGI+18a], loops, recursion, and control flow in procedural pro-
grams [AY01, BR02b, ABE+05, AAB+07, KST+08, KST+09, DHKR11, SFS12a,
SFS12b, FS15, KGC16, ABE18], and buffer over-flow and under-flow detection,
NULL pointer dereferencing (and pointer-arithmetic in general) and memory
safety problems [BHJM05, BHMV05, CGM05, IYG+05, QR05, SISG06, JM07,
KST+08, KST+09, VYY09, MMN+12, WKO13, KT14, Hua15].
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In this thesis, we focused on verification problems in software and embedded
software. This included verification of code of drivers and operating system util-
ities and general algorithmic software. The verification problems were related to
different data types (bit-vectors, integers and floats), loops and recursion (in the
context of bounded model checking and summaries), and control flow problems.
In Chap. 4, we also dealt with over-flow and under-flow detection. The bench-
marks were written in C and were either crafted or taken from online sources, as
SV-COMP [Com16, Com18].
In the rest of this chapter, we focus on describing the recent research in software
model checking (focusing on bounded and symbolic model checking only) and
additional techniques to deal with the state explosion problem. We limit the
discussion here to techniques used in the thesis, that is, incremental verification
and abstraction (SMT modelling and function summaries).
Bounded model checking. Bounded model checking (BMC) was presented
originally in the late 90s by Biere et al. [BCCZ99, BCC+99] as a complemen-
tary technique to symbolic model checking with BDDs. It relied on SAT solvers
to exhaustively check the system up to a given limited depth. Hence, BMC is
inherently incomplete [VWM15, BK18]. With additional techniques, the tech-
nique is complete [VWM15, BK18], as k-induction [SSS00, DHKR11, BDW15,
RICB17, WDH19], interpolation [McM03, CMNQ06, CPP14], abstraction refine-
ment techniques [PBG05, CPP14, BDW15], and inductive techniques with iter-
ative strengthening [Bra11, EMB11]. In our work, we have adopted BMC as an
approximation of the verification problem with no additional technique.
The bounded model checking technique proposed using SAT solvers [BCCZ99,
BCC+99, CBRZ01, BCC+03] and later using SMT solvers [AMP06, AMP09], in-
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stead of BDDs to overcome the memory bottleneck required for storing and ma-
nipulating BDDs. However, verification techniques with SAT solvers, in general,
were already in use earlier (e.g., [SS90]); the idea of solving path constraints
with SAT solvers has been used before for planning [KS96]. The SMV model
checker [BCCZ99, BCC+99] was the first model checker to include an implemen-
tation of BMC for LTL formulas which later extended to CTL, LTL and PLTL
formulas in NuSMV [CCG+02].
Bounded model checking techniques have been using propositional logic for
modelling and specification description (e.g., [CKL04, CKSY05, KT14, SFS12a,
SFS12b, FCHS15]) and first-order logic with the advent of SMT solvers for soft-
ware verification [DNS05]. In our work, we integrated the old model checker
FunFrog for propositional logic support while adding a new set of algorithms
for modelling and specification with first-order logic; we implemented SMT-
based BMC, a technique which has been already used before, for example
in [AMP06, AMP09, CFMS12, RE14, CdLF16]).
In software BMC, we use the control flow graph (CFG) representation to com-
pute the transition relation with a transition system defined over the whole pro-
gram. We convert each block of statements into SSA and represent all the memory
operations as defined in hardware [DKW08].
We used in HiFrog the implementation of CPROVER framework for C code
for the flow described above, similarly to many other tools as CBMC, SATabs,
ESBMC, and JBMC. CBMC was the first implementation of BMC for C pro-
grams [KT14]. TCBMC, a SAT-based BMC, is a CBMC version for concurrent
programs developed by IBM [RG05], while Esbmc is an SMT-based context-BMC
with k-induction and invariants algorithms [CFMS12]. FunFrog, a SAT-based
BMC with function summaries for incremental verification, has applied a similar
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approach to our work [SFS12a, SFS12b]. Last, JBMC is a new bounded model
checking tool for verifying Java byte-code [CKK+18]. Our tool HiFrog is an
SMT-based BMC for sequential C programs with several additional techniques:
incremental solving, incremental verification with SMT summaries, and CEGAR.
While the majority of the tools has had support for CEGAR and other techniques
for refinement as well as incremental solving, none of the methods has applied all
the three techniques in the context of SMT-based BMC.
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT). The satisfiability modulo theories
(SMT) [DNS05] reasoning framework checks the satisfiability of first-order for-
mulas (usually in the SMT-LIB2 format [BST10]). The framework models
the problem in Boolean formulas a while expressing domain-specific knowledge
with first-order theories (e.g., arrays, fixed-size bit-vectors, uninterpreted func-
tion, arithmetic and quantifiers). SMT solvers were usually built on top of a
SAT solver as Grasp [SS96], Chaff [MMZ+01], zChaff [ZM02, Zha03], Min-
iSAT2 [ES04] and SATO [Zha97], or an SMT solver as MathSAT5 [CGSS13]
and Z3 [DMB08b].
SAT solvers have applied the modern implementation of the Davis–Putnam–L-
ogemann–Loveland (DPLL) algorithm [DP60, DLL62] for deciding the satisfiabil-
ity of a propositional logic formula. In this framework, the SMT solver repeatedly
tried to find a satisfying valuation for the SAT formula and checked consistency un-
der the domain-specific theory using a theory solver usually with lazy or eager ap-
proaches. Commonly, SMT solvers implemented the DPLL algorithm extension,
that is, the DPLL(T) framework [GHN+04, NOT06, NO05] for DPLL-based SMT
solving. For example, the SMT solvers Z3 [DMB08b] and MathSAT5 [CGSS13]
used this framework in their implementation. Lazy approaches have maintained
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a tight integration of the Boolean reasoning of a DPLL-style search with theory-
specific solvers; in Chap. 7, we implemented an eager approach, as the algorithm
flatten the problem directly to the main SAT solver.
Common SMT solvers for verification have included, for example, the fol-
lowing tools: OpenSMT2 [HMAS16], Z3 [DMB08b], CVC4 [BCD+11], Math-
SAT5 [CGSS13], raSAT [TVKO17], dreal [GKC13] and iSAT3 [FHT+07].
HiFrog implementation was mainly depending on the OpenSMT2 solver for
solving and interpolating. We sometimes used the Z3 solver for theory combina-
tion and full incremental verification solving (push and pop).
Incremental solving. Incremental SAT and SMT solvers [Hoo93, WKS01,
ES04, DMB08b, BPST10, BCD+11, CGSS13, NRS14, HMAS16] have imple-
mented different approaches and allowed to alter the constraints in the solver
via push and pop operations in between two different checks for satisfiabil-
ity. These approaches have assisted in improving performance and dealing with
more complex problems, mainly when required to solve a set of related formu-
las [Sht01, WKS01, ES03, CLM+10, EMA10, FCN+10, Wie14, SKB+17].
In this thesis, we have utilised the incremental solving support of the SMT
solver only when adding new assert statements, except in LB-CEGAR. In Chap. 6,
the implementation of LB-CEGAR has leveraged incremental solving techniques
in the solvers to speed-up the solving time between two refinement cycles of (same
or contained) sub-domains of values and avoid initialising the solver once starting
the refinement of a new sub-domain of values.
Incremental verification. Incremental verification has been extensively re-
searched in domains such as hardware verification, deductive verification, and
model checking. The CPAchecker [CPA19, BK11] tool has been able to mi-
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grate predicates across program versions [BLN+13]. Deductive verification tools
such as Viper and Dafny offered modular verification [MSS16] and caching the
intermediate verification results [LW15] respectively.
CBMC [KT14, SKB+17] is a symbolic bounded model checker for C that to a
limited extent exploited incremental capabilities of a SAT solver but did not use
or output any reusable information like function summaries. Similar to HiFrog,
Esbmc [CFMS12] also shared the CPROVER [CKL04, cpr19] infrastructure and
is based on an SMT solver. To the best of our knowledge, it did not support in-
cremental verification [CdLF16]. FunFrog [SFS12a, SFS12b], the model check-
ing tool HiFrog built on top of, used an approach for extracting and reusing
interpolation-based function summaries in the context of SAT-based bounded
model checking. Unlike HiFrog, the work in FunFrog focused only on propo-
sitional logic and did not consider the rich field of first-order theories available
in modern SMT solvers. Hence, despite behaving incrementally, FunFrog was
expensive in many cases in practice. Kind [KGTW12, GBW+18] model checker
has dealt with verification of multiple safety properties of synchronous systems by
allowing the simultaneous verification of multiple properties incrementally. That
is, when each property has proven valid, the tool immediately used its invariant
to aid the verification process. Unlike Kind, HiFrog has not been support-
ing simultaneous verification of properties; however, we find this work interesting
and relevant to the work in this thesis, especially since OpenSMT2 had recently
applied algorithms for parallel and Distributed solving [HMAS16, MHS18].
Function summaries and interpolation. Function summaries date back to
Hoare logic [Hoa71], where a pair of pre-condition and post-condition can be seen
as an over-approximating function summary. Function summaries have been com-
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puted using algorithms for constructing Craig interpolants [Cra57, Hua95, Kra97,
Pud97, McM05, DKPW10, RAF+13], symbolic path formulas [God07, AGT08],
data-flow analysis [RHS95, BR00, BKW07], and iterative discovery of modification
of variable values, used in model checkers Saturn [XA05] and Calysto [BH08].
In this thesis, function summaries are either extracted manually (i.e., user-defined
summaries) or computed via Craig interpolants.
Interpolation-based function summarization framework has already been ap-
plied in static and dynamic analysis and in software verification [HHP10, McM10,
AGC12, SFS12a, SFS12b, SSCS12, KHK19]. FunFrog [SFS12a, SFS12b] used
over-approximated function summaries constructed via Craig interpolation in a
SAT-based incremental checking framework, and eVolCheck [FSS13] applied a
similar approach for SAT-based incremental upgrade checking. FOCAL [KHK19]
constructed and refined under-approximate of function summaries using Craig in-
terpolants as refining constraints for verification via concolic testing. In this thesis,
we used over-approximated function summaries as first-order formulas to aid the
verification process in incremental model checking framework.
McMillan introduced the first application of interpolants in formal verifica-
tion [McM03]. Since then, interpolation has been applied in algorithms with
various extensions in model checking [CMNQ06, EKS06, McM06, VG09, HHP10,
KW11, ABG+12, AM13, RHK13, CPP14, McM14, VGM15, FSS17, FB18, IX18,
IX19]. The model checkers CPAchecker [BK11], SeaHorn [GKKN15], Ulti-
mate Automizer [HCD+18] and others, leveraged interpolants in some form.
In this thesis, we leveraged interpolants only for constructing function summaries
from a successful verification of valid properties; interpolants for first-order for-
mulas were the actual SMT summaries used in our framework.
In this thesis, we applied different interpolation algorithms as means of abstrac-
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tion. These interpolation algorithms constructed interpolants of different strength
and size for different theories via the LIS framework [DKPW10]. The labelled
interpolation system (LIS) framework computes interpolants given a refutation
and a labelling function [Hua95, Kra97, Pud97, McM05, DKPW10, RAF+13]. In
this thesis, we used the LIS framework in [DKPW10], including the Proof-Sensitive
interpolation algorithms [AFHS15] for propositional logic interpolation. We used a
EUF interpolation algorithm with duality-based interpolation [AHAS17]; a similar
extension was applied to the interpolation algorithm for LRA based on [McM05].
LIA had no interpolation algorithm in HiFrog.
Abstraction and abstraction refinement. Verification by abstraction is a
class of techniques for verifying large systems and software (e.g., [CC77, CC79,
CGL94, CIY95, LGS+95, GS97, CU98, CGJ+00, CCK+02, CGJ+03, CKSY05,
GS05, BBB+10, EMA10, CCM12, WKO13, RNO14, HCR+16, KIY16, DG18]).
Abstraction in model checking [CGL94, DG18] has intended to reduce the size of
the model [DGG93, CGL94] for verifying larger systems (e.g., [CGL94, BBB+10,
SKB+17]). These approaches traded precision for efficiency, which caused false
results in case the abstraction failed to capture the relevant behaviour required
either for finding the bug or proving correctness.
In model checking, this problem has been dealt with abstraction refinement
(e.g., [CGJ+00, CCK+02, CGJ+03, CKSY05, GS05, EKS06, JM07, KKNP09,
RNO14, LMN15, DG18]). The counterexample-guided abstraction refine-
ment (CEGAR) [CGJ+00, CGJ+03] is a common and successful approach for
abstraction-refinement in model checking [BR02a, CKSY05, GS05, EKS06, JM07,
WBKW07, HWZ08, BLR11, KSU11, OR11, LMN15, HM19]. Iterative refinement
of the abstract model to eliminate the current counterexample, was proposed as
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localization reduction in [Kur94, AIKY95], and only later generalised into the
CEGAR approach [CGJ+00, Saï00, BR02a, CGJ+03]. We applied the CEGAR
approach in this thesis in all the refinement algorithms we have presented, some-
times with slight modifications.
Slam [BR02a, BLR11] was the first model checker implemented CEGAR ap-
proach combined with BDD-based model checking [BR00, BR02a]. The Blast
model checker implemented lazy abstraction, which is an optimization of CE-
GAR [CCG+04, BHJM07]. The F-Soft [IYG+05] model checker combined
CEGAR-based predicate abstraction refinement with other verification techniques
to check standard runtime errors in C programs as buffer overflows, and null
dereferences. Other tools combined CEGAR with SAT-based model checking as
Magic [EKS06] and SATabs [CKSY05]. We applied CEGAR in an SMT-based
verification approach similar to [HWZ08, Arm09, BW12, CNR13, LMN15, BD16,






Function summarization can be used as a means of incremental verification based
on the structure of the program. In this chapter, we present HiFrog, a function-
summarization-based model checker that uses SMT as the modelling and summa-
rization language.
The HiFrog model checker supports four encoding precisions through SMT:
uninterpreted functions, linear real arithmetic, linear integer arithmetic, and
propositional logic. In addition, the tool allows an optimized traversal of reach-
ability properties, counterexample-guided summary refinement, summary com-
pression, and user-provided summaries. We describe the use of the tool through
the description of its architecture and a rich set of features. The description is
complemented by an experimental evaluation on the practical impact the different
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SMT precisions have on model checking. The tool together with a comprehensive
demo is available at http://verify.inf.usi.ch/hifrog.
4.1 Introduction
Incremental verification addresses the unique opportunities and challenges that
arise when a verification task can be performed in an incremental way, as a se-
quence of smaller closely related tasks. We present an implementation of the in-
cremental verification of software with assertions that uses the insights obtained
from a successful verification of earlier assertions. As a fundamental building
block in storing the insights we use function summaries known to provide speed-
up through localizing and modularizing verification [SFS12a, RAF+13].
We describe in this chapter the HiFrog verification tool that uses Craig inter-
polation [Cra57] in the context of Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [BCCZ99] for
constructing function summaries. The novelty of the tool is in the unique way it
combines function summaries with the expressiveness of satisfiability modulo theo-
ries (SMT). The system currently supports verification based on the quantifier-free
theories of LRA and EUF, in addition to propositional logic (BOOL).1 Compared
to our earlier propositional tool FunFrog [SFS12a], the SMT summaries are
smaller and more efficient in verification. They are also often significantly more
human-readable, enabling their easier reuse, as well as injection of summaries pro-
vided directly by the user. The difference is due to the propositional summaries
being based on correctness proofs over circuit-level representation of arithmetic
operations. Theory encoding instead directly uses arithmetic symbols in the sum-
maries. In addition, the tool offers a rich set of features such as verification of
1There is a partial implementation of modelling LIA in HiFrog but without the functionality
described in this chapter, hence omitted.

























































Figure 4.1: HiFrog: tool overview.
recursive programs, different ways of optimizing the summaries with respect to
both size and strength, efficient heuristics for removing redundant safety proper-
ties, and easy-to-understand witnesses of property violations that can be directly
mapped to bugs in the source code.
4.2 Tool Overview
HiFrog consists of two main components SMT encoder and interpolating SMT
solver, and the function summaries described in Fig. 4.1, where the grey and
black arrows connect different modules of the tool (dashed - optional) and the
blue arrows represent the flow of the input/output data. The components are
initially configured with the theory and the interpolation algorithms. The tool
then processes assertions sequentially using function summaries when possible.
The results of a successful assertion verification are stored as interpolated function
summaries, and failed verifications trigger a refinement phase or the printing of
an error trace. This section details the tool features.
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4.2.1 Preprocessing
The source code is parsed and transformed into an intermediate goto-program
using the Goto-CC [cpr19] symbolic compiler. The loops are unwound to the
pre-determined number of iterations. HiFrog identifies the set of assertions from
the source code, reads the user-defined function summaries (if any) in the SMT-
LIB2-format, and makes them available for the subsequent analysis.
4.2.2 SMT encoding and function summarisation
For a given assertion, the goto-program is symbolically executed function-
per-function resulting in the “modular” Static Single Assignment (SSA)
form [CFR+89, CFR+91] of the unwound program, i.e., a form where each
function has its own isolated SSA-representation. To reduce the size of the ex-
pression in an SSA form, HiFrog performs backward SSA-slicing that keeps only
the variables in the SSA form that are syntactically dependent on the variables
in the assertion.
When the SSA form is pruned, HiFrog creates the SMT formula in the pre-
determined logic (BOOL, EUF, LRA or LIA). The modularity of the SSA form
comes in handy when the function summaries of the chosen logic (either user-
defined, interpolation-based, or treated non-deterministically) are available. If
this is the case, the call to a function with the available summary is replaced by
the summary. The final SMT formula is pushed to an SMT solver to decide its
satisfiability.
Due to the over-approximating nature of function summaries, the program
encoded with the summaries may contain spurious errors. The summary refiner
identifies and marks summaries directly involved in the detected error; HiFrog
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returns to the encoding stage to replace the marked summaries by the precise
(up to the pre-determined logic) function representations. Note that due to re-
finement, HiFrog reveals nested function calls (including recursive ones) which
are again replaced by available summaries. For an unsatisfiable SMT formula,
HiFrog extracts function summaries using interpolation. The extracted sum-
maries are serialized in a persistent storage so that they are available for other
HiFrog runs.
For a more detailed description regarding function summaries in bounded
model checking, see [SFS12a, SFS12b]. Currently HiFrog supports three encod-
ing precisions for interpolant-based function summaries: Uninterpreted Functions
(QF_UF), Linear Real Arithmetic (QF_LRA), and Propositional Logic; Lin-
ear Integer Arithmetic (QF_LIA) has a partial support in HiFrog. Examples of
function summaries with detailed technical explanations are available at [HiF17b].
4.2.3 User-defined summaries in HiFrog
We allow incorporating function summaries into the verification process of
HiFrog. Above we described function summaries that are Craig inter-
polants [Cra57] from one of the previous iterations of model checking. We also
allow the user to supply user-defined summaries, based on their external knowl-
edge of the system.
User-defined summaries follows the same form of function summaries, we treat
function summaries and user-defined summaries in the same way when loading the
summaries and while using these summaries for the current verification task. It is
possible to provide to HiFrog a library of user-defined summaries; the whole set
of summaries is uploaded to the SMT solver at once where each of the summaries
is treated in the same way as any function summaries by the SMT solver.
Chapter 4 SMT-based Function Summarization for Software Verification 61
We model user-defined summaries with the quantifier-free SMT theories for
equality logic with uninterpreted functions (EUF), linear integer arithmetic (LIA),
and linear real arithmetic (LRA). We refer both, function summaries and user-
defined summaries as SMT summaries when modelled with SMT logics.
4.2.4 Theories
HiFrog supports four different quantifier-free theories in which the program can
be modelled: bit-precise BOOL, EUF, LIA, and LRA. The use of theories beyond
BOOL allows the system to scale to larger problems since encoding in particu-
lar the arithmetic operations using bit-precision can be very expensive. As the
precise arithmetics often do not play a role in the correctness of the program,
substituting them with linear arithmetics, uninterpreted functions, or even non-
deterministic behaviour might result in a significant reduction in model checking
time (see Sec. 4.3). If a property is proved using one of the light-weight theories
EUF, LRA and LIA, the proof holds also for the exact BMC encoding of the
program. However, the loss of precision can sometimes produce spurious coun-
terexamples due to the over-approximating encoding. The light-weight theories
therefore need to be refined (that is, using theory refiner) to BOOL if the provided
counterexample does not correspond to a concrete counterexample.
In Chap, 7, we present a process to refine the precision automatically.
4.2.5 Obtaining summaries by interpolation
HiFrog relies on different interpolation frameworks for the different theories it
supports. As a result, the generation of propositional, EUF and LRA interpolants
can be controlled with respect to strength and size by specifying an interpolation
algorithm for a theory; LIA has currently no interpolation algorithm available
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in HiFrog. For propositional logic we provide the Labelled Interpolation Sys-
tems [DKPW10] including the Proof-Sensitive interpolation algorithms [AFHS15].
Interpolation for EUF is implemented with duality-based interpolation [AHAS17],
and a similar extension is applied to the interpolation algorithm for LRA based
on [McM05]. HiFrog also provides a range of techniques to reduce the size
of the generated interpolants through removing redundancies in propositional
proofs [RAF+13]: the algorithms RecyclePivotsWithIntersection and LowerUnits,
structural hashing, and a set of local rewriting rules.
4.2.6 Assertion optimizer
In addition to incremental verification of a set of assertions, HiFrog supports
the basic functionality of classical model checkers to verify all assertions at once.
For the cases when the set of assertions is too large, it can be optimized by con-
structing an assertion implication relation and exploiting it to remove redundant
assertions [FCHS15]. In a nutshell, the assertion optimizer considers pairs of spa-
tially close assertions ai and aj and uses the SMT solver to check if ai conjoined
with the code between ai and aj implies aj (if there is any other assertion between
ai and aj then it is treated as assumption). If the check succeeds, then aj is proven
redundant and its verification can be safely skipped.
4.3 HiFrog Usage
We provide a Linux binary of HiFrog reading as input a C-program, assertions
to be verified, a set of parameters and the interpolated or user-defined function
summaries in the SMT-LIB2 format.
HiFrog exploits the CPROVER framework [CKL04] and inherits some of
Chapter 4 SMT-based Function Summarization for Software Verification 63
its options (e.g., –unwind for the loop unrolling, –show-claims and –claim for
managing the assertions checks); the ability for the user to declare and to use a
nondet_TYPE() function of a specific numerical type (e.g., int, char, long, double,
unsigned, in LRA and int, char, long, in LIA) or add a __CPROVER_assume()
statement to limit the domain to a specific range of values.
HiFrog uses EUF by default but can be switched to LRA, LIA or proposi-
tional logic via the –logic option. HiFrog uses a variety of interpolation and
proof compression algorithms to control the precision (with –itp-uf-algorithm
option for EUF, –itp-lra-algorithm option for LRA, and –itp-algorithm op-
tion for propositional interpolation) and the size (with –reduce-proof) of sum-
maries. The summary storage is controlled using the –save-summaries and
–load-summaries options. In between verification runs, the summaries con-
tained in the corresponding files for EUF and LRA might be edited manually.
Finally, HiFrog supports the identification and reporting of redundant asser-
tions with –claims-opt, a useful feature for some automatically generated asser-
tions [FCHS15].
At the end of each verification run, HiFrog either reports VERIFICATION
SUCCESSFUL or VERIFICATION FAILED accompanied by an error trace. An error
trace presents a sequence of steps with a direct reference to the code and the
values of variables in these steps. In most cases when EUF and LRA introduce
a spurious error, HiFrog outputs a warning, and thus the user is advised to use
HiFrog with a more precise theory. HiFrog also reports the statistics on the
running time and the number of the summary-refinements performed.
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Figure 4.2: Running time by BOOL against EUF and LRA.
4.4 Experimental Results
We evaluated HiFrog on a large set of C programs coming from both academic
and industrial sources such as SV-COMP [Com16]. All benchmarks contained
multiple assertions to be verified. To demonstrate the advantages of the SMT-
based summarisation, we provide data for analysis of benchmarks containing 1086
assertions from which 478 were proven to hold using BOOL (meaning that those
properties satisfy the system specifications with propositional logic and it is the
highest number of instances we can prove to hold using the current implementation
of HiFrog with BOOL defined to be the most precise theory).
Fig. 4.2 presents two logarithmic plots for comparison of running times of
HiFrog with BOOL to respectively EUF and LRA. Each point represents a pair
of verification runs of a holding assertion with the two corresponding theories
using the interpolation-based summaries. For most of the assertions, the verifi-
cation with EUF and LRA is an order of magnitude faster than the verification
with BOOL. Even despite the over-approximating nature of EUF and LRA, our
experiments witnessed a large amount of properties which were also proven to be
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Table 4.1: Benchmarks UNSAT-solved assertions with BOOL, LRA and UF.





token.c 34 34 34
s3.c 27 19 22
mem.c 97 97 97
disk.c 23 7 15
ddv.c 143 47 47
cafe.c 30 15 20
tcas-asert.c 30 17 30
P2P.c 94 8 67
Total (8 cases) 478 (100%) 244 (51.05%) 332 (69.45%)
correct by employing the light-weight theories of HiFrog (namely, 51.05% and
69.45% of validated properties out of 478 for EUF and LRA respectively) 2.
We applied statistical tests to more rigorously analyse the results above.
Statistical Tests of the Efficiency of HiFrog. We hypothesised that asser-
tions proved to hold by BOOL and HiFrog (with EUF or LRA) had no significant
difference in terms of time consumption (our null hypothesis). We focused on the
UNSAT results when analysing our tool efficiency because it would be a challeng-
ing target to prove safety than to find a counterexample with first-order logic in
comparison to propositional logic. We justified our choice of the null hypothe-
sis when we considered both the quality of HiFrog’s implementation and the
characteristic of SMT-solvers in general; on the one hand, we evaluated HiFrog
in this chapter with its early implementation known for its poor performance
(time and memory), but on the other hand, SMT-solvers are known to speed up
computations in comparison to SAT solvers.
We applied the statistical test on eight benchmarks with multiple assertions
2From the evaluation of light-weight theories in this chapter, we omitted the refer-
ence to LIA. Since, it currently has no interpolation nor function summaries support
in OpenSMT2 and HiFrog.
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Figure 4.3: Graphical description of statistical analyses with Wilcoxon test
on reducing the solving time of pair of assertions in benchmarks, presented as
histograms of means ± SEM and labels: (**)P < 0.0001, (*)P = 0.0018, (***)P
= 0.0088, (****)P = 0.0078 and (ns)P not significant. A: (EUF,BOOL) and B:
(LRA,BOOL).
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(the exact number of assertions are in Table 4.1) for performance comparison of
UNSAT results, and we sampled the runtime in second. The majority of the data
sets did not pass the normality test; all failed except three sets of samples: disk.c
(EUF), cafe.c (LRA) and P2P.c (EUF). Therefore, we applied the Wilcoxon test
(a non-parametric t-test). Our goal was to test which method was faster, that is,
the method with the smaller mean value, when there was a significant statistical
difference (per benchmark).
Figure 4.3 presents the results of the statistical analyses with Wilcoxon test
(fully-paired, two-tailed) as histograms of the mean value (in seconds) with Stan-
dard Error Mean (SEM), where statistically significant p-value at ≤ 0.05, label A
for EUF and BOOL’s comparison, and label B for LRA and BOOL’s comparison.
The results of HiFrog with either EUF or LRA are always on the right bar.
We observed a signification difference in all sets in A and B except disk.c
with (EUF, BOOL), where for all benchmarks the mean value of solving time of
an assertion was smaller with HiFrog (EUF, LRA) than with BOOL except for
mem.c (EUF, BOOL). SEM was relatively small in all histograms’ right bars (EUF
and LRA) except token.c with (LRA, BOOL), unlike the left bars (token.c,
disk.c, tcas-asert.c with (EUF, BOOL), and P2P.c with (EUF, BOOL)),
which might indicate some sort of a common-case optimization implementation
in BOOL. To summarize the results, six out of eight benchmarks in set A and all
eight benchmarks in set B demonstrated a significant reduction in the average-
time of proving assertion correctness.
The analysis of those experiments’ results revealed that model checking us-
ing the EUF and LRA-based summarisation was extremely efficient in proving
correctness of assertions.
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Experiment settings. The timing results were obtained on an Ubuntu 14.04.1
LTS server running two Intel(R) Xeon(R) E5620 CPUs@2.40GHz and 16GB
RAM. We prepared a pre-compiled Linux-binary available at the Virtual Machine
at http://verify.inf.usi.ch/hifrog/binary; our benchmarks set is available
at http://verify.inf.usi.ch/hifrog/bench and can facilitate the property






In this, chapter we present an algorithm for bounded model checking with SMT
solvers of programs with library functions — either standard or user-defined.
Typically, if the program correctness depends on the output of a library function,
the model checking process either treats this function as an uninterpreted function
or is required to use a theory under which the function in question is fully defined.
The former approach leads to numerous spurious counterexamples, whereas the
latter faces the danger of the state-explosion problem, where the resulting formula
is too large to be solved by means of modern SMT solvers.
We extend the approach of user-defined summaries and propose to represent
the set of existing summaries for a given library function as a lattice of subsets of
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summaries, with the meet and join operations defined as intersection and union,
respectively. The refinement process is then triggered by the lattice traversal,
where in each element the SMT solver uses the subset of SMT summaries stored
in this element to search for a satisfying assignment. The direction of the traversal
is determined by the results of the concretization of an abstract counterexample
obtained at the current element. Our experimental results demonstrate that this
approach allows solving a number of instances that were previously unsolvable by
the existing bounded model checkers.
5.1 Introduction
SMT-based BMC amounts to verifying correctness of a given program within the
given a bound on the maximal number of loop iterations and recursion depth,
with the model and specification expressed in first-order logic. Successful ver-
ification of software relies on finding an expressive model to capture software’s
behaviours relevant to correctness but sufficiently high-level to prevent the rea-
soning from becoming prohibitively expensive — the process known as theory
refinement [HAE+17]. However, balancing between performance and the model’s
level of abstraction is a challenging task, as more precise theories are usually more
expensive computationally. Moreover, often there is no need to refine the theory
for the whole program. As the modern approach to software development encour-
ages modular development and re-use of components, programs increasingly use
library functions, defined elsewhere. If the correctness of the program depends
on the implementation of the library (or user-defined) functions, there is a need
for a modular approach that allows us to refine only the relevant functions. Yet,
currently, the theory refinement is not performed on the granularity level of a sin-
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gle function, hence BMC of even simple programs can result in a state explosion,
especially if the library function is called inside a loop.
In this chapter, we introduce an approach to efficient SMT-based bounded
model checking with lattices of summaries for library functions. Each lattice con-
tains summaries of a library function, and a summary is an equation or inequality
of a library function property. Roughly speaking, the lattice is a subset lattice,
where each element represents a subset of equations and inequalities that hold for
some subset of inputs to the function; the join and meet operators are defined as
union and intersection, respectively. The counterexample-guided abstraction re-
finement (CEGAR) [CGJ+00, CGJ+03] approach that we describe in this chapter
is lattice-based, is triggered by a traversal of the lattice, and the CEGAR loop is
repeated until one of the following outcomes occurs: (i) we prove correctness of
the bounded program (that is, absence of concrete counterexamples), (ii) we find a
concrete counterexample, or (iii) the current theory together with the summaries
in the lattice is determined insufficient for reaching a conclusion.
The following motivational example illustrates the use of lattices with LIA
(quantifier-free linear integer arithmetic) encoding and integer arithmetic theory.
Example 7. The code example in Fig. 5.1 describes the greatest common divisor
(GCD) algorithm. We assume that both inputs are positive integers. The program
is safe with respect to the assertion g ≤ x. However, with the problem encoded
with the first-order logic modulo Linear Integer Arithmetic (LIA), an SMT solver
cannot prove the correctness of the program, as GCD is not expressible in linear
arithmetic. The standard approach is to have gcd(x, y) assume any integer value;
thus, attempting to verify this program with an SMT solver with LIA results in
an infinite number of spurious counterexamples.
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1 i n t gcd ( i n t x , i n t y )
2 {
3 i n t tmp ;
4 whi le ( y != 0) {
5 tmp = x%y ;
6 x=y ;
7 y=tmp ; }
8 re turn x ;
9 }
1 i n t main ( void )
2 {
3 i n t x=45;
4 i n t y=18;
5 i n t g = gcd (x , y ) ;
6
7 a s s e r t ( g <= x) ;
8 }
Figure 5.1: The GCD program using modulo function.
In the example, we augment the solver with a set of equations and inequalities
of properties of the modulo function, arranged in a lattice of summaries1. These
equations and inequalities are taken from an existing set of lemmas and theorems
of the Coq proof assistant [The19a] for a%n:
f1 ≡ z_mod_mult ≡
≡ a mod n = 0 with the assumption a == x ∗ n for some positive integer x;
f2 ≡ z_mod_pos_bound ∧ z_mod_unique ≡
≡ (0 ≤ a mod n < n) ∧ (0 ≤ r < n =⇒ a = n ∗ q + r =⇒ r = a mod n)
for some positive integers r and q, with the assumption (n > 0) ∧ (a 6= x ∗ n);
f3 ≡ z_mod_remainder ∧ z_mod_unique_full ≡
≡ (n 6= 0 =⇒ (0 ≤ a mod n < n ∨ n < a mod n ≤ 0)) ∧ ((0 ≤ r < n ∨ n < r ≤ 0)
=⇒ a = b ∗ q + r =⇒ r = a mod n) with the assumption true.
The assumptions are different from the original guards in [The19a], as these are
1The order of introducing properties is significant but different for each program. Since there
is no set of properties, which all programs with modulo likely require for proving correctness,
using one specific order for prioritizing some of the properties, is meaningless. Moreover, it can
have a negative effect on the performance of the model checker if ignoring the size and complexity
of the properties’ expressions in the solver. On the other hand, our solution is general to all
programs with modulo operator occurrences.
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re-written during the construction of the lattice. Assumptions of elements can be
re-written to eliminate the case where two or more assumptions of elements of a
unique meet, refer to the same input value.
The original subset lattice consists of all subsets of the set {f1, f2, f3}. It is
analysed and reduced as described in Sec. 5.4 to remove equations and inequalities
with contradicting assumptions2 and equivalent elements. In this example, the
set {f3} generalises {f1} t {f2}. Figure 5.2 shows the original subset lattice on
the left, and the resulting meet semi-lattice on the right. Note that, we construct
the meet semi-lattice of the modulo library function once and use the semi-lattice
each time we verify a program with this library function. In the evaluation, we
demonstrate the above with a larger set of summaries.
{ f1 }




{ f1, f3 } { f2, f3 }





Figure 5.2: Diagrams of original subset lattice and reduced semi-lattice (modulo
function).
In the lattice traversal, we start from the bottom element ∅ and traverse the
semi-lattice until we either prove that the program is safe or find a real counterex-
ample (or show that a further theory refinement is needed). In this example, we
traverse the lattice until the element {f3}, which is sufficient to prove that the
2For example: assume(t > 0) and assume(t < 0) are contradicting assumptions, since the
conjunction of (t > 0) and (t < 0) is false.
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program is safe. Specifically, the equation f1 is used to prove loop termination,
and the equation f2 is used to prove the assert statement.
Our algorithms are implemented in the SMT-based bounded model checker
HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]) supporting a subset of the C language and us-
ing the OpenSMT2 SMT solver [HMAS16] and the Z3 [DMB08b] SMT solver.
We demonstrate the lattice construction on sets of equations and inequalities of
the modulo function. The summaries for the lattice construction are obtained
from the built-in theorems and statements in the Coq proof assistant [The19a].
Our preliminary experimental results show that our approach can avoid the
state-explosion problem and successfully solve programs that are not solvable us-
ing the standard CEGAR approach. Our set of benchmarks is a mix of our own
crafted benchmarks and benchmarks from the software verification competition
SV-COMP [Com18]. The lattices are constructed using data from an indepen-
dent source, and we show that even with a relatively small lattice we can verify
benchmarks which either are impossible to verify in less precise theories or are
too expensive to verify with the precise definition.
The scripts, the source code, HiFrog tool, and lattices and programs used in
our experiments, are available at [Git19a, Git19b, HiF19].
5.2 Preliminaries
We exploit the functionality of SMT function summaries by providing the SMT-
based model checker HiFrog (Sec. 2.4.2 and Sec. 4) with a library of user-defined
summaries (Sec. 2.5.1 and Sec. 4.2.3) to organize a set of equations and inequalities
of properties of a library function in a lattice of guarded literals (literals are defined
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in Sec. 2.3.1). We discuss the solution and its data structure in detail in the next
section. See Sec. 2.1 for general definitions of a poset, a lattice and a semi-lattice.
5.3 Overview of the Solution
In this section, we describe our suggested lattice-based counterexample-guided
abstraction refinement in bounded model checking (LB-CEGAR-BMC) approach
for verification of programs with library functions. In Sec. 5.3.2, we discuss the
general solution and focus on the modifications in the refinement loop in the
original CEGAR approach (see Sec. 2.6.1, Fig. 2.14).
We discuss the lattice of guarded literals used in the LB-CEGAR-BMC ap-
proach in the next section.
5.3.1 Lattices of guarded literals
In this section we describe the construction of lattices of expressions for external
functions.
We consider a subset lattice SL(X) and 〈SL(X),u〉 and its reduce meet semi-
lattice 〈L,u〉, for X being a finite set of guarded expressions, as defined next.
A guarded literal is a Boolean expression describing some property of the func-
tion in question, together with the guard that defines a continuous subdomain of
the inputs for which this property holds. For example, the property expressing
the fact that for 0 < x < 2, the value of sin x is positive is described by the
guarded literal
(assume(0 < x < 2)) ∧ (sin x > 0),
where (0 < x < 2) is a guard of the literal (sin x > 0). Literals that hold for all
x (such as, for example, (sin x ≤ 1) are guarded with assume(true)). A guard
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cannot refer to a non-continuous domain. For example,
(assume(0 < x < 2) ∨ (7 < x < 8)) ∧ (sin x > 0)
is not a legal guarded literal in our framework.
Given a set of guarded literals F for a library function f , the subset lattice
SL(F ) consists of all subsets of these literals. However, it is easy to see that
some elements in SL(F ) contain literals with contradictory guards. For example,
a lattice of all subsets of sin x could contain the element (assume(0 < x < 2)) ∧
(sin x > 0) and the element (assume(x = 0))∧ (sin x = 0), which do not intersect
on any subdomain of x. To reduce the size of the lattice and avoid unnecessary
calls to the SMT solver, we reduce SL(F ) to a meet semi-lattice L = 〈SL(F ),u〉
by removing all elements that have contradictory guards (that is, the conjunction
of their guards is false). Note that, even if we remove an element, its properties
appear in other elements that have no contradictory guards since L is a subset
lattice.
Note that after the removal of contradictory elements, the resulting set of
subsets is no longer closed under union, but it is still closed under intersection,
hence the resulting set is a meet semi-lattice. Note also that the resulting meet
semi-lattice can have a set of maximal elements instead of the single maximal
element. For brevity, in the rest of the chapter and the next chapter, we refer to
the meet semi-lattice of guarded literals for a function f simply as a lattice and
use the notation L.
A frontier of a lattice L is a set of elements X(L) such that each chain from
⊥ to a maximal element in L intersects X(L) in at least one element. The LB-
CEGAR-BMC algorithm described in Sec. 5.5 and later also its generalisation,
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the LB-CEGAR algorithm (Sec. 6.3), rely on the fact that the union of guards of
each frontier of the lattice is the whole domain of the inputs. If this is not the
case, we add elements to the lattice to cover the missing subdomains. For the
example of sin x above, if we have only two guarded literals
(assume(0 < x < 2)) ∧ (sin x > 0)
and
(assume(x = 0)) ∧ (sin x = 0)
in our set, we add the guarded literals
((assume(x < 0)) ∧ true)
and
((assume(x ≥ 2)) ∧ true)
to the set to cover the whole domain of x (recall that the guards should refer to
continuous subdomains, hence we need to add two guarded literals).
An example of possible frontiers in the reduced meet semi-lattice in Fig. 5.2
can be: the set {{f1}, {f2}} or the set {{f3}}.
The procedure described in this section is done at the preprocessing stage, once
for each library function, and the resulting lattices can be used in verification of
multiple programs as we discuss next.
5.3.2 Refinement of programs with library functions
The CEGAR approach we suggest here begins with verifying a first-order for-
mula and iteratively refining the definition of library functions in the model till
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eliminating all spurious counterexamples. We refine by loading more summaries
(each of which represents a guarded literal), and this requires altering the original
CEGAR approach. We change the refinement loop in the algorithm presented in
Fig. 2.14 and add the usage of lattices of guarded literals, as shown in Fig. 5.3.














Safe or UnknownSMT 
Summaries
Figure 5.3: The modified CEGAR loop for the lattice-based counterexample-
guided abstraction refinement in bounded model checking (LB-CEGAR-BMC)
approach.
The modified refinement loop in LB-CEGAR-BMC approach contains the
following steps:
• Construct a first-order formula as before, while encoding any library func-
tion as we encode uninterpreted functions (Fig. 5.3, construct a formula
stage during the first iteration of the refinement loop).
• Verify the current first-order formula as before (Fig. 5.3, check stage).
• Employ a feasibility check as before, while using a theory under which
the library functions in the current verification problem are fully defined
and can be fully encoded (Fig. 5.3, check feasibility stage).
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• Terminate the refinement once a counterexample passed the feasibility
check (unsafe), the component of the lattices of guarded literals allows us to
conclude that t holds in P (safe), or none of the lattices’ literals can refine
a counterexample that failed the feasibility check (unknown). That is, the
termination depends now on both: the lattices state and the result from
solve (Fig. 5.3, reporting Error trace in red colour, SAFE in green colour,
or Unknown in grey colour).
• Continue the refinement as long as spurious counterexamples still exist,
and there are additional guarded literals to refine with the encoding of the
problem (Fig. 5.3, LB-CEGAR refiner stage). We construct a refined first-
order formula with additional guarded literals from the lattices of guarded
literals component (Fig. 5.3, construct a formula stage).
We can conclude that t holds in P with lattices of guarded literals by using their
frontier (see Sec. 5.3.1). We decide which literals to add during each refinement by
traversing the lattices at a certain order. We suggest an order of traversing lattices
in Sec. 5.5.2. We later generalise the lattice traversal mechanism in Chap. 6.
5.4 Lattice Construction
In this section, we give additional definitions of a lattice of guarded literals char-
acteristics and its construction algorithm from a set of equations and inequalities
of properties of a library function. The construction algorithm outputs a lattice
for a single library function given its set of properties. The inner function calls
used in the construction algorithm are explained at the end of Sec. 5.4.2.
We note that while the size of the lattice can be exponential in the number of
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expressions, the construction of the lattice is done as a preprocessing step once,
and the results are used for verification of all programs with this function.
5.4.1 Definitions
A lattice of guarded literals L contains elements, where each element contains a
subset of guarded literals as we discuss in Sec. 5.3.1. The guard of an element (or
its assume statement) is a conjunction of all the guards of its literals. We define
the lattice’s characteristic required for understanding our algorithms.
An element E ∈ L is a contradictory element when ∧l∈E l = false holds,
where l is a guarded literal as described in Sec. 5.3.1. No contradictory elements
exist in L, as the lattice L must contain only non-contradictory subsets of guarded
literals in an element. Two elements E,E ′ ∈ L are logically equivalent ele-
ments if ∧l∈E l ⇐⇒ ∧l′∈E′ l′ holds. We keep only one element in L per subposet
of logically equivalent elements.








holds and the expression is in the following form: l def= assume(G) ∧ literal(x)
where G is a guard and x is an equality or inequality of a property of function f .
Note that, we keep the same partial order between elements in L as in SL(F )
(for L = 〈SL(F ),u〉) except for few changes for optimizations defined by the
construction algorithm we present in Sec. 5.4.
Chapter 5 Lattice-based CEGAR in Bounded Model Checking 81
5.4.2 Algorithm
The construction of a meet semi-lattice of guarded literals L for a library function
f given a set of equations and inequalities of properties F , is described in Alg. 1.
The algorithm consists of five main components:
Construct a subset lattice from the input. Given a set of statements (equa-
tion or inequality), we construct a set of guarded literals F (line 1). Then given
F , we construct a subset lattice SL(F ) (line 2).
Consistency check. For every element in SL(F ), we analyse the subset of guar-
ded literals corresponding to this element (lines 3-10); all non-contradictory ele-
ments (lines 6-7) are added to the meet semi-lattice L (line 8).
Equivalence check. Remove logical equivalent elements from L (lines 11-20).
We only keep the most upper element if it has equivalent elements.
Cleanup. After the execution of the checks and the removal of elements above,
it is possible that in the resulting structure, an element has a single predecessor
(lines 21-25). In this case, we unify the element with its predecessor (line 23). This
process is repeated iteratively until all elements have more than one predecessor,
except for the direct successors of the ⊥ element.
Fix Overlapping Assume Statements. Strengthen an assumption to avoid
overlapping between elements of the same predecessor (line 26, fixG); an over-
lapping assume statement is defined in Def. 1, Sec. 5.4.1.
The result of the algorithm is the meet semi-lattice L.
The exact L depends on the input set of statements, as well as on the theory.
We note, however, that L can be used by the SMT solver with a different theory
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than the one in which it was constructed, as long as an encoding of the guarded
literals in SMT-LIB2 format with this logic exists. For example, the reduced meet
semi-lattice in Fig. 5.2 can be used in EUF, even when its construction is done
via propositional logic, since the encoding of f1, f2, and f3 exists in EUF.
Algorithm 1: Lattice Construction
Input : propertiesSet = {(Y1, y1), . . . , (Yn, yn)}: a set of pairs of equation or inequality




(Y,y)∈propertiesSet{assume(Y ) ∧ y, assume(¬Y ) ∧ true}
2 SL(F )← buildSL(F )
3 foreach element E ∈ SL(F ) do




6 〈result,_〉 ← checkSAT (Query)
7 if result is SAT then
8 Add E to L
9 end
10 end
11 foreach two elements Elower, Eupper ∈ L such that Elower ⊆SL(F ) Eupper do





13 〈result,_〉 ← checkSAT (Query)
14 if result is UNSAT then
15 if #Elower < #Eupper then
16 swap(Eupper, Elower)
17 end
18 Remove Elower from L
19 end
20 end
21 foreach element E ∈ L do
22 if (#immediateUpper(E) is 1)∧ (#immediateLower(immediateUpper(E)) is 1) then
23 Remove E from L
24 end
25 end
26 L← fixG(L) // Strengthen overlapping assumptions of all elements’ successors
27 return L
Overlapping assume statements
Elements in L can have overlapping assume statements (Def. 1). In Fig. 5.2 for
example, the assume(Y ) statement of f2 originally was (n > 0) thus the assume
statements of f1 and f2 overlap over many values, e.g., when a = n. In this
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example (Fig. 5.2), we fix the assume statement of f2 to avoid such overlapping
by invoking fixG sub-procedure.
For each meet element E ∈ L, the sub-procedure fixG(L) changes the assump-
tions of E’s immediate successors to remove any overlapping assumptions (see
Def. 1). The assume statement of an immediate successor with a literal equal
to true is updated by intersecting with negation of all other assume statements
of the rest of the immediate successors of E, when removing any successor with
an (altered) assume statement equals to false. An assume statement of an im-
mediate successor is strengthen by intersecting with the negation of an assume
statement of overlapping elements.
A list of sub-procedures of main construction algorithm
Let f be a library function, F be its set of guarded literals (F is a finite set),
l, l′, l′′ be guarded literals in F , SL(F ) be a subset lattice, L be the lattice
L = 〈SL(F ),u〉, E,E ′ be elements in a lattice, and ψ be a logical formula,
the algorithm above (Alg. 1) invokes the following procedures:
◦ #E is the number of guarded literals in E.
◦ buildSL(F ) constructs a subset lattice SL(F ) given F .
◦ minimise(E), given an element E ∈ L, removes all literals in a subset of guarded
literals rem such as that rem ⊂ E and (∧l∈E−rem l) ⇐⇒ (∧l∈E l).
◦ checkSAT (ψ) determines the satisfiability of ψ.
◦ swap(E,E ′) swaps the current subset of guarded literals between E and E ′,
while (roughly speaking) each element keeps its own edges.
◦ immediateLower(E) gets all immediate predecessors of the element E.
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◦ immediateUpper(E) gets all immediate successors of the element E.
◦ fixG(L) alters assume statements of elements in L (Def. 1).
5.4.3 Lattice properties
Given a set of guarded literals F for a library function f , the subset lattice SL(F )
is constructed as defined in Sec. 2.1. The height of SL(F ) is |F |+1 by construction,
and the width is bounded by the following lemma on the width of a subset lattice.
Lemma 1. For a set S of size s, let SL(S) be the subset lattice of S. Then, the






Proof. The bound follows from Sperner’s theorem [And87] that states that the






These bounds also hold for L = 〈SL(F ),u〉, since L is a reduce lattice of SL(F ).
In Ex. 7, we use the subset of elements, {{f3}}, which is the lattice frontier,
instead of all elements of the lattice to prove the correctness of the code in Fig. 5.1.
We can omit the rest of the lattice elements since the lattice frontier captures
the whole input domain of the function. Informally, the claim follows from the
structure of the subset lattice and the fact that the bottom element of lattice
covers the whole domain. The claim and its formal proof are as follows.
Claim 1. If the union of guards of a given set of guarded literals S covers the
whole domain of the input, then for each frontier X(LS) of the subset lattice LS
of S, the union of guards of X(LS) also covers the whole domain of the input.
And conversely, if the union of guards of a subset X(LS) of the elements of LS
covers the whole domain of the inputs, then X(LS) is a frontier of LS.
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Proof. We prove by induction on a subset lattice LS that any element E ∈ LS its
guards refer to the same domain as the union of guards of all immediate successors
of element E.
(base) The element ∅ has no guards and thus refers to the whole input domain
Din. From the definition of subset lattice (Sec. 2.1.2), we know that each imme-
diate successor of ∅ is a set of a single element from S. Since we added elements
to S to cover the missing subdomains (Sec. 5.3.1), we know that the union of all
the guards of all items in S captures all values in Din.
(step) For each element E ∈ LS, the union of guards of all successors of E
is equivalent to the guard of E. Since LS is a subset lattice, then all immediate
upper elements of an element E ∈ LS contain exactly one additional guarded
literal from S. Since we added elements to S to cover the missing subdomains, we
know that any guarded literal has a guarded literal (or guarded literals) with an
opposite guard in S, thus the union of any such pair of guards of these guarded
literals leaves the original guard of E the same; since each of the successor of
E must contain either the original guarded literal or its complementary guarded
literal (or guarded literals). Therefore we get that the guard of the union of the
successors of E stays the same as required.
We use the above to prove the first part of the claim. We assume that the
claim holds only if the union of guards of a given set of guarded literals covers
the whole domain of the input, hence ∅ refers to the whole domain Din; since all
chains start from ∅, and since the guard of an element is a union of guards of
its immediate successors as proved by induction above, then if there is a frontier
X(LS) where the union of all guards of all the guarded literals in X(LS) is not Din,
then there is a chain from ∅ to maximal element without an element in X(LS),
which contradicts the definition of a frontier (Sec. 5.3.1).
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The LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2) and the LB-CEGAR algorithm
(Alg. 5) can use a reduced lattice of a subset lattice LS (Sec. 5.4.2) by apply-
ing the following changes to the original structure: (1) removes elements with
a guard equal to false (i.e., consistency check), (2) removes logically equivalent
elements by keeping a single element of these (i.e., equivalence check), (3) removes
elements with a single successor where both have the same guard (i.e., Cleanup),
and (4) fixes overlapping guard.
We fix overlapping guards while keeping the union of guards of all the successor
of an element the same; thus the union of guards stays the same also in a frontier
and therefore refers to the whole domain as before.
The rest of the changes of elements do not affect the union of guards; consis-
tency check removes elements with no contribution to the input domain (as this
equivalent to false), equivalence check affects only the number of possible fron-
tiers, and cleanup removes elements with the same guard with a weaker expression
compared to their single immediate successor.
The second part of the claim is trivial since any frontier of LS is a subposet of
LS.
5.5 Lattice-Based Bounded Model Checking
In this section, we describe the lattice-based counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement in bounded model checking (LB-CEGAR-BMC) algorithm for verifying
programs with respect to a safety property and suggest an efficient lattice traversal
algorithm for this version of the algorithm. We present a generalised version of
this algorithm in Chap. 6.
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5.5.1 Definitions
The lattices of guarded literals component in the LB-CEGAR-BMC’s refinement
loop (Fig. 5.3) contains sets of lattices for the model checking task. We describe
in this section this component and its limitations.
For a program P and a safety property t such as that P ∪ {t} has functions
which are missing the full definition in the current level of abstraction, we denote
the set of all such functions in P ∪ {t} as {f1, . . . , fm}. Each function f has a
meet semi-lattice L = 〈SL(F ),u〉 (F is a set of guarded literals of f). The set of
all meet semi-lattices of the functions in P ∪ {t} is L = {L1, . . . , Lm}.
We allocate a copy of L per occurrences of f in P ∪ {t}. The LB-CEGAR-
BMC uses these copies during verification process to be able to extract a different
frontier per occurrences of f in P ∪ {t}. By using several copies, we can traverse
lattices independently from other statements and hence can keep the queries to the
SMT-solver much smaller. Using a single lattice for all occurrences of the function
f instead could damage the performance of the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm. We
denote the set of all copies as Lattices = {L1,1, . . . , Lm,km}, where the lattice
Li,j is the copy of jth occurrence of fi in P ∪ {t}. We define K to be the set of
counters, K = {k1, . . . km} where ki ∈ K is the number of function calls of fi in
P ∪ {t}.
We assume each statement in the program under test has at most one occur-
rence of a function for the simplicity of our algorithm’s description. If there is
more than one library function in a statement, one can write an equivalent code
that guarantees this property.
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5.5.2 Traversal simulation of copies of lattices
The LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm uses lattices’ copies for a DFS style lattice
traversal. We simulate the traversal separately for each occurrence of a func-
tion f in P ∪{t} that has a lattice in L by using the idea of having several copies
of the lattice (one per occurrence of the function). As the lattice traversal idea
might not be trivial, we outline in detail four common cases (that is, single copy
with SAT and UNSAT results and two copies with SAT and UNSAT results) in
the hope it will clarify the general idea, before outlining the LB-CEGAR-BMC
algorithm in the next subsection. We refer in the text below to the specific line
each step performed in the LB-CEGAR-BMC, which can be helpful in under-
standing how the simulation interacts with the general flow of the CEGAR loop;
the simulation algorithm is part of the LB-CEGAR Refiner component (Fig. 5.3),
where Alg. 3 describes the invocation of LB-CEGAR-Refiner after UNSAT result,
Alg. 4 describes it after SAT result, and Alg. 2 describes the modified CEGAR
loop and invokes the traversal simulation for both cases (after SAT and UNSAT
result).
The basic idea of traversing a lattice is simple. We begin with the weakest
subset of guarded literals of the lattice. In the main refinement loop, we gradually
move to upper elements of the lattice containing a stronger subset of guarded
literals according to the counterexample presented to us as shown schematically
in Fig. 5.3. However, the exact order of traversing a lattice depends on the order
of the statements, the inner partially order of each lattice, the order we traverse
the copies (for example, which copy the refiner tries first, the counterexample
received from the SMT solver and as well our decision how and if to refine it), the
theory we use to encode our initial problem, and other heuristics.
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In this section, we present a traversal simulation of a copy (of a lattice) based
on the lattice structure and the order of statements in code. We describe in the
implementation part (Sec. 5.6.1) heuristics on the order of the statements in the
context of bounded model checking. We use the following symbols though the
section; let f be a library function, L a lattice for f , c a copy of L, E an element,
X(c) the frontier of c, P a program with occurrences of f , t a safety property in
the specification of P , ϕ̂ a first-order formula, CEX a counterexample, and χ a
first-order formula of currently used properties.
Traversal of a single copy of a lattice
A lattice traversal on a copy c of a lattice L for a function f (for an occurrence
of f in P ∪ {t}) starts with ⊥ element (that is, ∅), adding no guarded literals to
the query ϕ̂, which models P with the negation of t (Alg. 2, line 5). The traversal
on c continues according to the last result from the solver (Alg. 2, line 7), which
is either SAT or UNSAT result. If the solver returns ’unknown’, we treat it as a
SAT result. We describe each of the cases in detail, starting with the SAT result
with a single copy, c.
During execution, each time ϕ̂ ∧ χ is SAT, we traverse to an upper element
of c which eliminates the counterexample, CEX , as long as CEX is a spurious
counterexample (Alg. 4, lines 3-9). Once a real counterexample is obtained, the
algorithm terminates and returns Unsafe with the counterexample, CEX . Reach-
ing a maximal element in c during the traversal indicates that the guarded literals
in L cannot refine this occurrence of f in P ∪ {t}, which also terminates the re-
finement in the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2) and returns Unsafe (but
with no counterexample).
In Fig. 5.4, we sketch the flow of the case of a SAT result from the solver. The














Refine with { f1 } SAT result - tries to refine with { f3 }
Figure 5.4: Lattice traversal: single lattice, single copy, with last result SAT.
orange square marks the current element during each of the following steps. The
traversal simulation: (left) tries solving the problem with no additional guarded
literals and receives SAT result from the solver, and traverses to an upper element
(where we assume {f1} refines the current counterexample), (middle) adds {f1}
expressions to the query ϕ̂ (in Alg. 2, line 5-6), receives SAT (in Alg. 2, line 7), and
assuming none of the if conditions in Alg. 2 lines 15 and 18 holds, uses a stronger
subset of expressions {f3}. (right) {f3} is a maximal element, in this example
if the query ϕ̂ with {f3} is SAT, the refinement fails and the LB-CEGAR-BMC
algorithm returns Unsafe (Alg. 2, line 19).
Once the query ϕ̂ with additional guarded literals (that is the subset of guarded
literals of an element E ∈ c) is UNSAT, the traversal of a single copy skips the
successors of E, adds E to X(c) (the frontier of c), and continues the traversal
with one of the siblings of E according to the DFS order from left to right. The
traversal simulation of c terminates, if there are no remaining siblings of E, and
outputs Safe.
In Fig. 5.5, we sketch the flow of the case of a UNSAT result from the solver.
The orange square marks the current element during each of the following steps.














Refine with { f1 } UNSAT result – continue with { f2 }
Figure 5.5: Lattice traversal: single lattice, single copy, with last result
UNSAT.
(left) We assume the scenario at the beginning of the refinement is the same (that
is, we require some guarded literals to refine ϕ̂). The traversal simulation after
it: (middle) adds {f1} expressions to the query ϕ̂ (in Alg. 2, line 5-6), receives
UNSAT (in Alg. 2, line 7), adds {f1} to the frontier of c (Alg. 3, line 2), and
(right) uses a different subset of expressions {f2} for a different input domain of
the function call we refine (Alg. 3, line 7).
Note that, in this example, {f3} is the next element from {f1} according to
the DFS order. However, since {f1} is sufficient to prove UNSAT, there is no
need to strengthen the expressions in {f1} and use {f3}. Therefore, we can skip
{f3} in the DFS order and continue with {f2}.
Traversal of multiple copies of a lattice
We use the description of a single copy traversal when describing the traversal
simulation of multiple copies. Each of the copies follows the mechanism of a
single copy traversal while using additional guarded literals. These can be guarded
literals either of an element or a frontier, of other copies (Alg. 2, line 5, or Alg. 4,
line 5).
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As long as the result from the solver is SAT (Alg. 4, line 6, or Alg. 2, line 7),
the refinement continues the traversal simulation of multiple copies with no valid
frontier either by strengthening the subset of guarded literals of a copy (Alg. 4,
line 6) or by trying to add guarded literals from other copies (Alg. 4, next iteration
in the for loop in line 1).
We follow the same traversal simulation mechanism of a single copy per copy
while searching for such a subset of guarded literals (Alg. 4, lines 3-9). We continue
the refinement if one of the copies refines the current counterexample CEX (Alg. 4,
line 8, returns true); in that case, we return to the main loop of the LB-CEGAR-
BMC algorithm (Alg. 2, line 18, and then skips to the next iteration of the main
loop, lines 4-22). A subset of guarded literals refines CEX if with this subset CEX
is not feasible (Alg. 4, line 6, returns UNSAT). However, if none of the copies in
Lattices can refine the current counterexample CEX , the refinement fails (Alg. 4,
line 13, returns false).
In Fig. 5.6, we illustrate these two cases with two copies of L. We use either
copy c or other copies to refine an occurrence of f (where c is a copy of L for this
occurrence of f). c is “copy 1” and is the current copy the algorithm constructs
its frontier. “copy 2” is the other copy and has no frontier yet. The orange square
marks the current element in each of the copies during each of the following steps.
The traversal simulation for “copy 1” and “copy 2”: (top-left) tries solving
the problem with no additional guarded literals and receives SAT result from
the solver, and traverses to an upper element in “copy 1” (where we assume {f1}
refines the current counterexample). (top-right) We then return to the main loop
in the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2, line 18), continue to the next itera-
tion, and try solving the problem with {f1} of “copy 1”. (bot-left) The traversal
simulation continues and traverses to an upper element in “copy 1” (where we as-
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Figure 5.6: Lattice traversal: single lattice, two copies, with last result SAT.
sume {f3} does not refine the current counterexample and is a maximal element
of “copy 1”), (bot-right) resets back to {f1} in “copy 1”, and traverses to an upper
element in “copy 2”.
Following an UNSAT result, the algorithm either updates the frontier of the
current copy (Alg. 2, line 12) and (once the condition in Alg. 3 line 3 holds) starts
the traversal of another copy (Alg. 3, line 5) or, terminates (Alg. 2 line 9). In
the latter case, the algorithm terminates once using the frontiers of all the copies
is sufficient to prove that P is safe with respect to a property t. In the former
case, after the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2) finds a frontier, it uses this
frontier to construct a first-order formula adding all of its guarded literals (Alg. 2,
lines 5-6, and Alg. 4, lines 5-6). Hence, we use the guarded literals in the frontier
for extracting frontiers for the rest of the copies. There is no use of a current
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UNSAT result – continue with copy 2, 
while using copy 1’s frontier { f1 , { f2 }}












Figure 5.7: Lattice traversal: single lattice, two copies, with last result UNSAT.
We illustrate this case in Fig. 5.7 for two copies of a lattice (starting upper-left
side and left to right). The algorithm extracts and uses a frontier of the first copy
‘(“copy 1”) to assist refine the occurrence of function f of the second copy (“copy
2”). The orange square marks the current element or the copy’s frontier in each
of the copies during each of the following steps.
The traversal simulation for “copy 1” and “copy 2”: (top-left) tries solving
the problem with no additional guarded literals and receives SAT result from
the solver, and traverses to an upper element in “copy 1” (where we assume {f1}
refines the current counterexample). (top-right) We then return to the main loop
in the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2, line 18), continue to the next iteration,
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solve the problem with {f1} of “copy 1” (where we assume {f1} refines the current
sub-domain of values), and add {f1} to the frontier of “copy 1” (Alg. 2, line 12).
(bot-left) The traversal simulation continues and traverses to a sibling element of
{f1} in “copy 1”, which is {f2} in “copy 1”. (bot-right) We then return to the
main loop in the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2, line 18), continue to the
next iteration, solve the problem with {f2} of “copy 1” (where we assume {f2}
refines the current sub-domain of values), and add {f2} to the frontier of “copy
1” (Alg. 2, line 12). We then have a valid frontier of “copy 1”, {{f1}, {f2}}, which
we use when extracting the frontier of “copy 2”.
In Chap. 6, we present a generalised version of the algorithm in Sec. 5.5.3 and
describe a set of other heuristics to traverse lattices generalising the ideas here.
We then prove that the generalised version of the traversal simulation terminates,
its complexity, and that if the refinement outputs a positive result (that is, the
program is safe with respect to the given bound), then there are no counterexam-
ples up to the given depth in the program (that is, in its loop-free version). We
also present in Chap. 6 a set heuristics to achieve optimal order of traversing the
copies via experimental evidences.
5.5.3 Algorithm
The lattice-based counterexample-guided abstraction refinement in bounded model
checking algorithm (LB-CEGAR-BMC) for verifying programs is described in
Alg. 2 and two additional LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm’s sub-procedures: Alg. 3
and Alg. 4. The rest of LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm’s sub-procedures are de-
scribed at the end of this section shortly.
The LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2) takes the symbolically encoded pro-
gram P with a safety property t and constructs an over-approximating formula ϕ̂
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of the problem in a given logic (line 1). The LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2)
refines ϕ̂ by adding and removing guarded literals from lattices in L according
to the traversal on their copies, where we have a copy of a lattice per refined
expression (main loop, lines 4-22). The algorithm terminates once it has proved
the current ϕ̂ is Safe (lines 9-11), after extracting a real counterexample (lines
15-17), or after using all available guarded literals in all lattices’ copies while still
receiving spurious counterexamples (lines 18-20 or 24). The exact order, in which
we add guarded literals to eliminate counterexamples, is arbitrary at this point,
except for the partial order induced by the copies and their statements in the
code. We discuss the partial order in Alg. 4, and we offer several heuristics in
Chap. 6.
The refinement in the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2) is finite and re-
turns Unsafe if t does not hold in P . A counterexample in the last known
precision is returned when t does not hold in P and the guarded literals in the
lattices’ copies refine the over-approximate functions in ϕ̂. The LB-CEGAR-BMC
algorithm (Alg. 2) returns Safe if and only if the guarded literals in the lattices’
copies refine the over-approximate functions in ϕ̂ and t holds in P . The lattices
we use in the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2), are described in the previ-
ous sections in this chapter. Their description is essential for understanding the
LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2), mainly lines 1-4 in Alg. 2.
Frontiers construction
The LB-CEGAR-BMC’s sub-procedure: updateFrontier (Alg. 3) adds the current
element in the current copy, c, to its frontier (line 2) and continues the traversal
on the lattice’s copy via the sub-procedure traverseUNSAT (line 7). If the traversal
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Algorithm 2: LB-CEGAR-BMC
Input : Program P = {s1 := (x1 = t1), . . . , sn := (xn = tn)},
Safety property t,
Semi-lattices’ set L = {L1, . . . , Lm}.









j=1 (Li,j ← initialiseLI (s, Li))




6 Query ← ϕ̂ ∧ χ
7 〈result,CEX〉 ← checkSAT (Query)
8 if result is UNSAT then
9 if (χ is true) ∨ (∀.c ∈ Lattices : hasFrontier(c)) then
10 return 〈Safe,⊥〉 //Safe - Quit
11 end
12 Lattices← updateFrontier(Lattices) //Continue the Traversal
13 end
14 else
15 if checkRealCE(Query,CEX) then
16 return 〈Unsafe,CEX〉 //Real counterexample - Quit
17 end
18 if !refineCEX(P, t,Query,CEX ,Lattices) then




23 // End Of Main Loop
24 return 〈Unsafe,⊥〉 //Cannot refine - Quit
of c ended (line 3), then the sub-procedure starts traversing a copy without yet a
frontier (lines 3-6, and line 7).
Note that, (i) each copy has its own frontier (as we explain in Sec. 5.4.3 and
Sec. 5.5.1), (ii) a copy’s traversal ends when we either find a valid frontier or reach
a maximal element, and (iii) this sub-procedure, updateFrontier (Alg. 3), keeps
changing the same lattice’s copy till either extracting a valid frontier for this copy
or the main algorithm, the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2), terminates.
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Algorithm 3: updateFrontier (LB-CEGAR-BMC’s sub-procedure)
Input : Lattices’ copies Lattices
Output: Updated lattices’ copies Lattices
1 c← last changed copy in Lattices
2 Add element(c) to the frontier of c
3 if hasFrontier(c) then
4 ∀x ∈ Lattices.¬hasFrontier(x) =⇒ reset(x,⊥)
5 c← an item in {x|x ∈ Lattices ∧ ¬hasFrontier(x)}
6 end
7 traverseUNSAT(c)
8 return Lattices // Returns back to the main loop in Alg. 2 line 11
Abstraction refinement of a spurious counterexample
The LB-CEGAR-BMC’s sub-procedure: refineCEX (Alg. 4) describes the refine-
ment of a single spurious counterexample CEX via copies of lattices in Lattices.
The order of applying the copies’ guarded literals during refinement is according
to (1) the order in the code statements with an occurrence of F (the list of heuris-
tics is in Sec. 5.6.1), and (2) the partial order induced by each lattice. The rest
of our choices are arbitrary in this chapter (we change it in the next chapter).
The main loop (lines 1-12) searches for a lattice’s copy that refines a coun-
terexample given as input (that is, CEX). The inner loop (lines 3-10) searches
for an element in the current copy that its subset of guarded literals refines CEX
(lines 3-10). If the inner loop reaches a maximal element (line 3), then the main
loop skips this copy and continues the search with the next copy in Lattices (line
1). In that case, we also revert the changes in the copy that its traversal reached
a maximal element (line 11). We do not include copies with a frontier as these
are already part of the original query, Query.
A single counterexample refinement is successful if the query (line 6) is
UNSAT, that is, it can detect now that this counterexample CEX is infeasible by
using additional guarded literals (added in lines 4-5). The refinement fails if, for
all copies in Lattices, no element can refine the current counterexample CEX (line
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13). The refinement order is determined by the way the sub-procedure refineCEX
(Alg. 4) goes over statements s ∈ P∪{t} (line 1), which is done according to sets of
basic heuristics defined in Chap. 7. In the implementation section in this chapter
(Sec. 5.6.1), we describe these heuristics shortly.
Algorithm 4: refineCEX (LB-CEGAR-BMC’s sub-procedure)




All lattices’ copies Lattices.
Output: true or false
1 for s ∈ P ∪ {t} with c ∈ Lattices and ¬hasFrontier(c) do
2 n← element(c) //To reset later to original location n
3 while element(c) is not a maximal element do
4 traverseSAT(c) // Try to refine with a stronger subset
5 χ← currentFacts(c)
6 〈result,_〉 ← checkSAT (Query ∧ CEX ∧ χ)
7 if result is UNSAT then
8 return true // Refined CEX ; return back to main loop in Alg. 2 line 17
9 end
10 end
11 reset(c, n) // Cannot refine CEX with this copy, rest and continue to next copy
12 end
13 return false // Return to main loop in Alg. 2 lines 17-18
Validating counterexamples
The LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2) checks if CEX is a spurious counterex-
ample via checkRealCE sub-procedure (Alg. 2, line 14) similarly to the counterex-
ample check in Chap. 7 and returns either true with a real counterexample when
all queries are SAT, or false otherwise.
The solver produces an interpretation for the variables or a partial interpreta-
tion of uninterpreted functions and uninterpreted predicates in the case of EUF,
for statements s ∈ P∪{t} in the current precision. The counterexample validation
(checkRealCE sub-procedure) determines whether the conjunction of a statement
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s ∈ P ∪ {t} and a counterexample CEX with an interpretation or partial in-
terpretation is UNSAT in a more precise theory; an UNSAT result in any of
the queries indicates that the counterexample is indeed spurious. A more pre-
cise theory can be the theory of bit-vectors as in Chap. 7 or the theory the meet
semi-lattice was built with. If no available description of the function g with the
current query exist in a more precise theory, we assume CEX is spurious.
A list of sub-procedures of the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm
We describe the rest of the function calls in general. Let s be a statement in
P ∪ {t}, ψ a logical formula, CEX a counterexample, x a meet semi-lattice of
a statement s with a function f , and x′ a lattice’s copy of x, the LB-CEGAR-
BMC algorithm (Alg. 2) with its two sub-procedures updateFrontier (Alg. 3) and
refineCEX (Alg. 4) invoke the following procedures:
◦ checkRealCE(ψ,CEX) returns true if the formula CEX is a real counterexample
of formula ψ.
◦ checkSAT (ψ) determines the satisfiability of a formula ψ.
◦ convert(s) creates a symbolic formula in the initial logic for statement s.
◦ currentFacts(x′) retrieves the formula with the guarded literals in x′ which is a
union of all elements in the frontier, an intersection of the guarded literals in
the current element or, true if the current element is ⊥.
◦ element(x′) retrieves the current element in x′ or > for x′ with a full frontier.
◦ hasFrontier(x′) returns true if x′ has a frontier.
◦ initialiseLI (s, x) if there is a meet semi-lattice for operation(s) in L, creates a
copy of a meet semi-lattice x for s.
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◦ getFuncCallsCounts(L, (P ∪ {t})) gets counters of occurrences per function f
with a lattice in L.
◦ operation(s) retrieves the operation or function call name in s.
◦ reset(x′, n) sets the current element in the traversal simulation of x′ to be loca-
tion of element n and reverts the inner state of the search.
◦ traverseSAT (x′) simulates a traversal of x′ from the current element to elements
with stronger subset of guarded literals as described in Sec. 5.5.2.
◦ traverseUNSAT (x′) simulates a traversal of x′ in DFS style as described in
Sec. 5.5.2.
The sub-procedure updateFrontier (Alg. 3) and the sub-procedure refineCEX
(Alg. 4) are not part of the description on the list above as both are described in
detail in the Alg. 3 and Alg. 4. These two sub-procedures are called in the main
loop of the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2) in lines 12 and 18, respectively.
5.6 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we present the basic implementation of LB-CEGAR-BMC algo-
rithm in HiFrog.
In the next chapter, we generalise the algorithm to be able to deal with much
more complex cases. For the current implementation, we present an initial eval-
uation of our prototype on a single library function: the modulo operation with
several occurrences in the code. We use the evaluation here to understand better
the improvements required for dealing with complex cases. We present some of
the improvements in the next chapter and we discuss the rest in our future work
in Chap. 9.
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5.6.1 Implementation of the LB-CEAGR-BMC algorithm
The LB-CEAGR-BMC algorithm was implemented on the SMT-based function
summarisation bounded model checker HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]) and used
either the Z3 SMT solver [DMB08b] or the OpenSMT2 SMT solver [HMAS16].
The model checker was compiled with the GNU C++ compiler and the O3 op-
timization level. The preprocessing steps were implemented as a set of BASH
scripts. The scripts for the construction of a meet semi-lattice, the meet semi-
lattices for modulo operation, the complete experimental results, and the source
code are available at [Git19a, Git19b, HiF19].
Preprocessing
Extraction of guarded literals. A preprocessing step of our framework was
extracting a set of guarded literals F for a library function f . The equations
and inequalities of properties of f can be imported from another program or
a library and parsed into a set of guarded literals per library function. In the
experimental results, we imported equations and inequalities from the Coq proof
assistant [The19a] and Wikipedia [Mod19], where f := mod (modulo function).
We used a subset of lemmas, theorems and definitions of properties of the modulo
function from [Mod19, The19a] as is, as the data is simple to use, well known, and
reliable. We translated the equations and inequalities into the SMT-LIB2 format
manually (see [HiF19] for the results of this translation).
Validation. The validation test is as follows. Given a function f , a set of
expressions F , a statement s such that l (l ∈ F ) is sufficient to verify s, test
if s ∧ l is UNSAT. A complementary validation test is the sanity check which
verifies that the guarded literals in F are not contradictory in the theory under
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Figure 5.8: Architecture of LB-CEGAR-BMC implementation in SMT-based
model checking framework.
which f is fully defined. We describe in Sec. 5.6.2 the validation tests for the
guarded literals of properties of the modulo function used in the evaluation of
LB-CEGAR-BMC. The function f was mod and the set of guarded literals was
F := Fmod with 31 guarded literals.
Construction. The script contained greedy optimisation of the construction of
a meet semi-lattice algorithm (Alg. 1) to avoid, if possible, an exponential number
of calls to the solver. The first loop (in lines 3-10) started from the smallest subsets
of expressions (to largest), all successors of a contradictory element (see Sec. 5.4.1)
were pruned, and the second loop (Alg. 1, lines 11-19) considered only pairs of
(roughly speaking) connected elements.
The LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm
The overview of the interaction between HiFrog, the refiner in HiFrog and the
SMT solvers is shown in Fig. 5.8. In the current prototype, we added guarded
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literals of the meet semi-lattice as SMT summaries, while checking before applying
a summary that its assume statement (the guard of a literal) holds for better
performance. Any function that had no precise encoding in the current level of
abstraction (Fig. 5.8, given as an input file of settings to HiFrog) was added as
a candidate for refinement.
The spurious counterexample check was done via the CEX validator using bit-
vector logic similar to the counterexample check in Chap. 7, Sec. 7.4.2 with one
of the straightforward heuristics:
1. Forward order with a single refinement.
2. Backward order with a single refinement.
3. Forward order with simultaneous refinement.
4. Backward order with simultaneous refinement.
5. Forward order with dependency refinement.
6. Backward order with dependency refinement.
7. Forward order with simultaneous and dependency refinement.
8. Backward order with simultaneous and dependency refinement.
We refined a single statement each time we called the CEX validator by validating
a single statement only with option (1) and option (2). We refined a block of
statements with option (3) and option (4). We refined a statement with all the
statements this statement required to compute the expression in this statement
with option (5) and option (6). We refined a block of statements with all the
statements this block required to compute the expression in any of the statements
in this block with option (7) and option (8).
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For all options, we started the check either from the first statement 3 forwards
(1,3,5 or 7) or the assert statement backwards (2,4,6 or 8) and refined a statement
or statements (according to the selected option) that failed the counterexample
feasibility check via the CEX validator. We used only option 54 in our experiments
(Sec. 5.6.2). However, all 8the options were implemented in HiFrog also for the
LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm.
The CEX validator output was either true with a real counterexample when
all queries were SAT, or false with a set of candidates to refine otherwise. Each
query contained a statement (single refinement or simultaneous refinement), or
a set of statements (dependency refinement) with an assignment of values taken
from the current counterexample in SMT-LIB2 format.
The lattice traversal component contained three sub-components:
1. The model. This component contained the meet semi-lattices loaded to
HiFrog and their copies per occurrence of a function we refined.
2. CEX validator. This component validated the counterexample and reported
real counterexamples once found.
3. Refiner. This component did the refinement, added guarded literals to and
removed guarded literals from the encoding of the problem (program P with
a safety property t). This component also interacted with the CEX validator
and the rest of the system and terminated the refinement for each of the
three possible cases described in the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm (Alg. 2).
The SMT solvers instances used equality logic with uninterpreted functions (EUF)
or linear arithmetics with EUF for modelling and the OpenSMT2 SMT solver
instances with fixed-width bit-vectors for CEX validation.
3That is, the entry point of the program under test.
4The default option in HiFrog, see Chap. 7, Sec. 7.4.2 for more details.
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Table 5.1: Results of validation test.
Safe Unsafe
HiFrog+UDS LIA 37 46
EUF 9 46





This section describes the evaluation of the quality of meet semi-lattices of guarded
literals and the evaluation of the LB-CEGAR-BMC approach. The experiments
ran on a 64-bit virtual machine with Ubuntu 16.04 Linux system, single CPU and
10000 MB base memory. The time-out for all experiments was at 4000s, and the
memory limit was 3GB.
Validation results for modulo function
In this section, we describe the validation results for the set of guarded literals used
in the construction of meet semi-lattices of the modulo operation. The results here
are not part of the experiments of any of the algorithms presented in the chapter.
We did not use any of the algorithms in this chapter. The validation part is only
for ensuring as proper input as possible, where the input for the construction of
the lattice, is a set of these guarded literals as an SMT summary.
We built a set of benchmarks of 91 C-programs with a single assertion, with
45 safe and 46 unsafe instances for all the 31 guarded literals of properties of
the modulo function (as shown in Table 5.1, last row). We translated into SMT-
LIB2 format all the 31 guarded literals we used. The majority of them had
at least one UNSAT and one SAT benchmark. We ran HiFrog with SMT
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summaries such as that each guarded literal had its own SMT summary. We used
the OpenSMT2 SMT solver for EUF encoding and the Z3 SMT solver for LIA
with EUF encoding.
The column Safe in Table 5.1 contains the total number of solved instances
with different SMT theories and with or without SMT summaries. It describes
the result of the validation tests for three of the supported encoding modes of
HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]): propositional logic, LIA, and EUF encoding with
summaries (HiFrog+UDS LIA, HiFrog+UDS EUF) and without summaries
(HiFrogProp., HiFrogLIA, HiFrogEUF); propositional logic supports mod-
ulo function (hence, we have only five rows in Table 5.1 instead of six). We did not
expect any of the safe-benchmarks to be solved correctly with EUF and LIA with-
out SMT summaries. However, we added these results to Table 5.1 merely to check
that a safe benchmark could not be solved without an additional guarded literal.
With propositional encoding we could verify 20 out of 45 safe benchmarks.
The remaining 25 validation tests had time-out or out of memory issues or a
different result than expected5. A different result was possible due to choice of
implementation of the modulo operation in C (e.g., modulo of 0 or the inverse
of operations of elementary arithmetic). The cause for resources problems was
expensive operations at the bit-level precision in the crafted benchmarks. Neither
LIA nor EUF can express the modulo function and thus, in general, could not
terminate with a Safe result, as reported. However, we reported a few cases
in which LIA and EUF terminated with a Safe result due to simplifications in
the representation of the program in its Static Single Assignment (SSA) form
(few examples of the SSA form of these validation tests are available at [Git19a,
HiF19]).
5In our case, when the resource from which we loaded these properties disagree with C99.
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The validation results of the properties of the modulo functions as user-defined
summaries (UDS) with LIA (that is, combining a guarded literal’s summary with
the LIA in the encoding of the problem) verified 37 out of 45 safe benchmarks.
The remaining 8 validation tests contained non-linear operators (e.g., (a+b∗c)%c)
and thus could not be verified with linear arithmetic. The validation results of the
properties of the modulo functions as user-defined summaries (UDS) with EUF
reported only 9 instances as Safe (EUF’s expected behaviour on mathematical
benchmarks).
The last column of Table 5.1 investigates the unsafe benchmarks, correspond-
ing to the sanity check. All expressions are non-contradictory hence the addition
of guarded literals did not change the result of verification of the Unsafe instances
for both EUF and LIA, with SMT summaries.
Evaluation of LB-CEGAR-BMC
LB-CEGAR-BMC can solve instances with library functions, given a set of lattices
for these functions; because our choice of a library function for evaluation (for the
work in this chapter) was the modulo function, we did not expect it to outperform
any other well-established methods but to obtain similar results. Since (1) there is
efficient support in solvers for modulo function in propositional logic, and (2) the
current LB-CEGAR-BMC’s implementation (in this chapter) had naive heuristics
on the statements’ refinement order and no optimizations. And yet, we chose the
modulo function as it (a) is commonly used in C code and tend to appear in
benchmarks (like SV-COMP), (b) has a relatively large amount of mathematical
properties to construct a lattice, and (c) is a relatively simple example to model
as it requires integer arithmetic (unlike real arithmetic that we present in the next
chapter).
Chapter 5 Lattice-based CEGAR in Bounded Model Checking 109
In evaluating and analysing our implementation’s performance, we aimed to
understand the steps towards improvement tackling the two problems above by
comparing the number of solved and unsolved instances with different parameters.
When (i) the theory was UFLIA, UFLRA, or EUF (related to (1)), (ii) the lattice’s
size was 1,21, or 31, and (iii) the feasibility check of counterexamples was enabled
or disabled (both (ii) and (iii), related to (2)); the lattice’s size was: "1" for
methods with summaries but without any lattice, (i.e., user-defined summaries),
and "21" or "31" for LB-CEGAR-BMC with a 21- or 31-literal modulo lattice.
We examined via statistical tests the effect of (i), (ii) and (iii) in the next
paragraphs, with an initial hypothesis that there was no significant difference in
the number of solved instances (our null hypothesis). We first present our statis-
tical test results and later additional graphs to discuss in detail (i), (ii) and (iii).
We applied the statistical tests on LB-CEGAR-BMC with different parameters
for the comparison of the number of solved and unsolved instances (solved with
negative result (SAT), solved with positive result (UNSAT), false results (FALSE-
SAT), time-out (TO), out-of-memory (OM), and other errors (Error)) out of 137
benchmarks with the modulo operator6. Most datasets in all sets (A, B, and
C) did not pass the normality test. Therefore, we applied the Wilcoxon test (a
non-parametric t-test). Our goal was to check with which set of parameters (men-
tioned above) performed best; that is, the method with the largest mean value
when there was a significant statistical difference.
Figure 5.9 presents the results of the statistical analyses with Wilcoxon test
(fully-paired, two-tailed) as histograms of the mean value with Standard Error
Mean (SEM), where statistically significant p-value at ≤ 0.05, and labels A, B
and C refer to the comparison of the effect of the parameters sets in (iii), (ii)
6Our datasets contained samples with positive numbers for solved instances and negative
numbers for unsolved instances.
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Figure 5.9: Graphical description of statistical analyses with Wilcoxon
test on the number of solved and unsolved instances (SAT,UNSAT,FALSE-
SAT,TO,OM,Error) of LB-CEGAR-BMC with different sets of parameters, pre-
sented as histograms of means ± SEM, P-value (top-left): 0.1875, 0.3182, 0.0586,
0.8789, 0.3438, 0.2188, 0.1875, and labels for comparison of the effect of A (iii),
B (ii), and C (i). All tests results showed no statistically significant difference
(yet, the direction was (*) negative, (**) positive, or (***) unclear).
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and (i), respectively. The parameters used to obtain the results are mentioned
below each bar: (label A) LB-CEGAR-BMC with different lattices and different
theories compared with (CEX) or without (NO-CEX) counterexample feasibility
checks, (label B) LB-CEGAR-BMC and UDS compared with the parameters:
lattice size, guarded literals set’s size, and additional parameters, and (label C)
LB-CEGAR-BMC and CBMC compared with different theories (BOOL or other
SMT theories) and other parameters for LB-CEGAR-BMC (31 guarded literals
and no-cex). The results of LB-CEGAR-BMC are on the right bar for labelsB and
C. Label A is the comparison of LB-CEGAR-BMC between different parameters;
that is, the results of LB-CEGAR-BMC are on both bars.
We observed no signification difference in all tests in A, B, and C. While
we expected the null hypothesis to hold in B and C, it was unexpectedly true
also for A as we predicted the opposite when constructing our method (that is,
we did expect counterexamples to make a difference in term of performance).
Besides, in B, the direction of the results was mixed (positive and negative) with
no signification difference. Therefore, we would like to extend the discussion using
additional graphs and data in the next paragraphs.
Evaluation of the counterexamples’ guidance on the performance of
LB-CEGAR-BMC. In Fig. 5.10 we compared (in blue line) LB-CEGAR-BMC
with counterexample feasibility checks (as described in Sec. 5.6.1 with option (5))
against (in green line) LB-CEGAR-BMC with no counterexample feasibility check
(that is, instead of calling the CEX-validator, we always returned “false” and
forced refinement via the refiner). The graph in Fig. 5.10 shows no major changes
(even slight worse) when used the CEX-validator with respect to the number
of solved instances (SAT and UNSAT), which matches our observation on the
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Figure 5.10: Effect of counterexample feasibility checks in LB-CEGAR-BMC
on performance against LB-CEGAR-BMC without it.
statistical results in Fig.5.9 A. The change in the number of solved instances was
due to time-out and out-of-memory exceptions when we loaded the same lattices
to HiFrog in the evaluation. Hence, we have concluded that the CEX-validator
should solve the counterexample feasibility check via a lighter theory than bit-
vectors. In Chap. 6, we use NRA for the counterexample feasibility checks; in
future work (Chap. 9), we suggest using NRA, NIA or delta-SAT instead.
An interesting observation on Fig. 5.10 is related to the performance of the
benchmarks in UFLIA versus UFLRA. The LB-CEGAR-BMC performed bet-
ter with UFLRA due to out-of-resources exceptions in the instances solved with
UFLIA (as shown in Fig. 5.11, right graph, blue line). This is generally expected
behaviour, as SMT solvers tend to implement the integer arithmetic solver on
Chapter 5 Lattice-based CEGAR in Bounded Model Checking 113
top of the real arithmetic solver, which means that the former consumes more
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Figure 5.11: Measure the effect of lattice traversal algorithm in LB-CEGAR-
BMC on performance against flat lattice.
Evaluation of LB-CEGAR-BMC against UDS in HiFrog. In Fig. 5.11,
we compared the performance of LB-CEGAR-BMC against HiFrog with user-
defined summaries (UDS). The set contained either 21 or 31 summaries; in UDS,
we loaded all summaries at once to HiFrog. Fig. 5.11 (left) shows that LB-
CEGAR-BMC (in blue line) and UDS (in orange line) solved on average the same
number of instances (SAT and UNSAT), which supports our observation in
Fig.5.9 B, that there was no signification difference between the methods with
modulo operator. We have observed the following from Fig. 5.11:
• LB-CEGAR-BMC (in blue line) had fewer instances with out-of-resources
exceptions than UDS (in orange line) on the average (Fig. 5.11, right graph).
• The resources consumption problem (that is, out-of-memory and out-of-
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time) has grown in UDS with the size of the set of summaries loaded
to HiFrog. We did not observe this behaviour in LB-CEGAR-BMC7.
• LB-CEGAR-BMC with lattices of 21 and 31 guarded literals had the same
resource consumption in a specific theory.
Following the above, we observed that the memory and time consumption in
LB-CEGAR-BMC was better and more efficient on average than in HiFrog with
UDS. Moreover, the use of the structure of a lattice assisted keeping the resources
consumption low even when the size of the lattice grew (with UDS, the tool’s
performance has gotten worse with the increase in the number of summaries loaded
to HiFrog). To conclude, unlike UDS, due to the use of the structure of a lattice,
our method could handle a larger amount of summaries without compromising
performance, even-though HiFrog with UDS is a well-tested functionality taken
from FunFrog, while our method is a new prototype with much more complex
functionality than UDS.
Evaluation of LB-CEGAR-BMC with different theories. Fig.5.9 C
showed no significant statistical difference, usually with an unclear direction of
the results between LB-CEGAR-BMC and CBMC when solving the benchmarks
with modulo function. We referred to each row in our datasets in this paragraph
to analyse and understand better the results of solved and unsolved instances,
separately. In Fig. 5.12 we compared the result of the evaluation of LB-CEGAR-
BMC with different theories (UFLIA-Lattice-Ref. label, navy-blue bars, UFLRA-
Lattice-Ref. label, blue bars, and EUF-Lattice-Ref. label, orange bars, all with
lattice of 31 guarded literals for the modulo operation) on solved-safe instances
7This method is not suitable for a one-time verification task. We suggested here to apply
this method only for common functions required for many verification tasks. Hence, we did not
consider the lattice construction time.
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UFLIA-Lattice-Ref. UFLRA-Lattice-Ref. EUF-Lattice-Ref. CBMC-5.10
LIA-UDS Theory-Ref. PURE-LRA PURE-EUF
Figure 5.12: Experimental results of the LB-CEGAR-BMC approach against
HiFrog (various parameters) and CBMC.
(UNSAT bars), solved-unsafe instances (SAT bars), unsolved-unsafe instances8
(FP SAT bars), and unsolved instances due to out of resource errors (TO+MO
bars). The comparison was against other approaches: CBMC with the default
settings (CBMC-5.10 label, yellow bars), HiFrog with 31 user-defined summaries
(LIA-UDS label, brown bars), Theory refinement (Theory-Ref. label, grey bars),
HiFrog with LRA (PURE-LRA label, light-blue bars), and HiFrog with EUF
(PURE-EUF label, green bars). Experiments with LIA was not included in the
comparison as this option in HiFrog is still experimental.
(UNSAT bars) LB-CEGAR-BMC with UFLRA performed quite well; it
solved 85 safe instances when CBMC solved 94 (the highest number). LB-
CEGAR-BMC with UFLIA performed almost as good as HiFrog with user-
8That is, instances where the expected result was UNSAT but an approach returned SAT
and hence the tool reported safe benchmarks as unsafe.
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defined summaries. However, both of them (UFLIA-Lattice-Ref. and LIA-UDS)
solved less safe instances in comparison to the performance of these settings with
linear real arithmetic. This was due to performance issues of the linear integer
arithmetic we observed before (see the discussion for Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11).
(SAT bars) All approaches (we tried in this section) solved similar instances
in the unsafe set, where HiFrog with EUF out-performed all the other approaches
as expected. EUF is a light-theory and was the lightest in comparison to the rest
of the theories and techniques we used. Hence we expected it to have the highest
number of solved-unsafe instances. On the other hand, HiFrog with EUF also
had the highest number of false results.
(FP SAT bars) The unsolved instances with false results were mainly affected
by the availability of the definition of the modulo operation (full or partial) and
the ability to model arithmetic operations in general (e.g., to model < in EUF or
a∗b in LRA). Consequently, LB-CEGAR-BMC with EUF, HiFrog with LRA and
HiFrog with EUF had the highest number of false results; all these approaches
ran either with no additional user-defined libraries or with theories that have no
support for arithmetic operations.
(TO+MO bars) LB-CEGAR-BMC ran out-of-resources as HiFrog with
UDS (with 31 summaries and linear integer arithmetic). The theory refinement
approach (with similar counterexample feasibility check) had the highest number
of out-of-resources instances, while HiFrog had the lowest number of out-of-
resources instances.
We can already conclude the following from the statistical tests and the three
paragraphs discussing the results compared LB-CEGAR-BMC with different pa-
rameters (i), (ii) and (iii):
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• A further investigation is required for an efficient counterexample feasibility
check.
• Loading summaries into HiFrog affected the performance in a negative
way in compare to approaches with no summaries.
• A definition (even if partial) of arithmetic operation and modulo opera-
tion was essential for solving the benchmarks here, which was the rea-
son CBMC out-perform (in several instances) our current implementation
of LB-CEGAR-BMC. However, we demonstrated the potential of using a
lattice and light-weight theories over the full definition of a library function
for the majority of the instances CBMC solved.
We present below the full evaluation in Table 5.2.
Full results of the evaluation of LB-CEGAR-BMC. In Table 5.2, the col-
umn Approach refers to the approach we used to get the results in a row, and the
column logic indicates which SMT logic used. The column #lit states the number
of guarded literals or summaries loaded into the tool or N/A if no summaries
used, and the column Opts. indicates if there is any specific tool’s option we used
(NO-CEX for disabling the counterexample feasibility checks, UDS for loading
user-defined summaries into the tool, and Theory Ref. to use the theory refine-
ment option in HiFrog). For the results, the column #instances solved gives the
number of correctly solved-unsafe and solved-safe instances, and last, the column
#instances unsolved gives the number of unsolved instances for different reasons
(that is, instances with false positive, time-out, out-of-memory, and other errors
results). We present the full evaluation of LB-CEGAR-BMC with the following
settings: (i) with LIA with EUF (UFLIA) encoding with 21 or 31 guarded lit-
erals in the lattice for modulo operation (rows 1-2) and without counterexample
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feasibility check (rows 7-8), (ii) with LRA with EUF (UFLRA) encoding with 21
or 31 guarded literals in the lattice for modulo operation (rows 3-4) and without
counterexample feasibility check (rows 9-10), and (iii) with EUF encoding with 21
or 31 guarded literals in the lattice for modulo operation (rows 5-6) and without
counterexample feasibility check (rows 11-12). We compared our implementation
of LB-CEGAR-BMC approach in HiFrog (in rows 1-12) against:
1. HiFrog with LRA encoding and EUF encoding (Chap. 4). In rows: HiFrog
LRA 0 N/A (row 20) and HiFrog EUF 0 N/A (row 21) with the OpenSMT2
SMT solver.
2. HiFrog with user-defined summaries with LRA, LIA, or EUF encoding
(Chap. 4), with either 21 or 31 summaries (in rows: HiFrog LIA 21 UDS
(row 13), HiFrog LIA 31 UDS (row 14), HiFrog LRA 21 UDS (row 15),
HiFrog LRA 31 UDS (row 16), HiFrog EUF 21 UDS (row 17), and HiFrog
EUF 31 UDS (row 18)), and with the OpenSMT2 SMT solver for the
counterexample feasibility checks and for verification with EUF, and the
Z3 SMT solver for verification with LRA and LIA.
3. HiFrog theory-refinement option with CUF encoding (Chap. 7). In row:
HiFrog CUF 0 Theory Ref. (row 19) with the OpenSMT2 SMT solver.
4. CBMC version 5.10 [CKL04] (the winner of the software model checking
competition falsification track in 2017). In row: CBMC 5.10 0 N/A (row
22).
Note that, CBMC version 5.10 –refine option performs as the standard
CBMC version, and thus is not included in Table 5.2.
Even with a prototype implementation of our algorithms, LB-CEGAR-BMC
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performed quite well in comparison to established tools, with 109 solved in-
stances (for UFLRA, 31 guarded literals) and 91 solved instances (for UFLIA, 31
guarded literals) versus 119 solved instances with CBMC, 61 solved instances with
HiFrog LRA, and 56 solved instances with HiFrog EUF. LB-CEGAR-BMC
with EUF performed poorly even with respect to HiFrog EUF. In general, the
LB-CEGAR-BMC approach (with any of the theories) failed to prove safety once
other operations abstracted from the SMT encoding (e.g., SHL, SHR, pointer
arithmetic) or, in UFLRA and UFLIA when the code contained non-linear ex-
pressions.
The experimental results of LB-CEGAR-BMC (with and without counterex-
ample feasibility checks) and UDS mode of HiFrog were pretty much the same,
with 109 solved instances (for UFLRA, 31 guarded literals), and 91 solved in-
stances (for UFLIA, 31 guarded literals), versus HiFrog with UDS with 96 solved
instances (for LRA and LIA 31 summaries). However, in overall, it had better
resource consumption than UDS mode of HiFrog (TO+OM instances). An in-
teresting result was the performance of HiFrog with UDS in LRA with 21 and
31 summaries, with the former out-performed the latter due to out-of-memory
exception (occurred in many instances) when loading 31 summaries to the tool.
LB-CEGAR-BMC has no instance with time-out exception with UFLRA, while
all the rest of the approaches had (even for HiFrog with a lightweight theory
only as PURE LRA and PURE EUF).
LB-CEGAR-BMC, out-performed theory refinement mode of HiFrog; when
both theory refinement and LB-CEGAR-BMC (rows 1-6) used the same coun-
terexample feasibility check. LB-CEGAR-BMC with no counterexample feasi-
bility check (rows 7-12) also out-performed theory refinement mode of HiFrog.
Theory refinement had a high rate of instances with a general exception (unneces-
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sarily time-out or out-of-memory), which might indicate that the implementation
of theory refinement was not mature enough.
Last observation is related to the performance of LB-CEGAR-BMC with
UFLRA versus UFLIA, with the former out-performed the latter; we expected
the opposite results since these benchmarks contained mainly integer problems.
To conclude from the above, LB-CEGAR-BMC had similar results to CBMC
and HiFrog (with different settings) but failed to prove safety when other op-
erations abstracted from the SMT encoding. A possible solution to this problem
can be using lattices to refine these operations in addition to modulo operation.
We reported a better resource consumption in LB-CEGAR-BMC with a copy of a
lattice per occurrence of the modulo function than with user-defined summaries,
especially as the number of summaries loaded to HiFrog had grown. Last, the
counterexample feasibility checks were inefficient as there was no major difference
in the results with this option or without it. Even with the improvement of the
implementation of the counterexample feasibility checks, we believe these checks
at the bit level might still be expensive, and suggest to handle this problem by
using either a different theory or a solving approach for these checks.
None of the approaches in the comparison reports unsafe benchmarks as safe.
The full table of results and the set of benchmarks are available at [HiF19].
Experiment settings. We used two different in size meet semi-lattices for the
refinement of programs in C with modulo function calls. We constructed these
lattices with Fmod a set of 21 or 31 guarded literals, which were small arbitrary
subsets of the modulo function properties. The width and height of these lattices
were 10 and 13, and 11 and 13, respectively. The raw data was taken from the
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Coq proof assistant [The19a] and Wikipedia [Mod19] (see [HiF19] for a meet
semi-lattice sketch).
We used the OpenSMT2 SMT solver [HMAS16] for EUF solving and coun-
terexample feasibility checks, and the Z3 SMT solver [DMB08b] for LIA with
EUF and LRA with EUF solving. Note that, we removed three guarded literals
from the original set of guarded literals Fmod to prevent contradictions with IEEE
754 definition (done for any guarded literal that was based on the pure algebraic
definition or the Euclidean definition [Bou92]).
Our benchmarks consisted of 137 C programs with the modulo operation (pos-
sibly with more than one assertion). The benchmarks set was a mix of 81 SV-
COMP [Com18] benchmarks and 56 of our benchmarks (either from HiFrog tool,
previous papers or crafted benchmarks with modulo operation for this work). Ma-
jority of the benchmarks included at least several statements in the code with the
modulo operation and loops.
Chapter 6
Lattice-based SMT for Program
Verification
We present a lattice-based satisfiability modulo theory for verification of programs
with library functions, for which the mathematical libraries supporting these func-
tions contain a high number of equations and inequalities. Common strategies for
dealing with library functions include treating them as uninterpreted functions or
using the theories under which the functions are fully defined. The full definition
could in most cases lead to instances that are too large to solve efficiently.
Our lightweight theory uses lattices for efficient representation of library func-
tions by a subset of guarded literals. These lattices are constructed from equations
and inequalities of properties of the library functions. These subsets are found
during the lattice traversal. We generalise the method to a number of lattices
for functions whose values depend on each other in the program, and we describe
a simultaneous traversal algorithm of several lattices, so that a combination of
guarded literals from all lattices does not lead to contradictory values of their
variables.
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We evaluate our approach on benchmarks taken from the robotics community,
and our experimental results demonstrate that we are able to solve a number of
instances that were previously unsolvable by existing SMT solvers.
6.1 Introduction
Finding a scalable way for verifying programs or systems which use library func-
tions as a main part of their application (e.g., implementation of robots’ move-
ments in the Robot Operating System (ROS) [ROS19]) is a non-trivial task: the
code may contain hundreds of interacting expressions of the properties of the
library functions, whose truth values depend on each other. A straightforward
solution would be to use increasingly precise theories. However, this approach
results in prohibitively expensive computations (e.g., by adding details at the
bit-level to describe trigonometric functions, which would be very expensive).
Trigonometric functions serve as a good illustration of the problem outlined
above, as many domains of application, such as robotics, planning [Wit16],
and simulations for physics and engineering [osp19], rely on the computation
of trigonometric functions. Verification of software using trigonometric library
functions [AP10, DMP13, DM14, TE14, CGI+17b, GJBF18] either requires
a large amount of numerical calculations of polynomials along with irrational
numbers or uses large look-up trigonometric tables which tend to be less pre-
cise and are memory consuming [KGP06]. The former technique usually re-
places the irrational expressions with rational expressions with a defined error
bound [MM05, DLM09, AP10, CGI+17b, CGI+18b] in order to bound or to eval-
uate trigonometric expressions to some precision. A more precise approach relies
on Taylor series representation of trigonometric functions over reals; as it leads
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to complex computations, the resulting instances are too large to solve efficiently
for all, but very small programs.
Finally, the solver implemented in HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]) supports
the addition of sets of equations and inequalities as user-defined function sum-
maries. We can, therefore, extract the known properties of library functions from
the external libraries and encode them as user-defined SMT summaries to pass
to HiFrog, and, ultimately, to the SMT solver. However, this approach is not
scalable either, as we do not know beforehand which properties are going to be
relevant for solving a particular instance. Hence, for library functions with a large
number of equations (such as trigonometric functions—there are many equations
describing properties of these functions on some subdomains), the user-defined
summaries will render the instance too large to be solvable efficiently (or at all).
In this chapter, we present a novel approach to reasoning about programs
whose correctness depends on the values of library functions. Our approach uses
the concept of subset lattices to construct an efficient representation of known
properties of these functions. Essentially, we order the set of subsets of equations
describing properties of library functions in a lattice, where each element corre-
sponds to a set of properties that hold for some subdomain of the inputs. At every
iteration of the algorithm, we verify the program with only a subset of equations
that corresponds to the current element in the lattice. If this subset is insufficient
for the verification (that is, does not provide enough information about the library
function), we refine it by traversing the lattice to a higher element, containing a
superset of the equations.
This lattice-based counterexample-guided abstraction refinement algorithm
(LB-CEGAR) is based on the traditional counterexample-guided abstraction re-
finement (CEGAR) [CGJ+00, CGJ+03], but replaces the refinement of the theory
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by the refinement of the set of equations for the library function in the program.
Our approach is similar to the traditional CEGAR approach in the sense that
a SAT result may indicate a real counterexample (in which case there are con-
crete values of symbolic variables that show the existence of this execution), or a
spurious counterexample, where the satisfying assignment provided by the solver
is due to over-approximation in the representation of the program. In contrary
to the traditional CEGAR, where an UNSAT result indicated that there are no
counterexamples in an abstraction of the program and hence in the concrete pro-
gram as well, in LB-CEGAR the UNSAT result merely means that there are no
counterexamples in the current subdomain of the input to the library function.
As we describe in the chapter, the lattice is constructed so that every lattice fron-
tier covers the whole domain of the input variables. Hence, in case of an UNSAT
result, the LB-CEGAR algorithm attempts to construct a frontier of unsatisfia-
bility. Such a frontier would indicate that there are no counterexamples in the
current abstraction for each subdomain of the input, and hence for the whole
domain as well.
In the previous chapter, we described a simplified LB-CEGAR algorithm for
the case of one library function in the program and for small lattices. In this
chapter, we extend LB-CEGAR to the general case, where the program may con-
tain several library functions whose values can be interconnected (for example,
sin x and cosx). Furthermore, each function can appear in the program multiple
times, thus inducing several instances of the lattice, which are traversed simul-
taneously. We describe the generalised LB-CEGAR algorithm and analyse its
worst-case complexity and heuristics in Sec. 6.3.
We implemented the generalised LB-CEGAR algorithm in the bounded model
checker HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]) supporting a subset of the C language and
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using the OpenSMT2 SMT solver [HMAS16] and the Z3 SMT solver [DMB08b]
and evaluated the implementation on a large set of benchmarks containing pro-
grams whose correctness depends on the values of trigonometric functions. The
experimental results clearly demonstrate an advantage to LB-CEGAR over other
approaches. We outline the implementation in Sec. 6.4.1 and the experimental
results in Sec. 6.4.2.
Our results are based on the trigonometric functions being treated as un-
interpreted functions in the encoding of the problem to the SMT solver and
the encoding of the mathematical equations as user-defined function summaries
in the semantics of reals, which is common in modelling software [AMP06,
KRSS16, AAC+17, BG18]. We assume the correctness of these equations (such
as sin2 x + cos2 x = 1) over real numbers. The challenge of verifying problems
over IEEE floating-point semantics, stemming from the implementation of the
trigonometric functions in the underlying architecture, is outside of the scope of
this thesis. There are clear advantages to pinpointing the subset of mathematical
equations that are instrumental for the correctness of the program under verifi-
cation (which is what we do in this chapter) to the challenge of verification over
floating-point semantics, and we leave the exploration of this direction for future
work (see Chap. 9, Sec. 9.2, last paragraph).
The following example illustrates the motivation for LB-CEGAR on a small
program with trigonometric functions.
Example 8. The program in Fig. 6.1 contains two library function calls: sin x
and cosx. The correctness of the program follows immediately from the following
trigonometric identity:
∀x ∈ R. sin2 x+ cos2 x = 1. (6.1)
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1 #inc lude <math . h>
2
3 double non l in ( double x ) {
4 double x_sin = s i n (x ) ;
5 double x_cos = cos (x ) ;
6 re turn x_sin∗x_sin + x_cos∗x_cos ;
7 }
8
9 void main ( ) {
10 double y = nondet ( ) ;
11 double z = non l in (y ) ;
12 a s s e r t ( z == 1) ;
13 }
14
Figure 6.1: Program with two different library functions.
Clearly, verifying a program with sin x and cosx treated as uninterpreted func-
tions (that is, having non-deterministic values) would result in numerous spuri-
ous counterexamples. LB-CEGAR overcomes this problem by representing some
salient properties of these functions as lattices of equations, including, in partic-
ular, Eq. (6.1).
In this case, the elements of the lattices for sin x and for cosx at each iteration
of LB-CEGAR are not independent, as Eq. (6.1) should hold for each combination
of these elements. Moreover, having a lattice only for one function would not
suffice for proving the correctness of this program, as then we would have Eq. 6.1
only for one of these functions, while leaving the other one as a non-deterministic
variable. This would lead to spurious counterexamples, stemming from assigning
illegal values to the non-deterministic variable (for example, if cosx is left as a
non-deterministic variable, it could be assigned the value 2, hence falsifying the
assertion).
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General examples of lattice construction with different properties of library
functions as well as the refinement with such lattices of a small code example in
C are available at [HiF19].
The implementation, the set of benchmarks, the experimental results, and
additional materials, are available at [Git19a, Git19b, HiF19].
6.2 Preliminaries
Lattices of Guarded Literals We use the definitions in Sec. 5.3.1 and con-
struct the lattice as described in Sec. 5.4. We do not intend to extend the discus-
sion of the lattice construction in this chapter. See Sec. 2.1 for general definitions
of a poset, a lattice and a semi-lattice.
Function summaries. We exploit this functionality by providing HiFrog with
the library of user-defined summaries (Sec. 2.5.1) derived from external libraries
for the functions, whose values are critical for determining correctness of the
program, and we organise them in lattices as we explain in Chap. 5. This allows us
to verify programs in the most abstract theory of equality logic with uninterpreted
functions (EUF) or its extensions.
It is important to note that the use of function summaries is a choice of
implementation. There is no limitation of our approach using function summaries
as a means of input over other formats (e.g., plain strings).
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6.3 The Lattice-based Counterexample-Guided
Abstraction Refinement (LB-CEGAR) Al-
gorithm
In this section we present the main contribution of the chapter—the LB-CEGAR
algorithm. We start with an informal overview and then present the formal de-
scription of the algorithm. We proceed with discussing its worst-case complexity
and then present several heuristics that reduce the complexity for the majority of
the cases.
6.3.1 Overview of the LB-CEGAR algorithm
The inputs to the Lattice-based Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement
(LB-CEGAR) algorithm (Alg. 5) are a bounded loop-free program P that in-
cludes the function f and a safety property t. The algorithm follows the standard
procedure of translating P and the negation of t to a first-order formula ϕ and
invoking an SMT solver in order to find a satisfying assignment. In contrast to
the standard approach, in LB-CEGAR the SMT solver has access, in addition to
ϕ, to the external lattice Lf of guarded literals for f constructed in Sec. 5.3.1. At
each iteration LB-CEGAR adds the set of guarded literals in the current element
E of this lattice to ϕ before sending ϕ to the SMT solver.
The refinement loop in LB-CEGAR, invoked when a satisfying assignment
does not correspond to a concrete counterexample, amounts to the traversal of Lf
as described below in the procedure traverseSAT .
The algorithm terminates when it either finds a satisfying assignment that
corresponds to a concrete counterexample (and hence a bug in P ), reaches all
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maximal elements of Lf without finding concrete counterexamples for any of the
satisfying assignments (that is, the current set of properties of f encoded in Lf
is insufficient to verify P ), or finds a frontier of Lf such that ϕ is unsatisfiable
with each element of the frontier separately. The latter case implies that there
are no counterexamples in the over-approximation of P for the whole domain of
the inputs, and hence P satisfies t.
An iteration of LB-CEGAR with a program P , a safety property t, and a
current element e consisting of the set of guarded literals S(e) of the lattice Lf
results in one of the following (for one library function f and a single occurrence
of f in the loop-free program P ):
• An SMT solver finds a satisfying assignment for ϕ with S(e), and there is a
concrete counterexample corresponding to this assignment. The algorithm
terminates, outputting the counterexample as an evidence of the negative
result of model checking P .
• An SMT solver finds a satisfying assignment for ϕ with S(e), but there is no
concrete counterexample corresponding to this assignment. The algorithm
invokes a refinement step that amounts to traversing Lf to an element e′ that
refines e, that is, S(e) ⊂ S(e′). If no such element exists (in other words,
e is a maximal element of Lf ), the algorithm terminates with inconclusive
results.
• An SMT solver returns the UNSAT result for ϕ with S(e). In other words,
there is no satisfying assignment to ϕ in the subdomain of inputs induced
by e. The refinement step of LB-CEGAR is, then, to check satisfiability of
ϕ with elements of Lf that complement the subdomain of e to the whole
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domain of the input (that is, with elements of Lf that together with e form
a frontier of Lf ).
• An SMT solver returns the UNSAT result for ϕ with S(e), and e is a part
of a frontier of Lf for which ϕ is unsatisfiable. This result implies that there
is no satisfying assignment to ϕ over the whole domain of the inputs, and
therefore P is safe with respect to t.
If the function f appears in P several times, an instance of Lf is created for
each occurrence. Furthermore, if P contains more than one library function for
which we have a lattice of guarded literals, all these lattices are incorporated in
LB-CEGAR. For programs with trigonometric functions, which are the primary
domain of application in this chapter, it is often the case that an equation includes
several functions—see, for example, the program in Ex. 8.
In the next section, we present a pseudo-code for LB-CEGAR and discuss the
general case of several functions and several occurrences of each function in the
program.
6.3.2 The main LB-CEGAR algorithm
The pseudo-code of LB-CEGAR is presented below. The input to the algorithm
is a loop-free program P , a safety property t, and a set of lattices Lattices.
The sub-procedures and notations in Alg. 5 are defined as follows.
• The sub-procedure checkSAT (ψ) determines the satisfiability of an input
formula ψ in a given logic via an SMT solver.
• The sub-procedure checkRealCE(P, t,CEX) returns true if CEX can be
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Algorithm 5: LB-CEGAR
Input : Program P , safety property t, and set Lattices
Output: 〈Safe〉, 〈Unsafe,CEX〉, or 〈Unknown,⊥〉
1 ϕ← P ∧ ¬t
2 Query ← ϕ
3 〈result,CEX〉 ← checkSAT (Query)
4 if result is UNSAT ∨ checkRealCE(ϕ,CEX) then




9 χ′ ← χ // Formula from the previous iteration
10 if result is UNSAT then
11 traverseUNSAT(Lattices)
12 end




17 // Solve again if there are new literals
18 if χ 6= χ′ then
19 Query ← ϕ ∧ χ
20 〈result,CEX〉 ← checkSAT (Query)
21 end
22 until (χ == χ′)∨ ∨checkRealCE(Query,CEX) ∨ termination(result,Lattices);
23 Exit: // End of LB-CEGAR
24 if result is UNSAT then
25 return 〈Safe〉 // Safe
26 end
27 if checkRealCE(P, t,CEX) then
28 return 〈Unsafe,CEX〉 // Real counterexample
29 end
30 return 〈Unknown〉 // Inconclusive results, further refinement needed
concretised to a counterexample1, demonstrating a behaviour of P that fal-
sifies t.
• The set Lattices consists of all occurrences of lattices for all library functions
in P .
• We define currentFacts(ϕ,Lattices) as ϕ ∧ currentFacts(Lattices).
• We denote by Lif a lattice for the ith occurrence of f in P , and by e the
1A counterexample (conjoined with the model) is tested by using a theory under which the
library function is fully defined.
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current element in the lattice traversal. (i) For an element e, we define
currentFacts(Lattices) as the conjunction of guarded literals of e. (ii) For a
lattice with a frontier, we define currentFacts(Lattices) as the disjunction of
the conjunction of guarded literals of elements in the frontier2.
• The sub-procedure traverseUNSAT (Lattices) performs the traversal of the
lattice from the current element e to the next element e′ if the result
of model checking ϕ ∧ currentFacts is UNSAT. The next element e′
in the same lattice as e is e’s ‘sibling’, that is, an element, whose set
of literals corresponds to a different subdomain of the input. If there is
already a frontier of elements in each lattice such that model checking
ϕ ∧ currentFacts returns UNSAT for each element of these frontiers, the
procedure traverseUNSAT (Lattices) does not change the current element e.
• The sub-procedure traverseSAT (Lattices) is invoked when there is a satisfying
assignment for ϕ ∧ currentFacts, but the counterexample induced by it is
spurious, that is, it does not correspond to a behaviour of P falsifying t.
The procedure traverses the lattice to an element e′ that refines e, that is,
S(e) ⊂ S(e′). If e is a maximal element, the procedure traverseSAT (Lattices)
does not change the current element e.
• In both sub-procedures traverseUNSAT and traverseSAT , the lattices are tra-
versed either in an arbitrary order or in an order determined by heuristics.
However, we do not describe a fix order mechanism of traversing the lat-
tice to be able to deal with different combinations of library functions. We
describe such heuristics in Sec. 6.4.1.
2The formula of the frontier is a first-order formula in DNF form. For example, given a
frontier X(Lif ), its first-order formula is: ∨e∈X(Lif ). ∧l∈e l.
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• The sub-procedure termination(result,Lattices) checks whether one of the
termination conditions holds: either the current satisfying assignment in-
duces a concrete counterexamples, or there is an UNSAT frontier for each
lattice Lif ∈ Lattices, or there is a satisfying assignment for each maximal
element in each lattice in Lattices that does not induce a concrete counterex-
ample.
Finally, we address the complexity resulting from having several functions in
P , whose lattices refer to each other. This is illustrated by Ex. 8, where the
correctness of the program depends on the guarded literal
(assume(true)) ∧ (sin2 x+ cos2 x) = 1.
In fact, this is quite common in programs with trigonometric functions, as trigono-
metric identities often refer to several functions in the same identity. The algo-
rithm identifies library functions used in the set Lattices and assigns the same
variable to all occurrences of the same function, hence connecting between the
lattices of different functions.
6.3.3 Correctness and complexity
It is easy to see that LB-CEGAR terminates (Lemma 3 in Sec. 6.3.3). Indeed,
the lattice traversal visits every combination of elements of lattices in Lattices at
most once, and for each combination of elements it invokes the model checking
procedure of a bounded loop-free program P with respect to t, which terminates.
The number of possible combinations of elements in the lattices is exponential in
the number of lattices, hence leading to the complexity result below.
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Theorem 1. The worst-case running-time complexity of LB-CEGAR is O(|L|n×
MC(P, t)), where |L| is the bound on the size of each lattice in the set Lattices, n
is the number of lattices in Lattices, and MC(P, t) is the running-time complexity
of model checking P with respect to t using the guarded literals.
Proof. From Lemma 3, we know that the LB-CEGAR terminates. Before ter-
mination, the lattice traversal visits every combination of elements of lattices
in Lattices at most once; since, for the general case, we assume no heuristic or
optimization are used during the traversal.
For each combination of elements, it invokes the model checking procedure of
a bounded loop-free program P with respect to t, which terminates. The number
of possible combinations of elements in the lattices is exponential in the number
of lattices, hence leading to the complexity result below.
Moreover, the following theorem states that LB-CEGAR produces a correct
result.
Theorem 2. The following holds for any bounded loop-free program P and a
safety property t, assuming correctness of the guarded literals in Lattices:
• If LB-CEGAR outputs Safe, the program P is correct with respect to t.
• If LB-CEGAR outputs Unsafe with an accompanying CEX , the CEX
demonstrates an execution of P that falsifies t.
• If LB-CEGAR outputs Unknown, the current theory and the set of guarded
literals are insufficient to produce a conclusive result.
Proof. Once checkRealCE is true with any set of guarded literals, the condition
in line 22 is true, and the algorithm terminates. After exiting the loop in lines
8-22, since checkRealCE is true, the condition in line 27 holds, and LB-CEGAR
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outputs Unsafe with the real counterexample, which is the counterexample it
used last in the condition in line 22.
LB-CEGAR outputs Safe only if the conditions in line 24 holds, without lattic-
es if the first query is UNSAT (in line 3) or with lattices if the last query is
UNSAT (in line 20) and the condition for termination holds while using the
frontiers of all lattices (line 22, when termination is true and result = true). The
first case is true in general in bounded model checking. We prove the second case
where we use lattices.
The last query (line 19) just before violating the condition in line 22 is a
conjunction of ϕ with guarded literals from all elements of frontiers of all lattices
in Lattices. By Lemma 1, we know that the union of assume statements of
elements in the frontier captures the whole input domain of each of the functions
of the lattices in Lattices.
Therefore, if no satisfying assignment has been found with all frontiers of lat-
tices in Lattices, there is no satisfying assignment in the input domain of functions
for which we added guarded literals (i.e., those which have a lattice in Lattices) in
the unwound program P . Since there was no satisfying assignment for ϕ in line 3,
then the program is indeed safe with respect to the given bound and a property
t.
Once LB-CEGAR cannot find a counterexample nor a set of guarded literals
that refines ϕ (that is checkRealCE is false, χ = χ′, or termination is true but
result is SAT) then none of the conditions in lines 24 and 27 holds and LB-CEGAR
outputs Unknown (line 30).
We observe that, while the worst-case complexity of LB-CEGAR is exponential
in the number of lattices, in practice the algorithm is very efficient, as we show in
Sec. 6.4.2. This is partly due to the incrementality of the calls to the SMT solver,
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as the formula ϕ representing P ∧¬t stays the same for all iterations, and the next
element e′ differs from the current element e of the lattice only slightly. Another
reason for the significantly lower complexity in practice is that our implementation
of LB-CEGAR includes several heuristics, which we describe in the next section.
The heuristics do not alter the correctness of the algorithm.
Termination of LB-CEGAR algorithm
We prove here two additional lemmas required for the proof of Theorem 1.
The bound of each lattice L in Lattices is as follows.
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By using the height and the bound on the width of L, we get that the bound of
the size of the lattice is:






Lemma 3. The LB-CEGAR algorithm terminates.
Proof. Sine P is a bounded loop-free program then the set Lattices is finite. From
Lemma 2 we know that the size of each lattice in Lattices is finite (since the size
of each lattice is bounded).
Each iteration of the LB-CEGAR algorithm either invokes the sub-procedure
traverseUNSAT or the sub-procedure traverseSAT . In both cases, we traverse to
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an element which we yet visit: in the former case, traverseUNSAT performs a
traversal to an element whose set of literals corresponds to a different subdomain
of the input, and in the latter case, traverseSAT performs a traversal to an element
with a bigger set of guarded literals that refines the current counterexample; if
|Lattices| > 1, we label a combination of elements from Lattices as visited instead
of labelling an element.
The number of the lattices is finite; the size of each lattice is bounded and
hence finite too. Accordingly, the number of times that LB-CEGAR traverses
an element that has not yet been visited in each of the lattices is bounded and
hence finite. Once LB-CEGAR has no new element to visit (but yet found a
counterexample nor found guarded literals that suffice to prove correctness for
all subdomains), then χ is equal to χ′ and the LB-CEGAR algorithm terminates
(exits the loop in line 22 and outputs a result in lines 24-30).
6.4 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we present additional details of the implementation of the LB-
CEGAR algorithm in HiFrog on top of the prototype implementation presented
in Sec. 5.6.1, with an evaluation of the new implementation.
6.4.1 Implementation of the LB-CEGAR algorithm
The algorithms were implemented on top of the SMT-based function summarisa-
tion bounded model checker HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]) with the OpenSMT2
SMT solver [HMAS16] and the Z3 SMT solver [DMB08b, DMP13]. The details
of our initial implementation are described in Chap. 5. Here we describe the
extension of the implementation to support the LB-CEGAR algorithm.
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Figure 6.2: LB-CEGAR for program P with several library functions (c) in
comparison with BMC with UDS (a) and BMC with the initial approach LB-
CEGAR-BMC (b).
Fig. 6.2 presents a high-level view of the implementation of LB-CEGAR
in HiFrog and a comparison between the implementation as a flat (non-
hierarchical) set of user-defined summaries, our prototype implementation with
one function (LB-CEGAR-BMC), and the current implementation of the general
algorithm (LB-CEGAR).
Pre-processing stage
We constructed two lattices for sin and cos functions via a set of BASH scripts (see
Chap. 5) for the evaluation of our approach. The guarded literals were imported
from the raw data of Coq proof assistant [The19a] and Wikipedia [Lis19, Tri19]
and translated to SMT summaries. The definitions of constants (e.g., π from
math.h) and trigonometric tables (values of the trigonometric functions for x =
c · π, for some c ∈ N) were added to the set of guarded literals manually. The
final set consisted of 80 guarded literals and was used to construct the meet semi-
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lattices for sin x and cosx functions. Textual files of these meet semi-lattices are
available at [Git19b, HiF19].
Implementation in HiFrog
The implementation of LB-CEGAR uploaded only the set of guarded literals in
the current element of the lattice for better performance. In LB-CEGAR, if the
current element is insufficient for solving the formula (that is, the satisfying as-
signments produced by the SMT solver do not induce concrete counterexamples),
the algorithm traverses the lattice to a higher element. In the implementation,
this was translated as adding and removing some subsets of guarded literals. It
is clear that the new formula only differed from the one in the previous iteration
by a subset of guarded literals. The implementation exploited this fact by using
the SMT solver in an incremental mode.
We extended the support for incremental solving in HiFrog, adding non-,
semi-, and full-incremental solving modes, to support different degrees of incre-
mentality (e.g., the semi-incremental solving mode allows only push() calls). With
this support, the implementation modified only a single query from one iteration
to the next, which was less costly than re-writing the whole formula.
Heuristics
We implemented the following heuristics to improve the complexity of lattice
traversal in LB-CEGAR. None of these heuristics changed the worst-case run-
ning time complexity, but our experiments showed that they were beneficial on
programs in our benchmark set.
• The choice of the successor in the sub-procedure traverseSAT (Lattices) was
done based on the current spurious counterexample CEX , similarly to the
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traditional CEGAR. We identified the location in the code where the ab-
stract counterexample deviated from a concrete execution and used this
information to guide the lattice traversal to the element that refined this
particular location (if such an element existed).
• The ‘frontier of unsatisfiability’, that is, a frontier of a lattice that results
in UNSAT for each element of this frontier, was computed once per lattice
and was fixed. While in theory, it is possible that the current frontier of a
lattice L1 results in UNSAT when combined with an element e of a lattice
L2, but not with an element e′ of L2, in practice such cases were rare. There
is an option to output Unknown if the set of frontiers computed gradually
does not result in UNSAT, thus potentially increasing the number of cases,
where LB-CEGAR outputs an inconclusive result. In our experiments, this
heuristic did not lead to an increase in the number of inconclusive results.
• For lattices representing different occurrences of a function f in P which
occur in a loop, we traversed these lattices simultaneously. The motivation
for the ‘coordinated’ traversal was that all loop iterations, except, perhaps,
for the last one, are similar, and hence there is a high probability that the
same set of guarded literals would fit all these occurrences.
• We dynamically interpreted non-deterministic expressions in a guarded lit-
eral (an equation or inequality of a library function). Non-deterministic
expressions were those expressions that we could not model in the cur-
rent level of abstraction. In the current implementation, we interpreted
these expressions by using other expressions in the first-order formula of
the current encoding of the problem to guess the possible values of these
non-deterministic expressions.
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The main difference from Chap. 5 was that we treated non-deterministic
expressions in UDS as we treated uninterpreted functions, without any at-
tempt to narrow to a subdomain of values. In this chapter, we used the
mechanism of function summaries merely for loading the lattice into our
tool, but we interpreted the guarded literals concerning other library func-
tion calls in the program.
6.4.2 Experimental results
For the evaluation of LB-CEGAR, we constructed two lattices for sin and cos
functions with 40 and 38 guarded literals, respectively. The validation test for
these expressions contains a set of 144 benchmarks in C with a total of 365 assert
statements. The scripts for the lattice construction, the benchmarks for the vali-
dation test, and the results of the validation test are available at [Git19a, HiF19].
The set of benchmarks contained a mix of our crafted benchmarks,
programs from the software verification competition SV-COMP [Com18],
and HiFrog benchmarks (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]), with a total of 141 C pro-
grams with at least one library function call, containing in total 194 calls for
sin and 179 calls for cos , with 279 claims (127 SAT and 152 UNSAT). In 42
benchmarks, the library function is called at least 4 times, and in 8 benchmarks,
the library function call is in a loop. The crafted benchmarks either assert known
properties of trigonometric functions or contain a small part of code that is
typical to kinematic problems, mainly examining the ability of verifying code
with multiplication between two library function calls; e.g., cosφ× sin θ.
To model a program with its property, we either used the quantifier-free
SMT theory for equality logic with uninterpreted functions (EUF) with a semi-
incremental solving mode in the OpenSMT2 SMT solver [HMAS16] or the
Chapter 6 Lattice-based SMT for Program Verification 144
quanti- fier-free SMT theories for linear arithmetics (LA) with EUF with an in-
cremental solving mode in the Z3 SMT solver [DMB08b]. For the CEGAR-style
check of counterexamples in the sub-procedure checkRealCE in Sec. 6.3.2, we used
the quantifier-free SMT theory for non-linear real arithmetic (NRA).
The default parameters of the LB-CEGAR algorithm include the use of all the
heuristics in Sec. 6.4.1. In the evaluation, we used the default parameters and
thus used all of the four heuristics; see [HiF19] for more details regarding these
parameters.
The experiments were performed on a virtual machine (VM) with
Ubuntu 16.04 Linux system, single-core, 8GB RAM; the VM runs on a ma-
chine with 4-Intel i7-6600U CPUs clocked at 2.60GHz. The experimental results,
the benchmarks, and the source code, are available at [Git19a, Git19b, HiF19].
Evaluation of LB-CEGAR with real arithmetic
Figure 6.3 presents the comparison of LB-CEGAR with (i) CBMC version 5.10
[cbm19], (ii) HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]), and (iii) LB-CEGAR-BMC our pro-
totype implementation described in Chap. 5 supporting one library function at a
time.
The total number of solved instances is the blue bar and the orange bar,
for Safe and Unsafe instances respectively. The total number (as a negative
number) of unsolved instances is the gray bar and the yellow bar, for SAT
instances that are classified as Unknown (or SAT without a counterexample),
and for the instances that timed out (TO) or were out-of-memory (OM), with the
time-out set to 4000s and out-of-memory set to 3GB, respectively.
The four different colours of the bars are consistent across all six charts. Each
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of the number (#) of solved claims with different ap-
proaches and a set of trigonometric benchmarks in C.
chart represents the total solved instances for a particular tool or a variant of a
tool. The tools at the clockwise order are,
• LB-CEGAR with UFLRA (top-left).
• LB-CEGAR-BMC (Chap. 5) with UFLRA and a single lattice (top-middle).
• CBMC [CKL04] (top-right).
• HiFrog (Chap. 4) with user defined summaries with LRA (bottom-left),
with LRA (bottom-middle), and with EUF (bottom-right).
Note that, HiFrog used either EUF or LRA (the quantifier-free SMT theory
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for linear real arithmetic). All approaches with summaries used EUF with LRA
(UFLRA).
Verification with function summaries in HiFrog avoids processing the single
static assignment (SSA) expression of the original function, and only uses SMT
summaries (Chap. 4). The SMT summaries in the experimental section here3
were an over-approximation of library functions and contained no computation of
the actual function nor of its Taylor series approximations, at any stage. Hence,
complicated benchmarks, which contained library function calls in a loop or a non-
linear expression, were more likely to be successfully verified with summary-based
approaches than with classical approaches. These (unlike our method) usually
required computation (up to some precision) of an approximation of the function
and ran out of resources eventually. HiFrog with user-defined summaries used
∼ 80 equations of trigonometric properties, loaded at once as unstructured data
and solved a total of 227 instances (HiFrog - User-Defined, bottom-left, Fig. 6.3).
HiFrog with a single lattice used ∼ 40 equations of trigonometric properties,
and solved a total of 185 instances (LB-CEGAR-BMC, single lattice, top-middle,
Fig. 6.3).
LB-CEGAR, two lattices (sin and cos), constructed from a set of ∼ 80 equa-
tions of trigonometric properties (LB-CEGAR, top-left, Fig. 6.3), outperformed
both variants of HiFrog and had the highest overall number of solved instances:
over 260 instances.
Connecting lattices of different functions in LB-CEGAR algorithm allowed
our approach to verify the highest number of Safe instances, on many on which
other tools failed (including HiFrog-User-Defined and LB-CEGAR-BMC with sin-
3There is no limitation on using a summary with the actual definition of a function with
our method in general, as we have shown in [EAH+18] for Modulo function. However, the
generalised technique in this chapter designed to perform well, even without such a summary,
as schematically shown in Fig. 6.2 (c).
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gle lattice). In comparison with LB-CEGAR (with 261 solved instances, out of
279), other tools that did not use summaries or insights on trigonometric func-
tions, managed to solve at most 136 instances (CBMC V. 5. 10, HiFrog-LRA,
and HiFrog-EUF, in Fig. 6.3, at top-right, bottom-middle, and bottom-right, re-
spectively), mainly because of the use of non-deterministic variables to represent
trigonometric functions.
Evaluation of LB-CEGAR with different parameters of HiFrog
Table 6.1 presents a full comparison of our implementation of the LB-CEGAR
algorithm with other tools. The comparison was performed using various pa-
rameters of HiFrog, even-though LRA with EUF is the most suitable theory-
combination for trigonometric functions, based on our experience.
The physical files of SMT summaries for LRA and EUF (UFLRA) were the
same; HiFrog read an SMT summary file differently according to the theory in
use. The SMT summaries for the quantifier-free SMT theory for linear integer
arithmetic (LIA) were different to prevent any conversions to real arithmetic (e.g.,
to_real token) in the SMT query where all guards and literals were modelled via
LIA with EUF (UFLIA).
In Table 6.1, the verification results of LB-CEGAR appear in white and are
compared to CBMC [CKL04] and HiFrog (Chap. 4 and Chap. 5) appeared in
grey and dark grey. The best results underlined and marked in light-yellow. The
symbol # stands for the number of instances solved (first two lines) or unsolved
(last two lines). Unsolved instances are false-negative results (FN-SAT), incon-
clusive (also marked as FN-SAT), or time-out or out-of-memory (TO +OM).
The description of each column in Table 6.1 is as follows.
• The white columns in Table 6.1 (3 columns, LB-CEGAR col.) contain
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the results LB-CEGAR presented in this chapter along with the sets of
heuristics presented in Sec. 6.4.1 and different sets of parameters (with the
theory being EUF, UFLRA ,or UFLIA in the columns EUF, LIA and LRA
respectively), against other tools in the grey scale columns.
• The grey scale columns in Table 6.1 (10 columns from the end) contain
the results of other tools: LB-CEGAR-BMC with a single lattice (Chap. 5)
in LB-CEGAR-BMC col., HiFrog with a large set of user defined sum-
maries (Chap. 4) in HiFrog UDS col., and HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17])
and CBMC version 5.10 [cbm19] in the most right columns.
The evaluation of HiFrog in grey-scale is with a single lattice, and with and
without user defined summaries, using: EUF, LRA, LIA, LRA with EUF
(UFLRA), LIA with EUF (UFLIA), each of which is a different column in
Table 6.1 (with the theory being EUF, LRA or LIA).
The variant of HiFrog with theory refinement is omitted from the comparison,
as its current implementation does not support trigonometric functions.
For the LB-CEGAR approach for verification of programs with multiple
trigonometric functions, the best setting was with LRA with EUF (LB-CEGAR,
LRA col.), which had the highest overall number of solved instances over 260 in-
stances, and performed almost as well as HiFrog without any summary (ran out
of resources 4 times versus 2 times HiFrog did). The other two configurations of
parameters we tried with the LB-CEGAR approach for programs with multiple
library functions, were EUF (LB-CEGAR, EUF col.) and LIA with EUF (LB-
CEGAR, LIA col.). While EUF performed poorly in general, LIA with EUF has
shown limited potential in solving instances that required real arithmetic, which
indicates the possibility of applying this method for code with library functions
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over significantly different input domains, that is, code with both continuous and
discontinuous functions.
The comparison with LB-CEGAR-BMC with a single lattice (Chap. 5) (LB-
CEGAR-BMC, LRA col.) used either a meet semi-lattice for sin function or for
cos function per benchmark, which led to poor performance when both lattices
were required; however, perhaps unsurprisingly, this did not result in poor per-
formance when a single lattice was sufficient to prove the safety of a claim (59
instances, LB-CEGAR-BMC, LRA col.). HiFrog with user-defined summaries
(HiFrog UDS, LRA col.) could not solve around 50 safe instances that required a
wider context regarding other library functions, for one or more expressions with
a library function call.
6.5 Related Work
In this section, we discuss the related work to the lattice construction algorithm,
and the LB-CEGAR algorithms for efficient verification of software with library
functions (Chap. 5-6), including the use of mathematical properties, lattices, func-
tion summaries, SMT solvers, and other techniques for this purpose.
Lattices are a useful mathematical structure in understanding the relation-
ships between different abstractions and have been widely applied in a program
solving with Craig interpolation [Cra57]. For instance, [RS13] presented a seman-
tic solver-independent framework for systematically exploring interpolant lattices
using the notion of interpolation abstraction; the framework tried to find the
right level of abstraction (or description) of an interpolant of a problem (a chuck
of code). A lattice-based system for interpolation in propositional structures was
presented in [DKPW10], extended to consider size optimisation techniques in
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the context of function summaries in [RAF+13, AFHS15], and further extended
to partial variable assignments in [JAF+16]. Similar lattice-based reasoning has
also been extended to interpolation in first-order logic with other SMT, including
the equality logic with uninterpreted functions [AHAS17], and linear real arith-
metic [AHS17]. The approach presented in this chapter differs from the above
in that we did not rely on interpolation and worked in tight integration with the
model checker.
Computationally inexpensive theories can be used to over-approximate com-
plex problems. These approaches have been used in solving equations on non-
linear real arithmetic and transcendental functions based on linear real arith-
metic and equality logic with uninterpreted functions [KIY16, CGI+17a, CGI+17b,
CGI+18b], as well as on scaling up bit-vector solving [HCR+16, AAC+17,
HAE+17, BT19]. Our work in Chap. 5 and Chap. 6 can be seen as a generalisation
of these approaches as we supported inclusion of lemmas from more descriptive
logics to increase the expressiveness of computationally lighter logics.
The problem of verification of programs with transcendental functions and,
in particular, trigonometric functions have been addressed by several verifi-
cation tools. iSAT3 [FHT+07] handled the problem via interval propaga-
tion by refining the computed interval bounds, and dReal [GKC13] also
used interval propagation with δ-satisfiability but with user-specified precision
where δ is associated with the numerical error. Coq interval [Mel12] and
Gappa [DDLM11] applied interval propagation with Taylor series, while Math-
SAT5 [CGSS13, CGI+17b, CGI+18b, IGCS19] applied Taylor series with a
partial set of trigonometric properties. CVC4 [RTJB17, BT19] and Math-
SAT5 [CGI+17a, CGI+17b, CGI+18a, CGI+18b, IGCS19] adopted incremental
linearisation (as defined in MathSAT5) for solving non-linear arithmetic prob-
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lems in general. [Har00] addressed the problem for hardware verification. In
contrast to these approaches, our algorithm did not require non-linear arithmetic
or a calculation of Taylor series, which is computationally expensive for large
programs.
Lattices and posets have been used in abstract interpretation [CC77] to model
a sound approximation of the semantics of code, where completeness and partial
completeness [CC79, Cou00, GRS00, GQ01] referred to the no loss of precision
during the approximation of the semantics of code. Giacobazzi et al. [GRS00,
GQ01] presented the notation of backward and forward completeness and showed
the connection between iteratively computing the backward (forward)-complete
shell to the general CEGAR framework [CGJ+03]. The completeness of their
algorithm depended on the properties of the abstraction, while our algorithm had
no such requirements.
The idea of applying SMT solvers with abstract interpretation for program ver-
ification and the formalism of the unified approach with sufficient conditions for
completeness were presented in [CCM12]. A generic abstract satisfaction frame-
work [DHK14] with an efficient implementation [Hal13] applied the language of
abstract interpretation into SMT solvers and presented a simplified formalism
with fix-point completeness. These approaches applied abstract domains in SMT
solvers to deal with often difficult to model program properties. For trigonometric
functions where the implementation is usually based on Taylor approximations,
the program properties and the properties of trigonometric functions in mathe-
matics differ substantially.
Program slicing [Wei81] aims to reduce the size of a program by decomposing
the program into program slices according to a slicing criterion. In backward
slicing [Wei81, Sil12] the program slices were defined as the executable subset
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of statements with the same behaviour while slicing out any statement with no
effect on the variables and the control flow of the property under test. Attempts to
reduce further the size of a slice by aggressive slicing techniques (e.g., by aggressive
slicing [SFB07, KSK15]) remind the use of an assume statement of guarded literals
in the meet semi-lattice in our work. The similarity of the techniques was in
reducing the size of SMT queries by decomposing the expressions into meaningful
subsets each of which referred to a set of values of variables of the expression (in
our case, the library function call). Thin slicing [SFB07] kept only data-dependent
statements relevant to the property while removing control flow statements. Value
slicing [KSK15] similarly to thin slicing kept statements affecting values of the
variables in the property while bringing back conditional statements that are
value-impacting relevant to the property.
Interesting work on combining theorem provers with SMT solvers included the
SMTCoq system [EMT+17]. Our work in Chap. 5 and Chap. 6 used equations
and inequalities of properties of mathematical functions from the Coq library, but
differed from SMTCoq in that we imported the equations and inequalities of the
properties directly to the SMT solver instead of giving the SMT solver to Coq.
6.6 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a new algorithm LB-CEGAR that is used for verification of pro-
grams with library functions, for which a number of equations, some of which
are instrumental for verification of these programs, exist in external sources (the
mathematical library, the Coq proof assistant, etc.). The main idea of the algo-
rithm is to organize the equations in subset lattices, and to replace the traditional
CEGAR refinement loop with lattice traversal. The algorithm is general in the
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sense that it allows several occurrences of the same library function and/or sev-
eral different library functions, some of which depend on each other, in the same
program. While the theoretical worst-case complexity of LB-CEGAR is high due
to an exponential number of combinations of elements of different lattices, our
experimental results show that the algorithm is very efficient in practice and out-
performs state-of-the-art model checking tools on benchmarks with trigonometric
functions.
We view the programs with trigonometric functions as the primary domain
of application of LB-CEGAR. In the future, we plan to explore the domain of
verification of programs describing robots’ movements and kinematics in general.
Chapter 7
Theory Refinement for Program
Verification
Recent progress in automated formal verification is to a large degree due to the
development of constraint languages that are sufficiently light-weight for reasoning
but still expressive enough to prove properties of programs. Satisfiability modulo
theories (SMT) solvers implement efficient decision procedures but offer little
direct support for adapting the constraint language to the task at hand.
Theory refinement is a new approach that modularly adjusts the modelling
precision based on the properties being verified through the use of a combina-
tion of theories. We implement the approach using an augmented version of the
theory of bit-vectors and uninterpreted functions capable of directly injecting non-
clausal refinements to the inherent Boolean structure of SMT. In our comparison
to a state-of-the-art model checker, our prototype implementation is in general
competitive, being several orders of magnitudes faster on some instances that
are challenging for flattening, while computing models that are significantly more
succinct.
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7.1 Introduction
The satisfiability modulo theories (SMT) [DNS05] reasoning framework is cur-
rently one of the most successful approaches to verifying software in a scalable
way. The approach is based on modelling the software and its specifications
in propositional logic, while expressing domain-specific knowledge with first-order
theories connected to the logic through equalities. Once a satisfying assignment is
found for the propositional model, its consistency is queried as equalities from the
theory solvers, which, in case of inconsistency, provide an explanation as a propo-
sitional clause. Successful verification of software relies on finding a model that
is expressive enough to capture software behaviour relevant to correctness, while
sufficiently high-level to prevent reasoning from becoming prohibitively expensive.
Since in general more precise theories are both more expensive computationally
and potentially distracting for the automatic reasoning, finding such a balance is
a non-trivial task.
We introduce theory refinement, a counterexample-guided abstraction refine-
ment (CEGAR) [CGJ+00, CGJ+03] approach for modelling software modularly
using theories that are partially ordered with respect to their precision. Our main
contribution is the process of gradually encoding a program using the most precise
theory only for a critical subset of all program statements, while keeping lower
precision for the rest of the statements. The critical subset of theories is iden-
tified based on counterexamples, and theories of different precision are bound to
each other through special identities. We study several automatic heuristics for
guiding the encoding and provide also a manual encoding option. We apply the-
ory refinement on verification of safety properties of software through bounded
model checking. However, we believe that the technique is applicable in most
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verification techniques where higher-level information is available on the problem
structure. This includes model checking [BCCZ99] and upgrade checking [FSS13],
k-induction [McM05], the IC3 algorithm [Bra11], and generation of inductive in-
variants [GBM14]. We show that the modular composition of the theories prefer-
ring lower precision can be used to both obtain speed-up in solving and identifying
statements whose precise semantics do not affect the program safety, providing
the model checker with cleaner proofs.
Many SMT solvers use over-approximation through theories as a means of
speeding up solving. For instance [BCF+07, BB09, HBJ+14] organizes the theory
solvers into layers that solve problems represented in BV. The query is first
given to fast and less precise theory solvers, and only passed on to the exact
solver if previous layers fail to show unsatisfiability. In contrast to low-level SMT
solving, the work in this chapter studies how to automatically identify statements
whose exact semantics can be ignored in model checking. This shift of view point
has several advantages: (i) the approach can be used both to obtain speed-up in
solving, and as a means for synthesis and finding fix-points for transition relations;
(ii) the guidance from the source code allows the use of more powerful heuristics
for choosing which statements should remain abstract; and (iii) the refinement
takes place on the level of the program, not at the level of the theory query, an
approach potentially more natural from the point of view of the semantics of the
program.
We present theory refinement with two new theories called uninterpreted func-
tions for programs (UFP) and bit vectors for programs (BVP) that are based on
the theories of quantifier-free uninterpreted functions with equality (EUF), and
bit vectors (BV), respectively. The two theories were chosen since they represent
two natural extremes in precision and are commonly used in the layered solver
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approach (see, e.g., [HBJ+14]). In addition to the functionality of EUF, UFP
provides interpretations for constants, conversion of abstract values to concrete
values, and commutativity for uninterpreted functions when applicable. The key
difference in BVP compared to BV is that BVP is capable of directly injecting
non-clausal refinements, modelling the program statements bit-precisely, to the
inherent Boolean structure maintained in the SMT solver.
We implemented theory refinement on the SMT solver OpenSMT2 [HMAS16]
and the bounded model checker HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]) supporting a subset
of the C language. We report promising results both with respect to speed and
the amount of refined program statements on both instances from a software
verification competition and our own regression test suite. We demonstrate that
the approach has a potential of several orders of magnitude of improvement over
the approach based solely on flattened bit-vectors, as implemented in the state-of-
the-art tool CBMC and in our own tool. The implementation and the benchmarks
are available at [HiF17a].
7.2 Combination of Theories in Theory Refine-
ment
This section fixes a notation for describing instances of the safety problem using
SMT and provides two communicating theories for solving the safety problem.
The goal of the presentation is to clarify how the modelling works in the SMT
framework, placing particular emphasis on the use of symbols and their semantics.
In modelling programs, we consider sets of quantifier-free symbolic statements
of the form x = t, where x is a variable, and t is a term. This form essentially
corresponds to the Single static assignment (SSA) form for loop-free programs
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&& , || Sb × Sb → Sb Logical and, or
! Sb → Sb Logical not
Non-logical functions
+ , *u , *s , /u , /s Sz × Sz → Sz Sum, unsigned and signed
product and division
% u , % s Sz × Sz → Sz Unsigned and signed remain-
der
 ,a ,l Sz × Sz → Sz left shift, arithmetic and logical
right shift
& , | , ˆ Sz × Sz → Sz Bitwise and, or, exclusive or
∼ : Sz → Sz bitwise complement
≤s , ≤u , <s , <u ,
≥s , ≥u , >s , >u
Sz × Sz → Sb Signed and unsigned less than
or equal to and greater than or
equal to
(see Chap. 2, Sec. 2.4.3). The symbolic statements are defined over a sort of
bounded integers Sz and a Boolean sort Sb = {>l,⊥l}; we distinguish between
these sorts and, for instance, the sorts of integers Z and Booleans B to clarify the
difference between this symbolic encoding (hence the S) and the representation
used by an SMT solver. Table 7.1 lists the non-variable functions we consider
in our encoding. Note that unlike some programming languages, including C
and C++, we do not allow the encodings to interpret terms from Sz as terms
from Sb or vice versa. We distinguish between the functions defined over the sort
Sb and those defined over Sz , calling the former logical functions and the latter
non-logical functions. The control-flow structures, such as if-then-elses, are
encoded using the functions ! , || , and && . For the purpose of this presentation
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c =
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(a % u 2) + (b % u 2)
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% u 2
c′ = (a + b) % u 2
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Figure 7.1: (Left) sequence of statements and (right) the corresponding encoding
in combined UFP and BVP (to be described in Sec. 7.2.3, on the left all the
variables are of sort Sz , and e and f are unbound).
we assume that the encodings do not contain arrays and pointers1. Fig. 7.1 (left)
shows an example sequence of statements that we use as a running example in
the discussion of this section.
7.2.1 Bit vectors for programs
Our theory of bit vectors for programs (BVP) has a single sort BVzbw containing
the integers representable in bw ∈ N bits. When the bit-width of the sort is clear
from the context we simply write BVz for the sort. Each BVP term t of sort
BVzbw is associated with the bits t1, . . . , tbw which are variables from the sort B.
The bits t1 and tbw are called, respectively, the least significant bit and the most
significant bit of t.
The BVP theory has two special constants 1b and 0b. For the constant 0b,
0bi = ⊥, 1 ≤ i ≤ bw. For the constant 1b, 1b1 = > and 1bi = ⊥ for 2 ≤ i ≤ bw. The
equality of BVP is =BVz : BVz × BVz → BVz . The interpretation of the equality
is that if x =BVz y holds, then the value of the equality term is 1b and otherwise
0b. Finally, BVP has the functions defined in Table 7.1 with all sorts replaced
1We do support these in our implementation, but their results are treated non-
deterministically, that is, as unbound variables from Sz.
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by the sort BVz . For a term t, the Boolean functions determining the bits ti are
computed through propositional flattening (see, e.g., [KS08]).
We encode a sequence of statements P = {x1 = t1, . . . , xn = tn} in BVP as
follows. Each statement xi = ti is converted to |xi|b =BVz |ti|b, where the operator
| · |b is defined for a symbolic term t recursively:
|t|b def=

xb if t .= x is a variable or a constant
|x|b ./ |y|b if t .= x ./ y where ./ is a binary function,
◦|x|b if t .= ◦x where ◦ is a unary function
(7.1)
where a .= b denotes that the term a matches the form of b. Conjunction of the
least significant bits of encoded statements in P defines its BVP-encoding [P ]b:
[P ]b def= (|x1|b =BVz |t1|b)1 ∧ . . . ∧ (|xn|b =BVz |tn|b)1 (7.2)
We say that a safety property t holds in program P if and only if [P ]b ∧ ¬[t]b1
is unsatisfiable. Based on the definition we can see that the symbolic encoding
in Fig. 7.1 satisfies the safety property (d = d′) due to properties of modular
arithmetics. The BVP encoding is often inefficient due to the quadratic growth of
the formula with respect to bw. However, in many cases, the bit-precise encoding
of statements (e.g., *u in Fig. 7.1) are irrelevant to the safety property and can
therefore be over-approximated. This motivates the use of less precise but more
efficiently solvable encodings such as those based on uninterpreted functions.
7.2.2 Uninterpreted functions for programs
The logic UFP (Uninterpreted Functions for Programs) is the standard logic of
quantifier-free uninterpreted functions having the Boolean sort B, the standard
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Boolean functions op : B× . . .×B→ B where op is an operator such as ∨,∧, and
¬, and an unbounded number of variables. In addition, the logic is augmented
with
• a sort UFPn of real or integer numbers;
• the functions listed in Table 7.1 treated as uninterpreted functions with the
sorts UFPn and B instead of Sz and Sb respectively;
• commutativity of the functions + , *u , *s , & , and | ; and
• the concept of constants beyond the Boolean > and ⊥.
As usual, UFP also contains the equality function =S: T × T → B for all sorts T .
As in the symbolic encoding, also in UFP we differentiate between two types of
functions: those with a return sort B, and those with a return sort UFPn.
Given a sequence of statements P = {x1 = t1, . . . , xn = tn}, we denote its
encoding in UFP by [P ]u def= ([x1]u =T1 [t1]u) ∧ . . . ∧ ([xn]u =Tn [tn]u), where Ti is
either UFPn or B depending on the related sort. The encoding operator [·]u is
defined as follows for a term t:
[t]u def=

xu if t .= x is a variable or a constant
[x]u ∧ [y]u if t .= x && y
[x]u ∨ [y]u if t .= x || y
¬[x]u if t .= ! x
[x]u ./ [y]u if t .= x ./ y where ./ is a non-logical function.
(7.3)
We distinguish between the notions of program safety in UFP and in BVP.
In particular, we say that a safety property t holds in program P in UFP if and
only if [P ]u ∧ ¬[t]u is unsatisfiable.
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The program in Fig. 7.1 is safe with respect to the safety property ! (c =
c′) || (d = d′) in UFP and therefore also in BVP. However, it is not safe in UFP
with respect to the safety property d = d′ that is safe in BVP. For checking safety
of programs in UFP we use a theory solver implementing a congruence closure
algorithm [DNS05] that is modified to support constants and commutativity. The
modifications are described in more detail in Sec. 7.4.1.
In the experiments in Chap. 4, we showed that safety of many programs can
be established by interpreting the arithmetic functions as uninterpreted functions.
In the next subsection we describe how the UFP logic and the BVP logic can be
combined.
7.2.3 Combination of UFP and BVP
We present the theory refinement approach using a seamless integration of the
UFP and BVP encoding, and therefore require a form of theory combination.
However, unlike in conventional theory combination on bit vectors (see, e.g.,
[HBJ+14]), we do not need to consider bit-vectors as theories, but instead they
are embedded directly to the Boolean structure of the SMT solver. The two the-
ories UFP and BVP are combined using a binding formula defined as follows.
Definition 2. Given a symbolic statement t, let [t]u and [t]b be its UFP and BVP-
encodings respectively. If both [t]u and [t]b appear together in a formula, we say
that t is bound. Let B be the set of all bound statements. The binding formula






([t]b1 ↔ [t′]b1) ∧ . . . ∧ ([t]bbw ↔ [t′]bbw)
)
(7.4)









Figure 7.2: Symbolic encoding of program and the corresponding SMT formula.
Intuitively, the combination of the theories UFP and BVP with FB allow us
to express an over-approximation of the symbolic encoding of a program. This is
stated more formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let P be a program. Then [P ]b ∧ FB |= [P ]u.
Proof. (sketch) By simulation of executions in BVP: if there exist values vb1, . . . , vbn
for the variables xb1, . . . , xbn in a term [a = t]b then the same values vu1 , . . . , vun satisfy
the corresponding equality [a]u = [t]u.
Fig. 7.2 shows the combined UFP and BVP encoding schematically. In the
schematic example most of the program is encoded using UFP, while certain crit-
ical parts are encoded in BVP and made to communicate with the UFP encoding
using the binding formula FB. The symbolic encoding of a program is partitioned
by the model checker into three parts: the UFP encoding, the BVP encoding, and
the binding formula FB. The conjunction of these is solved by the SMT solver.
We describe how our method decides which critical statements to encode in BVP
in the next section. Fig. 7.1 (right) describes a combination encoding of UFP and
BVP together with the necessary binding formula for the running example.
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Algorithm 6: The theory refinement algorithm
input : P = {(x1 = t1), . . . , (xn = tn)}: a program, and t: a safety property
output: 〈Safe,⊥〉 or 〈Unsafe,CEX b〉
1 For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n initialize ρ[xi = ti]← [xi = ti]u
2 ρ[t]← [t]u
3 FB ← >
4 while true do
5 Query ← ρ[x1 = t1] ∧ . . . ∧ ρ[xn = tn] ∧ ¬ρ[t] ∧ FB
6 〈result,CEX〉 ← checkSAT (Query)
7 if result is UNSAT then
8 return 〈Safe,⊥〉
9 end
10 CEX b ← getValues(CEX)
11 foreach s ∈ P ∪ {t} s.t. ρ[s] 6|= [s]b do
12 〈result,_〉 ← checkSAT ([s]b ∧ CEX b)
13 if result is UNSAT then
14 ρ[s]← refines(ρ[s])




19 if No s was refined at line 14 then
20 return 〈Unsafe,CEX b〉
21 end
22 end
7.3 Counterexample-Guided Theory Refine-
ment
This section provides an algorithm for verifying safety of programs by gradually
refining the precision ρ of the symbolic encoding from UFP to BVP in parts where
satisfying truth assignments shows that it is necessary for soundness. Algorithm 6
describes the high-level idea. The algorithm takes as input a symbolically encoded
problem P and a safety property t, and returns either Safe, if t holds in P , or
Unsafe with a bit-precise counterexample if t does not hold in P . During the
execution the algorithm picks statements s ∈ P ∪ {t} and refines their approxi-
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mations in ρ until ρ[s] is equivalent to [s]b. Based on ρ, the algorithm constructs
the binding formula FB sufficient to connect the UFP and BVP terms.
The safety of the program is tested at lines 5–9 using the current precision ρ
and the binding formula. If the check succeeds, the algorithm terminates at line 9.
Otherwise, a satisfying truth assignment is extracted at line 10 and then used to
refine ρ at lines 11–18.
The need for refinement is checked for every statement s with a precision ρ[s]
not equivalent to [s]b. If the truth assignment CEX b is inconsistent with [s]b then
ρ[s] is refined to block the truth assignment. If at least one such replacement
happens in the current iteration, the execution proceeds to line 5. In practice it
is a good idea to refine several statements based on a single counterexample, as
discussed in Sec. 7.4.2. If no refinement is done, the truth assignment corresponds
to a counterexample and the algorithm terminates at line 20.
The algorithm uses four sub-procedures checkSAT , getValues, refines, and
computeBinding. checkSAT (F ) determines the satisfiability of a formula F ,
getValues(CEX) computes a BVP encoding of CEX through substituting the
abstract values from UFP with concrete BVP values. refines(F ) refines the state-
ment s with respect to the previous precision F , and computeBinding(ρ) com-
putes the binding formula using Def. 2. Below we give a definition for the refine
procedure, while we discuss the other procedures in more detail in Sec. 7.4.1.
Definition 3. The procedure refines(F ) returns an iterative refinement of the
statement s of the symbolic encoding with respect to F , such that (i) refines(F ) |=
F , and (ii) refines has a fix-point that is equivalent to [s]b and reachable in a
finite number of applications of refines.
While in the implementation discussed in Sect. 7.4.1 we use refines(F ) =
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[s]b∧[s]u, we want to point out the possibility of using interpolation-based methods
(see, e.g., [AFHS15]) for the refinement.
Theorem 4. Alg. 6 terminates in a finite number of steps.
Proof. Assume that Alg. 6 does not terminate. Then there is a term in P ∪ {t}
that can be refined an unbounded number of times before the fix-point equivalent
to [s]b is reached, which contradicts Def. 3.
Theorem 5. Alg. 6 returns Unsafe if and only if the symbolic encoding P has
an execution violating the safety property t.
Proof. The algorithm maintains the invariants
Inv1 [x1 = t1]b ∧ . . . ∧ [xn = tn]b |= ρ[x1 = t1] ∧ . . . ∧ ρ[xn = tn]
Inv2 [t]b |= ρ[t]
(7.5)
at line 14 by Def. 3 and Th. 3. Assume that the algorithm returns Unsafe
but there is no execution violating the safety property t. Then there is a truth
assignment σ such that ρ[x1 = t1] ∧ . . . ∧ ρ[xn = tn] ∧ FB is true and ρ[t] is false.
The truth assignment σ must also satisfy [x1 = t1]b ∧ . . . ∧ [xn = tn]b. By Inv2,
if ρ[t] is false also [t]b is false, hence contradicting the unsafety of (P, t). Now
assume the algorithm returns Safe but there is an execution of P violating t.
Then there is a truth assignment satisfying [P ]b ∧ ¬[t]b. Since by Th. 3 both
[P ]b ∧FB |= ρ[x1 = t1]∧ . . .∧ ρ[xn = tn] and ¬[t]b ∧FB |= ¬ρ[t], also the query on
line 5 is satisfiable, contradicting the assumption.





















































Figure 7.3: SMT-based model checking framework for theory refinement ap-
proach.
7.4 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section we present important details regarding the implementation of the
functionality of the theory refinement algorithm in the solver and the model-
checker and evaluating the efficiency of our algorithm.
7.4.1 Implementation of the theory refinement algorithm
This section describes the prototype implementation of the theory re-
finement algorithm. The algorithm was implemented on the SMT
solver OpenSMT2 [HMAS16] and the bounded model checker HiFrog
(Chap. 4, [AAC+17]). The overview of implementation includes the three
main components and interactions between them is depicted in Fig. 7.3.
The solver for UFP
The UFP theory solver was based on the co-operation between a congruence
closure algorithm, which maintained sets of equivalence classes and inequalities
between the classes, and a SAT solver, which enforced a propositional structure
describing the relations between the equalities. The equality graph (egraph) al-
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gorithm represents the problem as an undirected graph to describe the relations
between these equalities. We refer the reader to [DNS05] for the full description
of the egraph algorithm that the UFP solver based on and [KS08] (Chap. 4) for
the definition of egraph in decision procedures for EUF.
Constants. The original egraph algorithm did not support constants other than
the Boolean > and ⊥, but constants played often an important role in our bench-
marks. The egraph algorithm can represent an inequality between two terms t1, t2
by asserting explicitly the inequality t1 6= t2 over these terms. This representation
grows quadratically in the number of constants and therefore is not scalable. We
adopted a different strategy for representing the inequalities between constants.
An equivalence class in the egraph algorithm was represented by a linked list
binding together the terms in the same class. Each class was represented by a
canonical term from the linked list. In the original algorithm of [DNS05], when
two equivalence classes a and b were joined, the canonical term of the new class
a ∪ b was the representative of whichever class a or b contains more terms. This
was done to allow efficient joining and splitting in the backtracking search driven
by the SMT solver. In our implementation the representative of a class a was
always a constant if a contained a constant. The implicit inequality between con-
stants was then implemented by a check that the respective equivalence classes
were not both represented by a constant term. This approach fitted naturally into
the egraph algorithm and explanation generation. In the experiments we observed
no noticeable slowdown compared to the original approach.
Values. Alg. 6 requires concrete values from the UFP theory to construct a
counterexample candidate. In general, the values for UFP were obtained by as-
signing a running number for each equivalence class that the egraph algorithm
Chapter 7 Theory Refinement for Program Verification 170
maintained. However, there were two special cases for the values. First, if the
equivalence class contained a constant, the value was that of the constant. Sec-
ond, a pre-processing step in the SMT solver removed terms that only appeared
on clauses that were true by construction. Since these terms could have any value,
we indicated this with a special flag.
Commutativity. The commutativity of the functions Co = { + , *u , *s , & , | }
was implemented by conjoining the set {◦(a, b) ↔ ◦(b, a) | ◦ ∈ Co, ◦(a, b) in P}
to the instance [P ]u being solved. A similar approach was followed, for instance,
in [CGI+17a].
The solver for BVP
The BVP theory is solved through propositional flattening [KS08]. The solver
supports the operations listed in Table 7.1, and allows the use of arbitrary bit-
widths.2 Based on an extensive testing the implementation is robust, but still
prototypical in the sense that we implement no sophisticated pre-processing tech-
niques that are available in many other bit-vector solvers (see, e.g., [BCF+07]).
Unlike many other SMT solvers (see, e.g., [HBJ+14]), we do not implement the
bit-vector solver as a separate SAT solver working on the flattening and driven by
the main SAT solver. Instead, we flatten the problem directly to the main SAT
solver. This has several advantages: we avoid the overhead of duplicate solver
instantiation, and we enable the solver to potentially learn much more intricate
relationships between the flattened formula and the formula in UFP. However,
an in-depth analysis of the implications of this design is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
2The shift operations  , a , l assume a bit-width that is a power of two.
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Theory refinement in model checking
We integrated Alg. 6 into the bounded model checker HiFrog for C programs.
HiFrog obtains first the symbolic encoding of the program P and a safety prop-
erty t through a sequence of pre-processing steps, builds then the UFP formula,
and finally gradually transforms parts of the UFP formula into BVP based on
truth assignments until the safety is determined. We follow the approach where
safety properties are expressed as assertions in the C code. The architecture is
depicted in Fig. 7.3. HiFrog maintains two SMT solvers during the execution
and which are represented by the checkSAT calls in Alg. 6: the main solver for
checking the satisfiability query constructed at line 5 (shown on the bottom of
Fig. 7.3) and the refinement solver for checking the spuriousness of each counterex-
ample at line 10 (shown on the right of Fig. 7.3). This choice was taken so that
the expensive calls on the main solver would not be slowed down by unnecessary
clauses at the refinement solver.
The counterexamples were flattened to propositional logic through the call to
getValues by mapping the values in UFP to a unique bit-vector constant of the
given bit width bw. At this stage of the development we ignored the case where
the UFP solver gave more equivalence classes than what was representable in bw
bits, since this limitation did not affect our results.
The binding formula (see Def. 2) is updated whenever a statement x = t is
refined. This was done by first constructing the BVP formulas [x]b and [t]b, and
then adding the missing equalities to FB with the call to computeBinding.





































Figure 7.4: Timings of CBMC (left) and HiFrog’s flattening (right) against
HiFrog’s theory refinement for the safe instances.
7.4.2 Experimental results
We evaluated the theory-refinement mode of HiFrog on C programs mostly com-
ing from the software model checking competition (SV-COMP). The benchmarks
were split into the safe (128 instances) and unsafe (30 instances) sets, indicating
whether the bad behaviour is reachable or not. Among safe instances, 17 require
refinements.
For benchmarking we used Ubuntu 14.04 Linux system with two Intel Xeon
E5620 CPUs clocked at 2.40GHz and 12 Gigabyte memory limit per process using
a time-out of 300 seconds CPU time. The model checker was compiled with the
GNU C++ compiler and the O3 optimization level. The complete experimental
results, the source code, and a virtual machine are all available at [HiF17a].
Fig. 7.4 shows the verification results on safe properties. We compared
(Fig. 7.4, left) the HiFrog’s theory-refinement mode against CBMC version
5.7, the winner of the software model checking competition falsification track in
2017.3 In 101 cases, HiFrog was either as fast or faster than CBMC, sometimes
by orders of magnitude. Furthermore, HiFrog’s theory refinement mode is com-
3OpenSMT22: https://scm.ti-edu.ch/repogit/opensmt2.git, git ID: 99c960e4c;
HiFrog (including CBMC that shares the CPROVER framework [cpr19] with HiFrog):
https://scm.ti-edu.ch/repogit/hifrog, git ID b35956f2c.





































Figure 7.5: Timings of CBMC (left) and HiFrog’s flattening (right) against
HiFrog’s theory refinement for the unsafe instances.
Table 7.2: Comparison of the heuristics against the Min heuristic on instances
requiring refinement.
H0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 Min
#solved 17 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
#ref 660 2218 1250 1250 533 2266 1442 1831 162
time (s) 538 223 257 317 123 166 147 158 46.2
pared against HiFrog’s propositional flattening (Fig. 7.4, right), hence ensuring
that the only difference in the solvers is in how the symbolic encoding is presented
to the SMT solver. In 115 cases, the theory refinement was either as fast or faster
than flattening in determining safety, providing a more convincing evidence that
the theory refinement approach works well in practice.
The verification results of unsafe benchmarks are shown in Fig. 7.5. In five
cases, bug detection by HiFrog was slower than the one by CBMC since HiFrog
required iterative refining of all the expressions to confirm the validity of the
counterexample. However, in the remaining cases, HiFrog was comparable to
CBMC.
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Experiments on refinement heuristic
Alg. 6 does not address which exact statement should be refined based on a
counterexample on Line 11 in case there are several possibilities. However this
selection affects the run time of the model checking and is therefore of practical
interest. We consider the following three features while building a refinement
heuristic:
• Traversal order: the algorithm can proceed either by choosing from P the
first statement (forward order) or the last statement (backward order) sat-
isfying the condition on Line 11.
• All statements falsified by the counterexample are refined simultaneously
(simultaneous refinement).
• All statements that depend on refined statements are refined simultaneously
(dependency refinement).
The heuristics are as follows: H0 – Forward order; H1 – Backward order; H2
– Forward order with simultaneous refinement; H3 – Backward order with si-
multaneous refinement; H4 – Forward order with dependency refinement; H5 –
Backward order with dependency refinement; H6 – Forward order with simulta-
neous and dependency refinement; and H7 – Backward order with simultaneous
and dependency refinement. Based on the experimentation, the fastest solver on
average resulted from using Forward order with dependency refinement. This was
the heuristic we used in the results on Figs. 7.4-7.5. We briefly report on the
results of the heuristics in Table 7.2 over the 17 instances of our total benchmark
set where statements were refined. This benchmark set contained three crafted
instances and the rest from the bit-vector category of SV-COMP. The row labelled
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#solved reports how many instances the heuristic could solve before the time-out,
#ref reports how many statements in total had to be refined over the set, and
time reports the total run time. As a reference, the table also reports results
on the heuristic Min that requires no run time and computes a minimum set of













Total number of statements
Figure 7.6: Number of refined state-
ments using the Min heuristic with re-
spect to total number of statements.
Finally, in Fig. 7.6 we show the re-
duction in the number of refined state-
ments when using the Min heuristic on
the 17 instances. As expected, the per-
formance of the heuristic depended on
the instance, but when effective, dra-
matically reduced the amount of flat-
tened statements.
While the results are still prelimi-
nary mostly due to the prototype na-
ture of the tools we are developing, we believe that they make a very strong point
for the potential of the theory refinement approach in software model checking.
7.5 Related Work
Solving bit-vector problems with layers of theory solvers was introduced in
[BCF+07] and further developed in [HBJ+14]. While we worked directly on soft-
ware verification instead of bit-vectors, our approach is related, as we also used
a hierarchy of solvers combined with rewriting techniques. However, we worked
explicitly on the modelling language by automatically adjusting the precision to
be different in different parts of the problem and adding additional constraints
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that seam these parts together. In [BB09], a CEGAR-based approach was used
for solving problems involving arrays by transforming an abstract representation
into clauses. We differ from this approach in that we integrated the system on
the theory solver level, employing in the experiments the congruence closure al-
gorithm together with a propositional solver. To the best of our knowledge, no
existing approach used this level of granularity in the modelling. Furthermore, we
used counterexamples that were checked against the bit-precise implementation,
and this way avoided the refinement of program parts likely needed to be refined
in approaches based on layered theory solvers.
Exploiting simultaneously several theories for one verification goal is not new.
For example, [GBM14] presented a system for synthesizing safe bit-precise induc-
tive invariants for software. Compared to our work in this chapter, the refinement
direction is inverted: the software was first flattened, and in case of a time-out,
converted to a domain-specific theory. Furthermore, we integrated seamlessly the
theories UFP and BVP into an SMT solver, whereas [GBM14] considered real
arithmetics.
Uninterpreted functions have been used together with the bit-precise encod-
ing for verifying the equivalence of Verilog designs in [BBS11, HCR+16]. The
approach used machine learning to identify sub-components that can likely be
abstracted. In contrast, our emphasis is on software verification and integration
to the SMT solver. A related approach [KIY16] constructed test cases for scien-
tific software by computing difference constraints from non-linear mathematical
functions. This approach can be viewed as a special case of the framework we
present in this chapter; the formulas we derived could also be used for generating
test cases, although this is not the focus of this chapter. Similarly, incremental
reduction approach [CGI+17a] combined linear real arithmetic and equality of
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uninterpreted functions (EUF) for the SMT encoding of the program. The al-
gorithm initially used EUF to abstract non-linear operators, and then used the
monotonicity and the multiplication checks to identify spurious counterexample,
thus avoiding simulation and code execution. Both checks might result in a re-
finement formula, which was added then to the current SMT encoding. Unlike
ours, their approach cannot be applied as such for bit-precise reasoning.
The incremental reduction approach was extended to incremental linearisa-
tion approach for solving efficiently non-linear arithmetic problems in general
in [CGI+17b, CGI+18a, CGI+18b, IGCS19]. The approach has been adopted
for solving transcendental functions in MathSAT5 [CGI+17b, CGI+18b] and for
solving symbolic bit-width bit-vectors problems in CVC4 [RTJB17, BT19]. The
CEGAR-based incremental linearisation required the definition of the relative er-
ror approximation per function it refined (to be able to increase precision during
refinement), while our work used a lighter approach and only required the bit-
width configuration as an input. In Chap. 4, we reported very positive results on
using the combination of EUF, LRA, and propositional flattening for encoding
model checking problems. In this chapter, the work explored the possibilities in
much more depth and rigour was motivated by this early result in Chap. 4.
Another program-based refinement approach was proposed in [KBH15], where
the compositional program was approximated with a program-specific theory of
transition systems. Our approach is orthogonal to this, as we were able to handle
programs in a more general way through the eventual flattening, while the theory
of transition systems could likely be integrated as an additional theory.
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7.6 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a new approach for abstraction refinement in software verification
with SMT solvers. Our approach introduces iterative theory refinement and sup-
ports solving of formulas of combined theories in the SMT solver, where the bind-
ing to the theory is maintained by a series of identities in the original formula.
Our main contribution is the gradual encoding process that uses the most precise
theory only for a subset of all program statements, while handling the rest of the
statements by using the less precise theories. This subset of the statements could
either be identified by checking spurious counterexamples or simply specified by
the user. Our framework can be extended by sets of theories with a partial order
of refinement defined among them. In this chapter, we demonstrated the frame-
work on the UFP theory with the partial refinement to the BVP theory. We
implemented this framework in the OpenSMT2 SMT solver [HMAS16] solver
and the model checker HiFrog (Chap. 4, [AAC+17]).
We study different refinement strategies and compare them against a strategy
computed off-line, as well as with the encoding into propositional logic, known as
flattening or bit-blasting. Improvement is seen both in the running time and in
the size of the resulting formula, demonstrating that the spurious counterexamples
are usually eliminated by refining a small number of statements in the formula.
In future we plan to progress in several directions. We will study theory refine-
ment with arithmetic theories and arrays, defining a partial order among theories
based on the level of abstraction/refinement that they provide. We will further
improve the automatic refinement based on an analysis of the counterexamples us-
ing approaches such as interpolation. We also plan to develop more sophisticated




SMT-based software verification can achieve high precision using bit-precise mod-
els or combinations between different theories. Often such approaches suffer from
problems related to scalability due to the complexity of the underlying decision
procedures. Achieving better performance (at the expense of precision) is done
by increasing the level of abstraction of the model. However, as the level of
abstraction increases, missing important details of the program model becomes
problematic.
In this chapter, we handle this trade-off problem with an incremental verifica-
tion approach that controls the precision of the program modules on demand. The
idea is to model a program using the lightest possible (i.e., less expensive) theories
that suffice to verify the desired property. We employ safe over-approximations
for the program based on both function summaries and light-weight SMT theo-
ries. During the verification, once the precision is too low to prove the correctness
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of a property, our approach lazily strengthens either all affected summaries or the
theory through an iterative refinement procedure.
The resulting summarization framework provides a natural and lightweight
approach for carrying information between different theories. An experimental
evaluation with a bounded model checker for C on a wide range of benchmarks
demonstrates that our approach scales well, often effortlessly solving instances
where the state-of-the-art model checker CBMC runs out of resources.
8.1 Introduction
The specifications of software systems with multiple properties can be expensive to
check due to a significant amount of repetitive work. We suggest overcoming this
matter by operating incrementally so that the verifier can reuse results obtained
during verification of different properties to avoid wasting resources. Assuming
that a specification usually involves a certain amount of closely related properties,
this incremental approach avoids verifying each property from scratch, and instead
automatically identify and focus on small “deltas” in the verification conditions.
Verification approaches based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) rep-
resent a program together with a specification in first-order logic. Often the
specification is naturally expressible as a set of individual properties. Each of the
properties in the specifications of the software can require a different encoding
that is precise enough to prove the absence of spurious counterexamples of this
property. In a real sense, this means that each formula requires its own theory. For
example, some properties might be provable with a lightweight and an inexpen-
sive encoding, such as the theory of equality and uninterpreted functions (EUF),
while other properties might require expensive bit-precise reasoning. Identifying
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automatically which theory is suitable for verifying each property is challenging.
In the incremental verification setting maintaining such a framework gives new
challenges. In this chapter, we solve this problem by designing the theory interface
that enables migrating information among formulas in different theories. An over-
approximating function summary [SFS12b, AAC+17] is a well-known concept in
Bounded Model Checking [BCCZ99] that enables reuse of information among ver-
ification runs. Summaries are extracted using Craig interpolation [Cra57] after
a successful verification run for one property and used as a light-weight replace-
ment of the precise encoding of the corresponding functions while verifying other
properties. In this chapter, we propose an algorithm that effectively incorporates
different theories for incremental verification of multiple properties via creation,
reuse, and refinement of function summaries.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first integrated system for SMT-based
incremental model checking in which a sequence of safety properties is verified.
Our algorithm works as follows. Given a program, a sequence of properties to ver-
ify and an initially empty set of function summaries in several available theories
T1, . . . , Tn, the algorithm encodes the program and the current property using the
least precise theory T1 and the least precise summaries available. In case the algo-
rithm finds a proof, the result is sound since we guarantee that both the theories
and the summaries always over-approximate the concrete program. Our algorithm
starts with imprecise encodings since, if sufficient for proving a property, it lowers
the cost of summarization and results in more compact summaries. If no proof
is found, the algorithm increases the precision lazily. Assume that the problem is
currently encoded using the theory Ti. In the phase called local refinement, the
algorithm sequentially adds summaries translated from theories Tj to Ti (j 6= i)
and checks if the property in this encoding is provable. The algorithm enters the
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second phase, global refinement, where the problem is encoded in a more precise
theory Ti+1, only when all summaries are already tried on theory Ti. Then the
algorithm returns to the local refinement again. Similarly to [SFS12b, AAC+17],
our algorithm is capable of generating new function summaries and identifying
actual bugs. Our refinement is driven by a counterexample-guided analysis that
distinguishes spurious counterexamples from the real ones.
We have implemented the algorithm on top of the function-summarization-
based bounded model checker HiFrog using the OpenSMT2 SMT solver for
both solving and interpolation [HMAS16]. Our implementation supports the the-
ories of equality and uninterpreted functions (EUF), linear real arithmetic (LRA),
and bit-vectors (BV). We provide an extensive evaluation on a range of large-scale
benchmarks taken from SV-COMP1 and crafted by ourselves. The tool exhibits
a competitive performance compared to the state-of-the-art.
To sum up, our contributions are as follows:
• A novel approach to incremental verification that lazily identifies, among
several suitable candidates, the lightest level of encoding for each given
property.
• A theory interface for exchanging function summaries among formulas in
different theories.
• An algorithm to leverage both function summaries and the overall preci-
sion of the program encoding that in practice demonstrates a competitive
performance on a range of large-scale programs.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We motivate the work pre-
sented in this chapter with an example in Section 8.2. We provide a background
1Software Verification Competition, http://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/, Linux Device Drivers
(ldv) category.
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on function summarization and SMT in Section 8.3 and describes formally how
the summary conversion is carried out between different SMT encodings in Sec-
tion 8.4. We present our main algorithm for combining summary refinement and
theory refinement in Section 8.5. Finally, we report the experimental evaluation
in Section 8.6, give a brief overview of related work in Section 8.7, and concludes
this chapter in Section 8.8.
8.2 Motivating Example
Fig. 8.1 shows a C program with a function call containing non-linear operations
and two user-defined assertions. Our approach verifies the two assertions in the
code incrementally. It is not hard to see that the program is safe with respect to
both assertions. However, verification of this program using bit-precise encoding
is expensive.
Our algorithm tries the less precise but easier to solve theory of equality and
uninterpreted functions (EUF) as the level of abstraction first, leading to suc-
cessful verification of the first assertion almost immediately. The algorithm then
generates and stores a summary for function func. To verify the second assertion,
reasoning over linear real arithmetic (LRA) is necessary. Our algorithm presented
later in this chapter enables to translate the summary for func from EUF to LRA
and to reuse it to successfully verify the second assertion.
8.3 Background and Previous Work
Our discussion relies heavily on concepts used in SMT solving. In Sec. 2.3.1, we
define the notation that we use in the presentation in this chapter.
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1
2 i n t a , b , c ;
3
4 void func ( ) {
5 c = b ;
6 i f ( a > 0) a = b ;
7 i n t m = 0 ;
8 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 100 ; i++)
9 m += a∗b ;
10 b = m;
11 }
12
13 i n t main ( ) {
14 a = nondet ( ) ; b = nondet ( ) ;
15 i f ( a <= 0) return −1;
16 func ( ) ;
17 a s s e r t ( a == c ) ;
18 i f ( a > 0) {
19 func ( ) ;
20 i f ( c > 10) a s s e r t ( a > 7) ;
21 }
22 re turn 0 ;
23 }
24
Figure 8.1: Program in C with non-linear arithmetic.
8.3.1 Programs and summaries
In this thesis, we reduce a Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [BCCZ99] task to an
SMT task. That is, a program is encoded to a quantifier-free first-order formula
in a given theory T , which is then solved for satisfiability. Our intent is to
allow function calls in the considered programs and to over-approximate them
by summaries whenever applicable. If the program encoding is inconsistent with
the negation of safety specification, then the program is safe. For the definition
of a loop-free program with summaries as a quantifier-free first-order formula see
Sec 2.5.1 in Chap. 2.
Given an unsatisfiable formulas, we construct summaries using Craig Interpo-
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// encoding of the first call of function
“func”:
c1 = b0 ∧ a1 = ite(a0 > 0, b0, a0) ∧m0 = 0 ∧ L_UNW1 ∧ b1 = m10
// encoding of the second call of function
“func”:
c2 = b1 ∧ a2 = ite(a1 > 0, b1, a1) ∧m11 = 0 ∧ L_UNW2 ∧ b2 = m21
// encoding of function “main”:
a0 > 0 ∧ a1 > 0 ∧ c2 > 10
// encoding of the negation of the first
assertion:
¬(a1 = c1)
// encoding of the negation of the second
assertion:
¬(a2 > 7)
Figure 8.2: Modular encoding of program from Fig. 8.1 to an SMT formula.
lation [Cra57], a widely used technique to create over-approximations in Model
Checking; see Sec. 2.3.2 and Sec. 2.5.1 in Chap. 2 for formal definitions with basic
examples of Craig interpolation and function summaries.
In our context, unsatisfiable formulas originate from bug-free programs, and
thus the summaries express that no trace allowed by the function body leads to
a violation of the considered safety specification. In order to construct and use
function summaries in the context of BMC, we assume that a BMC formula is
a conjunction of encodings of individual function calls. Thus, the problem of
determining whether the program is safe with respect to a safety assertion Q
reduces to the problem of determining the satisfiability of the SMT formula
∧
f̂∈F̂
encode(f̂) ∧ ¬encode(Q) =⇒ ⊥.
We illustrate the encoding on the following example.
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Example 9. Fig. 8.2 shows a (simplified) encoding of program from Fig. 8.1 to
an SMT formula. The formula consists of five parts: a conjunct representing
function main , two equivalent (modulo renaming) conjuncts representing calls
of func , and two conjuncts representing the negated assertions. As customary
in BMC, each program variable has its indexed copies (induced by the single
static assignment form). The formulas L_UNWi, i ∈ {1, 2}, represent a loop
unwinding. Note that the encoding of main consists only of the path condition
to assertions, but in general it should explicitly encode all possible paths through
the function body.
In [SFS12b], we presented a method to extract summaries for every function
call f̂ exploiting the proof of unsatisfiability of this formula. In a nutshell, the
approach considers a conjunction of the encoding of all nested function calls from
f̂ , i.e., fprecise def= encode(f̂) ∧
∧
ĝ∈nested_calls(f̂) encode(ĝ), treats it as A, treats
the rest of the program encoding (including the negation of assertion) as B, and
interpolates. Note that the resulting interpolant fsum can now be used in place of
fprecise when creating the formula again because by construction fprecise =⇒ fsum.
Example 10. A possible function summary for func obtained after verifying the
first assertion is (a0 > 0) =⇒ (a1 = c1). It can successfully replace both calls to
func (after the variables are renamed to match the second call) while verifying
the second assertion.
Note that for the examples above, using two SMT precisions are enough: EUF
for the first assertion, and LRA for the second one.
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8.4 Theory-Based Model Refinement
This section presents a general framework that allows a translation back and forth
among theories of SMT with different level of precision.
Our work views the problem of bounded model checking of C programs as
a decision problem which is (i) decidable, and (ii) not based on Nelson-Oppen
theory combination [NO79]. We may therefore concentrate in our framework on
four theories of interest: the quantifier-free theories of equality and uninterpreted
functions (EUF), linear real arithmetic (LRA), non-linear real arithmetic (NRA),
and bit-vectors (BV)2. As a result, we obtain a decision procedure that has
a relatively low complexity. Our framework, called theory interface, provides a
common place from which the theories are instantiated, and to which they can
also be converted back. This theory interface is not aimed to be passed to an SMT
solver, but instead provides an infrastructure through which an instance from one
theory can be converted to an instance from another theory.
The transformation from a theory T to the theory interface and back can be
expressed in the theory-specific instantiations of the following rules, where [φ]T
denotes that the expression φ is encoded using theory T :
[f(t)]T
f([t]T ) if f([t]
T ) in T [f(t)]
T
vf(t) if f([t]
T ) not in T (8.1)
We use the notation f(t) to abbreviate f(t1, . . . , tn), and f([t]T ) to abbre-
viate f([t1]T , . . . , [tn]T ). Above we write f([t]T ) in T , if f ∈ Σ and there is a
derivation recursively using the rules (8.1) such that f([t]T ) is expressible in T .
We denote by vf(t) a variable that is unique to the expression f(t). For example,
2For the signature of bit-vectors, we use a modification presented in Chap. 7, that preserves
the high-level programming language structures to facilitate the proofs of over-approximation.
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the expression f(x, x) is not expressible in the theory of linear real arithmetic if
f is the multiplication operation and x is a variable, and therefore the result of
applying the rules (Eq. (8.1)) is vx∗x. To simplify slightly the notation, we define
a bijectionM that maps terms f(t) to the variables vf(t). For completeness, we







that are independent of a theory and thus common to all transformations.
8.4.1 Theory interface
A theory interface T is a general representation of formulas that we use for trans-
formation among theories. Fig. 8.3 outlines a communication among our four
theories of interest; the horizontal arrows demonstrate the relation among these
theories from the perspective of over-approximation. This relation is a part of
the contribution of this work. Because this chapter aims at using from early on a
light-weight theory that suffices for reasoning, over-approximation among theories
is at the core of speeding up the solving procedure. In the rest of this section,
we formally define a theory interface and establish a relation among theories in a
sound way.
Definition 4 (Theory interface T). Given a sequence of theories T1, . . . , Tn with
signatures Σ1, . . . ,Σn respectively, a theory interface T is a tuple 〈Σ,M1, . . . ,Mn〉
where Σ def= Σ1 ∪ · · · ∪ Σn, and each Mi is a bijective mapping Mi : (SΣ ∪ RΣ) \
(SΣi ∪ RΣi) → Xi where {Xi}0<i≤n are pairwise disjoint sets of unique variables
not used anywhere else.
Intuitively, Mi replaces the formulas and terms that are not expressible in
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LRANRAEUF
  Theory Interface  
BV
Figure 8.3: Theory interface between EUF, LRA, NRA, and BV.
theory Ti by unique fresh variables. Note that for every Ti, SΣi ⊆ SΣ and RΣi ⊆
RΣ.
The projection of T to one of the theories Ti is done by the following rules.
First, if f(t) ∈ SΣi (i.e., is expressible in theory Ti), then it is projected to Ti
without changes. Second, if f(t) /∈ SΣi (i.e., is not expressible in theory Ti),
then we replace it by a fresh symbolMi(f(t)) def= vf(t) ∈ Xi. For transformation
in the opposite direction, i.e., Ti to T, we define the inverse function M−1i as
M−1i : vf(t) 7→ f(t) for vf(t) in the range ofMi.
In the following, we develop a set of translation functions to different theo-
ries and build the over-approximation relation among these translation functions.
Given a formula φ in theory interface T and an arbitrary theory T , we write
TrT (φ) for the translation from φ to T .
Definition 5 (over-approximation). Let φ be a formula in T, and T1 and T2 two
arbitrary theories. The two translation functions, TrT1(φ) and TrT2(φ) convert the
original formula φ into T1 and T2 respectively. We say that T1 over-approximates
T2 if no satisfying assignment exists in T1 for formula TrT1(φ), then it implies
that there is no satisfying assignment in T2 for formula TrT2(φ).
We give the specifics for the theories EUF and LRA, and provide after it also
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the rules of transformation from theory interface to BV and NRA. To establish
the over-approximation relation, we assume in this chapter that the programs
being verified admit no overflows or underflows, and that their semantics can be
exactly captured by BV.
Definition 6 (Theory of EUF). Let X be a set of variables and F be a set
of function symbols with arities. An Equality logic formula with uninterpreted
functions (EUF) is defined by the grammar
trm ::= const
| var
| f(trm, . . . , trm) where f is uninterpreted
fla ::= Bvar
| p(trm, . . . , trm) where p is uninterpreted
| trm = trm | trm 6= trm | > | ⊥ | ¬fla
| fla ∧ fla | fla ∨ fla |
where fla is a quantifier-free formula, var ∈ X , f ∈ F , and const ∈ C. With the
exception of equality and disequality (=, 6=), function and predicate symbols are
treated as uninterpreted.
Semantically, EUF has the axioms of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity for
the symbol of equality, and congruence axiom for function and predicate symbols
(x = y) → (f(x) = f(y)) and (x = y) → (p(x) ↔ p(y)) where x = y is
an abbreviation for (x1 = y1) ∧ . . . ∧ (xn = yn) and f and p are function and
predicate symbols, respectively, of arity n.
Definition 7. A quantifier-free formula in the language of theory of Linear Real
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Arithmetic (LRA) is defined by the following grammar:
trm ::= const
| var
| const ∗ var
| f(trm, . . . , trm) where f ∈ {+}
fla ::= Bvar
| p(trm, . . . , trm) where p ∈ { ≤ , < }
| > | ⊥ | ¬fla
| fla ∧ fla | fla ∨ fla |
where var are variables, and const is a rational number.
We define next a particular class of quantifier free theory of bit-vectors (BV)
which is based on the definitions in Chap. 2 (Sec. 2.3.1) and Chap. 7 (Sec. 7.2).
In Chap. 7, we presented theory called BVP (Bit Vectors for Programs) which
was an augmented version of the theory of bit-vectors. For abbreviation we use
in this chapter the BV notation. In order to be applicable in our framework, BV
should comply with the restriction that no overflows are allowed.
Based on SMT-LIB2 standard the signature in BV is as follows:
ΣBV = {+, ∗, bvand, bvor, bvudiv, bvurem, bvshl, bvlshr, bvnot, bvneg}. We con-
sider the predicate symbols as P = {>,<,≤,≥}. Note that for the addition
and multiplication we use the same notation i.e., “+” and “*” throughout the
chapter to highlight the fact that the syntax is in common with our theory of
interest. Therefore syntactically they can be used in the transformation rules.
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However, the task of interpretation of each function symbol must be delegated to
the corresponding theory solver.
8.4.2 Encoding of theory interface into specific theories
Light-weight theories help removing overly complex or irrelevant details from the
encoding of a program whenever possible. We define the following rules for the
theory-specific part of the transformation from T to EUF :
[v]EUF









Note that in the third rule of (8.3), if the function symbol > or < is applied
over the terms of theory interface, it can be simply translated into a disequality
in EUF. All the other cases in the signature of theory interface which cannot be
applied in the first three rules such as {≤,≥, . . .} are handled by the fourth rule.
Theorem 6. For every formula φ ∈ T, EUF over-approximates BV .
Over-approximations between theories is defined in Def. 5.
Proof. We show that every model in BV can be translated to a model in EUF.
Assume that there is a satisfying assignment in BV, such that a = b holds for
two bit-vectors a and b. This can be trivially translated to an equality a = b in
EUF.
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In case of equality of two function applications f(a) = f(b), we utilize the
congruence rule in EUF, assuming that each function in BV is implemented as a
deterministic circuit.
We define the following rules to transform T to LRA3:
[v]LRA
v v is a variable or an integer constant (8.4.2)
[t1 = t2]LRA














The rule (8.4.6) uniquely associates the expression with a fresh variable. Es-
sentially this rule is used for over-approximation of all the expressions that cannot
be expressed in sufficient precision in LRA. The rules (8.4.2) and (8.4.5) operate
only on integer constants in order to preserve the soundness of translation between
LRA and BV. Example 11 illustrates this case in detail.
Example 11 (Over-approximation of BV by LRA). Consider the following
excerpt of a program written in C: int x = 1; int y = 0.5 * x; assert ( y
== 0 ); Let φ def= x = 1 ∧ 0.5 ∗ x = 0 represent the corresponding SMT repre-
3We assume that before undergoing a transformation, a preprocessing is done for the sake of
normalization, e.g., −1 ∗ 2 ∗ x is normalized to −2 ∗ x.
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sentation. Following the semantics of C, a bit-precise encoding of φ is satisfiable
since 0.5 ∗ 1 is truncated to 0. However, an LRA-encoding of φ is unsatisfiable.
According to Def. 5, this means that LRA does not over-approximate BV. In
order to get that over-approximating behaviour, we impose restrictions on LRA
rules (8.4.2) and (8.4.5) and apply rule (8.4.6) when these restrictions are not met.
The translation applied to φ results in x = 1 ∧ v0.5∗x = 0 which is satisfiable in
LRA. The same restrictions are imposed in NRA.
Theorem 7. For every formula φ ∈ T, LRA over-approximates BV .
Over-approximations between theories is defined in Def. 5.
Proof. We show that every model in BV can be translated to a model in LRA.
Assume that there are no overflows or underflows in BV. This guarantees that
the models of all arithmetic operations in BV are also models in LRA.
The rules for transforming from T to NRA are as follows:
[v]NRA
v v is a variable or a constant
[t1 = t2]NRA
([t1]NRA ≤ [t2]NRA) ∧ ([t2]NRA ≤ [t2]NRA)
[t1 ./ t2]NRA
[t1]NRA ./ [t2]NRA
./ is a function symbol in NRA, e.g., ./∈ {+,−, ∗ }
(8.5)
Regarding the transforming to NRA: the "otherwise" fall back,
[otherwise]M(f(t))[f(t)]NRA
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, is not required here as we never use it. This is because we assume that all
formula and terms from NRA, LRA, BV and EUF are expressible in NRA (see
Def. 4 and Fig. 8.3) under the encoding of the verification problem in HiFrog.
In the following the rules for translation from T to BV are as follows:
[v]BV





./ is a predicate symbol or binary function symbol in BV ,
i.e., ./∈ {bvand, bvor,+, ∗, bvudiv, bvurem, bvshl, bvlshr}
[4 t1]BV
4 [t1]BV




8.4.3 Decoding theories to the theory interface
The previous section describes the instantiation from the theory interface to a
specific theory of interest. This section presents the inverse, that is, transforming
from a theory to the theory interface. Such steps are necessary in order to build
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the over-approximation relation among theories. The key insight is to use the
mappingM−1.









Similarly, the rules for transforming from LRA to theory interface T are as
follows:




is a function or predicate symbol in LRA
[v]T
v v is a variable or a constant, v 6∈ dom(M−1)
[v]T
M−1(v) v ∈ dom(M
−1)
(8.8)
The rules for transforming from NRA to theory interface T are as follows:
([t1]T ≤ [t2]T) ∧ ([t2]T ≤ [t1]T)]
[t1]T = [t2]T
[v]T
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./ is a binary function symbol in BV ,
e.g., ./∈ {bvand, bvor,+, ∗, bvudiv, bvurem, bvshl, bvlshr}
[4 t1]T
4 [t1]T
4 is a unary function symbol in BV ,4 ∈ {bvnot, bvneg}
[v]T
v v is a variable or a constant, v 6∈ dom(M−1)
[v]T
M−1(v) v ∈ dom(M
−1)
(8.10)
Determining satisfiability in an over-approximative theory does not guarantee
that the formula is satisfiable in a more precise theory since the satisfiability
might have been introduced by the abstraction. In such cases, the strength of the
formula must be enhanced through techniques such as refinement. In the next
section, we discuss how to use the theory-based model refinement idea in a model
checking algorithm.
8.5 Summary and Theory-Aware Model Check-
ing
Our novel approach to incremental bounded model checking is presented in Alg. 7.
It takes as input a program with a sequence 〈Q1, . . . , Qm〉 of safety assertions that
are to be verified, and a sequence of theories 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉, such that for each i and
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Algorithm 7: Verify(P, 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉, 〈Q1, . . . , Qm〉)
Input: Program P with function calls F̂ , sequence of theories 〈T1, . . . , Tn〉; sequence of
safety assertions 〈Q1, . . . , Qm〉
Output: Verification result: {Safe, Unsafe }
1 for each Tj do
2 for each f̂ ∈ F̂ do σTj (f̂)← true;
3 for each Qi do
4 for each Tj do
5 〈result, σTj 〉 ← SumRef(P, Tj , 〈σT1 , . . . , σTn〉, Qi);
6 if result = Safe then break;
7 if j = n then return Unsafe;
8 return Safe;
j, i < j, Tj is not an over-approximation of Tj4. For simplicity, we assume that all
assertions are located in the entry function (i.e., ˆmain), but our implementation
does not have this restriction. We refer to σTj (f̂) as to a summary for function
f which is encoded in theory Tj. Note that the function summary is initialized
with the weakest possible summary, namely true. The algorithm searches for a
first assertion which does not hold and then terminates with the Unsafe result.
If no such assertion is found, the algorithm terminates with the Safe result.
Alg. 7 maintains a set of mappings for each function call and each theory to
a summary formula that over-approximates the behaviour of the source function
and is expressible in the theory. These summary formulas are initially true but
are refined after a verification run of each assertion Qi. Importantly, they are
reused by a verification run of the next assertion Qi+1.
An algorithm for verifying an assertion Q with function summaries is shown in
Alg. 8. It starts by encoding the entry function in a given theory T and conjoins
it with the negation of encoding of Q in T . If this formula ϕ is unsatisfiable,
then Q holds, manifesting the weakest possible summary true was adequate for
all nested function calls from ˆmain. Otherwise, our algorithm starts gradually
4In our implementation, we chose T1 = EUF, T2 = LRA, and T3 = BV.
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Algorithm 8: SumRef(P, T , 〈σT1 , . . . , σTn〉, Q)
Input: Program P = (F, fmain) with function calls F̂ , theory T ; sequence 〈σT1 , . . . , σTn〉
of mappings of function calls to their summaries; Q: safety assertion to verify
Output: Verification result: {Safe, Unsafe }, updated σT
Data: ϕ: BMC formula, WL ⊆ F̂ , Pr : precision mapping for function calls, CEX :
counterexample
1 ϕ← encodeT ( ˆmain) ∧ ¬encodeT (Q);
2 for each f̂ ∈ F̂ do Pr(f̂)← 0;
3 while true do
4 〈result,CEX〉 ← Solve(ϕ);
5 if result = SAT then
6 WL ← getCallsWithWeakSumms(CE);
7 if WL = ∅ then return Unsafe;
8 for each f̂ ∈WL do
9 if Pr(f̂) < n then
10 Pr(f̂)← Pr(f̂) + 1;
11 ψ ← σTPr(f̂)(f̂);
12 ϕ← ϕ ∧ translateT (ψ);
13 else
14 ϕ← ϕ ∧ encodeT (f̂);
15 else
16 for each f̂ ∈ F̂ do
17 σT (f̂)← σT (f̂) ∧ getItpT (ϕ, f̂);
18 return 〈Safe, σT 〉;
strengthening the formula ϕ by adding summaries of the function calls responsible
for the satisfiability of ϕ. We rely on a method described in [SFS12b] to get models
of satisfiable formulas and identifying the “reason” for their satisfiability.
Our new contribution is a method to refine summaries based on lazy enumer-
ation of available theories. In particular, Alg. 8 maintains a level of precision
for each function call. In each round of refinement, if a function call f̂ requires
strengthening, its level of precision is increased by one, and a summary of that
level, if available, is conjoined to ϕ. The key ingredient here is the set of transla-
tion rules, described in the previous section, that allow effectively reusing formulas
among theories. Note that the translation process is not direct but operates via
a theory interface (omitted from the pseudo-code in order to save space).
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In order to prove the soundness of Alg. 7, we need to show that a summary
in one theory can be reused in another theory. In other words, the correctness
of Alg. 7 depends on the correctness of transferral of summaries from one theory
to another theory. To this end, we connect the over-approximations via function
summarization with the over-approximations via less precise theory. The following
theorem captures formally the correctness of summary transformation through
theory interface.
Theorem 8. Let f be a function, fTsum be a summary of f obtained from fTprecise,
and fT ′sum be a translation of fTsum to theory T ′. Then fT
′
sum is also a summary of
f .
Proof. First, notice that by translating back fTsum to the theory interface using
the rules in (8.1) we obtain an over-approximating representation fsum of fprecise.
This follows from the properties of the translation. Next, by translating fsum to
theory T ′ using rules in (8.1) we obtain an over-approximating formula fT ′sum of
fsum. Finally, by transitivity fT
′
sum over-approximates fprecise, and hence fT
′
sum is a
summary of f as stated in the theorem.
Note that the fact that fT ′sum is a summary of f is sufficient for correctness of
using fT ′sum instead of fT
′
precise in next verification tasks in case of unsatisfiability
results. It is not required that fT ′sum over-approximates fT
′
precise. In case of over-
approximating theory T ′ it may happen that the full encoding of a function f ,
fT
′
precise, is not sufficient to prove a property while a summary obtained from a
different theory might be enough.
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8.6 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section we present details regarding the implementation of the additional
functionality required for theory-aware summary refinement algorithm with its
evaluation in HiFrog.
8.6.1 Implementation of the theory-aware summary re-
finement algorithm
We have implemented our summary and theory refinement algorithm on top of
HiFrog, an SMT-based incremental bounded model checker. As a back-end,
HiFrog used the OpenSMT2 SMT solver [HMAS16] which is equipped with a
flexible interpolation framework for EUF [AHAS17] and LRA [AHS17] for com-
puting function summaries. Technical information about the set-up of the tool
and evaluation results are available at [Sum18].
With the reported experiments, our goal was to understand how bounded
model checking can benefit from using over-approximative techniques based on
function summaries obtained from SMT theories. We, therefore, compared our
implementation against CBMC v5.8 [KT14], the most efficient bounded model
checker based on the results of Competition on Software Verification SV-COMP
[Com18]. In this chapter, we (1) automated the theory aware-refinement process
(previously has been required manual intervention) and (2) applied summaries
among theories (previously had no support at all). In the following, we present
an explicit experimental comparison against our earlier version to highlight the
usefulness of the proposed algorithm.
We instantiated the summary and theory refinement framework as described
by Alg. 7 and Alg. 8 with three theories: EUF, LRA and BV (using a standard
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encoding to propositional logic). In the global refinement phase of Alg. 7, the
program was first encoded in EUF. In case of an unsuccessful verification with
EUF, the entire program was encoded in LRA. Where the verification with LRA
failed, the entire program fell back on bit-blasting. In the local refinement phase,
in each of these stages, summaries of functions were used (when available) and re-
fined on demand. After a successful verification run, summaries were extracted in
the current theory and were available for verification of the subsequent assertions.
Using the framework described in Sec. 8.4, these summaries were translated to
different theories on-demand.
In our prototype implementation, only EUF and LRA theories exchanged sum-
maries. However, before the precise bit-blasting of the entire program, it is possi-
ble to bit-blast the more abstract EUF and LRA summaries. While this feature
is currently under development, we believe that it will lead to smaller and more
compact proofs and thus improve the efficiency of the entire tool. Similarly, the
inverse direction of extracting high-level information from bit-precise summaries
remains a future work.
8.6.2 Experimental results
For benchmarking we used an Ubuntu 16.04 Linux system with two Intel Xeon
E5620 CPUs clocked at 2.40GHz. We limited the memory consumption to 2
Gigabytes and the CPU time to 200 seconds per process.
We chose 109 C programs from the ldv category of SV-COMP [Com18] that
either CBMC or HiFrog could solve within our time and memory limits. Our
choice of the ldv benchmarks was justified because they exercised our algorithm
in an interesting way due to containing many assertions and functions, and being
relatively large. We excluded programs where CBMC reported an internal error.
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In addition, we included 31 tricky hand-crafted smaller programs to stress-test
our implementation. On average, the benchmarks had 10,000 lines of code, the
longest ones reaching to 35,000 lines of code.
In total, our benchmark set contained 140 C programs and 500 assertions
(verification tasks) placed inside these programs. 215 of these assertions were
recognized as unreachable statements by the entry function in the C program.
We excluded them from our study and focused on those tasks that require a full
solving procedure. This narrowed down our set to 285 verification tasks.
In the following, we provide more details on statistics we collected after the
extensive evaluation of our algorithm against CBMC and three individual veri-
fication approaches from the initial version of HiFrog (Chap. 4), namely pure
EUF, LRA, BV. Table 8.1 gives statistics on our benchmark set. The column
Solved indicates the number of benchmarks which were solved by each tool within
the time and memory limits. In total HiFrog solved 24 more benchmarks than
CBMC5. Among 98 benchmarks for which HiFrog succeeded to return an answer
within the time and memory limits, 24 benchmarks were unsafe and 74 bench-
marks were safe. Interestingly, the average running time for unsafe benchmarks
was longer (78 s) than the one for safe ones (48 s). This can be explained by our
observation that in the unsafe cases, an iterative refinement of all the summaries
was required to confirm the validity of the counterexample. However, in the safe
cases, HiFrog was comparable to CBMC.
As can be seen from the column Time-outs, CBMC performed better than
HiFrog on SV-COMP benchmarks, but it failed on almost 60% of our crafted
benchmarks. As can be seen from the column Memory outs, HiFrog solved
5Since many of our benchmarks include non-linear arithmetic, we also tried CBMC with the
experimental –refine option. This did not significantly change the results, and therefore we
report here the results obtained with the default options of CBMC.
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Table 8.1: HiFrog against CBMC, and the initial version of HiFrog (Chap. 4)
with respect to pure EUF, LRA, and BV solving (#sv is the number of bench-
marks from SV-COMP, and #craft is the number of our tricky hand-crafted
benchmarks).
Tools Solved Time-outs Memory outs Unknown#sv #craft #sv craft #sv #craft #sv #craft
HiFrog 67 31 32 0 10 0 - -
CBMC 63 11 28 20 18 0 - -
EUF only 49 0 38 0 10 0 12 31
LRA only 48 1 40 0 11 0 10 30










Figure 8.4: HiFrog vs CBMC (outer horizontal and vertical lines refer to
memory limit of 2GB, and the inner lines refer to time-out at 200 s).
eight more SV-COMP benchmarks, on which CBMC immediately exceeded the
memory limits. Overall, the experiments showed that HiFrog was able to solve
more benchmarks, and both times out and runs out of memory were less often
than CBMC.
Fig. 8.4 gives a scatter plot representing a more detailed performance compari-
son of HiFrog and CBMC. Each cross in the figure stands for a single benchmark
with the running time of HiFrog on the x-axis, and the running time of CBMC
on the y-axis. The crosses on the outer lines correspond to executions that ex-
ceeded the memory limit of 2GB, and the crosses on the inner lines correspond to
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executions that exceeded the time limit of 200 s. A large amount of crosses on the
top horizontal lines lets us conclude that HiFrog was able to solve benchmarks
which were challenging for CBMC. Furthermore, the solving was relatively fast
in these cases.
The last three rows in Table 8.1 explain how our novel algorithm in HiFrog
performed compared to the initial version of HiFrog (Chap. 4), in which sum-
mary reuse was naïve and manual with respect to successive assertions. Because
this functionality was not directly available in the older HiFrog, we prepared a
set of helper scripts so that the older HiFrog could process assertions one after
the other with possible re-use of the summaries. As expected, EUF and LRA had
a large number of unsafe results, 43 and 40 respectively. We marked such results
as unknown since due to the abstract nature of EUF and LRA the results were
possibly spurious and thus cannot be trusted. By comparison, all unsafe results
returned by our new algorithm correspond to actual bugs. Verifying with BV
revealed that a large number of benchmarks (56 instances) exceeded the memory
limit, manifesting the cost of bit-blasting, which was avoided in our new approach
whenever possible.
In conclusion, we find it encouraging that the techniques described in this
chapter provide such an impressive performance increase in our model checking
procedure. Considering both the effectiveness and the downsides of our approach,
in overall the evaluation results showed a significant positive impact on the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of verification of large-scale and multi-property bench-
marks. Although we acknowledge that these initial results obtained with the 140
instances might not be enough to draw a decisive conclusion, the results do jus-
tify future efforts into extending the benchmarking, among others, to large-scale
instances with multiple user-defined assertions.
Chapter 8 Function summarization Modulo Theories 206
8.7 Related Work
Our work in this chapter was built on top of FunFrog [SFS12b], an approach
for extracting and reusing interpolation-based function summaries in the context
of Bounded Model Checking. The original work in FunFrog focused only on
propositional logic and did not consider the rich field of first-order theories avail-
able in modern SMT solvers. Hence, despite behaving incrementally, FunFrog
was expensive in many cases in practice.
In Chap. 4, we generalised the use function summaries by translating them
to various SMT theories. However, Chap. 4 offered a support of different levels
of abstraction, but the information obtained from one level of abstraction could
only be reused at the same level of abstraction. Our new approach in this chapter
has no such limitation; it converted and used information in the form of function
summaries obtained from the current level of encoding when working on different
levels of encoding.
The idea of using an abstract description of the bit-precise level of en-
coding has been applied successfully in hardware designs [ALS08] and soft-
ware [HAE+17, HR17] verification. The approaches used a different level of en-
coding for different parts of the problem. These approaches typically started with
uninterpreted functions and gradually refined to bit-level precision to rule out spu-
rious counterexamples when necessary, while mixing different levels of encoding to
verify a single property. Unlike these approaches, we did not mix different levels
of encoding but shifted to more precise encoding globally, when the previous level
of abstraction was insufficient. A single level of encoding allowed us to extract
useful information in the form of function summaries from successful verification
runs and to reuse that information in the next verification run.
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Both interpolants and function summaries have been heavily used in model
checking techniques. Interpolants have been commonly used as a means of ab-
straction. Since McMillan’s first application of interpolants in formal verifica-
tion [McM03], interpolation has been applied in algorithms with various exten-
sions in model checking [CMNQ06, McM06, VG09, HHP10, ABG+12, AM13,
RHK13, CPP14, McM14, VGM15, FSS17, FB18, IX18, IX19]; the model checkers
CPAchecker [BK11], SeaHorn [GKKN15], Ultimate Automizer [HCD+18]
and others, leveraged interpolants in some form.
Function summaries date back to Hoare logic [Hoa71] where a pair of pre-
condition and post-condition can be seen as an over-approximating function sum-
mary. Besides computation of function summaries using interpolation, function
summaries have been computed using data-flow analysis [RHS95, BR00, BKW07]
and iterative discovery of modification of variable values, used in model checkers
Saturn [XA05] and Calysto [BH08]. However, all of these applications are
orthogonal to our approach in incremental model checking.
8.8 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a novel SMT-based approach to incremental verification scal-
able to large-scale programs with multiple properties. Our key idea is to exploit
both the function summaries and the overall precision of the program encoding
lazily. That is, among several theories available for the encoding, we have proposed
to identify the lightest one suitable for each given property. To exploit laziness, we
have designed a theory interface which enables the exchange of function summaries
among formulas in different theories and avoids an expensive theory combination.
Thus, our proposed algorithm performs both local refinement and global refine-
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ment on demand. We were able to prove the effectiveness of our algorithm in
practice, by implementing the approach on top of the HiFrog tool and carrying
out an extensive experimental evaluation on the SV-COMP [Com18] benchmarks.
Our results show that in comparison to a state-of-the-art model checker CBMC,
our tool can solve more instances within the same limits on time and memory.
Future work. In the future, we intend to study the applicability of this ap-
proach to other areas of program verification, such as upgrade checking [FSS17],
which considers a task of verification of somewhat related programs against the
same property (as opposed to verification of the same program against somewhat
related properties, as in the context of this chapter). We also plan to apply the
developed ideas in algorithms such as software verification based on IC3 [Bra11],
where correctness of unbounded programs is reduced to finding general proofs for
a sequence of verification conditions that is generated on-the-fly.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
The model checking technique is one of the common and successful approaches
for verification of systems. Different classes of methods of model checking have
been developed to deal better with the state explosion problem, as well with the
computability problem in software since the development of the original technique
in the 1980s. In this thesis, I have investigated modelling software systems with
abstractions via approximative models with a set of complementary techniques
for abstraction refinement once a model could not capture software behaviour
relevant to the correctness in the current level of abstraction. I have considered
two different classes of modelling via approximation; these were, the bounded
model checking technique (for under-approximative models) and the satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT) reasoning framework (for over-approximative models).
In addition to these, I have explored the usage of the counterexample-guided-
abstraction-refinement (CEGAR) framework for different verification tasks to be
able to capture missing behaviour relevant to the correctness in different level of
abstractions.
In this thesis, we have presented a new framework for SMT-based incremental
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bounded model checking with function summaries and novel CEGAR-based tech-
niques to handle the problems above for different verification tasks. The novelty
of this work has been in the unique combination of SMT-based model check-
ing techniques with additional abstraction and abstraction refinement techniques
for efficient software verification. These techniques included bounded model
checking, incremental verification and function summaries, theory refinement, the
lattice-based counterexample abstraction refinement (LB-CEGAR-BMC and LB-
CEGAR) and theory-aware summary refinement. We have described the imple-
mentation of the framework in a new model checker HiFrog (in Chap. 4), with
the additional techniques (in Chap. 4-Chap. 8).
Through HiFrog, we have explored the ability of our techniques to find a
model expressive enough to capture software behaviour relevant to the correctness
yet being sufficiently high-level to prevent reasoning from becoming prohibitively
expensive for different verification tasks (e.g., software with many properties, soft-
ware with library function calls, and software with bit-vectors operators). We
have analysed and examined the effectiveness and the downsides of the refine-
ment approaches. Overall, through the evaluation, we demonstrated a significant
positive impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the verification of complex
benchmarks. Furthermore, we investigated the negative initial results obtained
with the benchmarks and believe the current results justify future efforts into
developing and extending each of the refinement techniques.
To conclude, the SMT-based model checking approach is capable of verifying
complex and larger software dealing efficiently with safe and unsafe instances by
modelling the verification problem in different SMT logics while incorporating the
smart and novel refinement techniques into the bounded model checking process.
I summarise the contributions of the thesis by presenting our methodology
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details in Sec. 9.1. In Sec. 9.2, I describe the future work direction for the SMT-
based incremental BMC approach and each of the refinement techniques.
9.1 Summary of the Thesis
We have presented and described a novel SMT-based incremental model checking
framework with several different abstraction refinement techniques. Each of the
refinement techniques dealt with different difficulty that resulted from an approx-
imate model. We have generalised a single refinement flow for all four abstraction
refinement techniques in the thesis in our SMT-based incremental model checking
framework with function summaries.
We have described the implementation of HiFrog with its architecture and
a rich set of features. The set of features included (i) a support to different
encoding precisions with SMT logic, (ii) the use of function summaries and user-
defined summaries, (iii) obtaining summaries through interpolation with several
interpolation algorithms (depends on the theory, and other input parameters), (iv)
summary compression, and (v) other basic features. Besides, to handle the over-
approximation nature of SMT function summaries, we have introduced a summary
refinement algorithm. The counterexample-guided summary refinement algorithm
identified and marked summaries directly involved in an error detected due to a
spurious counterexample. In the next refinement iteration, these summaries were
replaced by the precise function representations. In addition, we have described
an optimization for traversing reachability properties by constructing an assertion
implication relation between close asserts in code to reduce the verification time.
In the evaluation of the basic implementation of HiFrog, we observed that
model checking with the EUF and LRA-based summarisation was extremely ef-
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ficient in comparison to propositional logic, yet, the light-weight theories had a
high rate of false unsafe results. We have identified two reasons for this issue: (i)
the over-approximative nature of the light-weight theories, (ii) lack of support of
operations at the modelling stage when using SMT logics (e.g., shift-left Boolean
operation or modulo operation on integers). We have proposed to decrease the
false results rate with additional abstraction refinement techniques.
We examined the model checking process of programs with library functions
which their correctness depends on the output of a library function. We have no-
ticed that once the description of these functions is missing in light-weight theories,
the model checking process treated these functions as uninterpreted functions. We
observed that modelling these programs with light-weight theories has led to false
results (that is, reporting a safe program is unsafe due to over-approximations).
For the refinement of programs with a library function, we have suggested using
properties of the mathematical function in the context of bounded model checking.
We have partially ordered the equations and inequalities in a subset lattice of
guarded literals by inclusion relation via a new lattice construction algorithm.
We have formalised a refinement process, the LB-CEGAR-BMC algorithm, in the
context of bounded model checking with these lattices. The refinement process
depends on a lattice traversal algorithm. The original lattice traversal algorithm
we have proposed in Chap. 5 was in the context of bounded model checking.
The refinement algorithm has used an initial high-level description of the function
for different sub-domains of the input. Following the order of statements with an
occurrence of a library function with respect to the location of the entry point and
an assert statement in the loop-free program, the lattice traversal algorithm has
traversed to an upper subset of guarded literals till modelling with the function’s
full definition based on the lattice structure and spurious counterexamples.
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In the evaluation of LB-CEGAR-BMC on benchmarks with modulo opera-
tion, we observed that LB-CEGAR-BMC consumed fewer resources with lattice
than with UDS, especially as the number of summaries loaded to HiFrog had
grown, and had (with LRA) the best time consumption results. However, LB-
CEGAR-BMC failed to prove safety when other operations abstracted from the
SMT encoding or when the counterexample feasibility checks were inefficient. We
have dealt with these problems in Chap. 6 with a set of lattices and a counterex-
ample feasibility check with non-linear arithmetic instead of propositional logic.
I intend to explore this direction in-depth in future work.
We introduced LB-CEGAR, a full and generalised algorithm of the LB-
CEGAR-BMC algorithm, in Chap. 6. The algorithm represented a function effi-
ciently via a lattice of literals (as first-order formulas) and gradually refines the
current representation of this function according to the partial order of literals.
We have formalized LB-CEGAR such as that there was no more a requirement
to have or use the full definition of a library function. We were able to remove
this requirement by using a set of additional techniques and heuristics to deal
efficiently with this scenario. The LB-CEGAR is a generalization of LB-CEGAR-
BMC in that sense that the majority of these techniques and heuristics have not
assume a specific program structure and in particular, have not require the code
to be a loop-free program.
In the evaluation of LB-CEGAR on benchmarks with trigonometric, we
observed that LB-CEGAR verified the highest number of Safe instances, on
many on which other tools failed. The LB-CEGAR performed almost as well
as HiFrog without any summary; in future work, I intend to examine additional
techniques to achieve the same resource consumption as HiFrog with light-weight
theories (Chap. 4).
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We have introduced the idea of theory refinement. The new approach mod-
ularly adjusted the modelling precision based on the properties being verified
through the use of a combination of theories. The approach verified a program
via light-weight theories, and yet, it avoided spurious counterexample once part of
the program (or its specification) was not expressible in a light-weight theory effi-
ciently. The counterexample-guided theory refinement algorithm used the partial
order according to precision between SMT theories to gradually refine (some of)
the program statements to a bit-level precision. The algorithm guided by spurious
counterexamples and the location of statements in a loop-free program identified
and refined only the statements required for proving the correctness of the model
via theory combination. We have formalised the notation for an efficient combi-
nation of two theories via a binding formula for the communication between two
SMT theories. We demonstrated the process with two new theories called UFP
and BVP.
We have described several heuristics with an evaluation of the effect of the
refinement order of statements in the code on the resource consumption of the
algorithm. When benchmarking the theory refinement algorithm, we observed
that HiFrog with theory refinement was comparable to CBMC on safe in-
stances; bug detection by HiFrog with theory refinement was slower than the
one by CBMC. The problem was in the iterative refining of all the expressions
to confirm the validity of the counterexample. I discuss how to handle the prob-
lem with smarter counterexample feasibility checks and improved heuristics in the
future work section.
In the incremental verification approach followed in this thesis, the model
checker verifies each property separately. The theory-aware summary refinement
approach, a novel approach, used this idea to model a program using the lightest
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possible theories to verify the desired property. That is, the approach lazily refined
the encoding at the level of a property (in the LB-CEGAR-BMC, the LB-CEGAR,
and theory refinement algorithms, Chap. 5, Chap. 6 and Chap. 7, respectively,
the refinement has been done at the level of program statements).
The approach allowed using function summaries between different theories for
incremental verification of software with many requirements via a theory interface
mechanism. The conversion carried out between different SMT encodings of the
same function summary was done via the theory interface. We have formalised
the encoding and the decoding of summaries in a specific theory into and from
the theory interface and presented the summary and theory-aware model checking
algorithm that combined summary refinement with theory-aware refinement over
an incremental verification framework using this mechanism. In the evaluation of
the approach, we compared the approach with CBMC and HiFrog as in Chap. 4,
and in overall, the results showed a significant positive impact on the effectiveness
and efficiency of verification of large-scale and multi-property benchmarks of the
theory-aware summary refinement approach.
9.2 Future Work
Following the evaluation discussions in Chap.5-Chap.8, the thesis conclusion and
summary, I consider several research directions for the framework in general, the
refinement techniques and possible combinations of the techniques. In the fol-
lowing sections, I describe the future work in more details in the SMT-based
incremental model checking framework.
Unify refinement mechanism in HiFrog. I have formalised the high-level
architecture of HiFrog for all refinement approaches presented in this thesis (see
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Fig. 1.1 and Fig. 2.11 for more details). Since these refinement techniques are part
of a single refinement flow (the inner cycle as described in Sec. 2.5), HiFrog can
benefit from a combination of these refinement techniques when verifying a prop-
erty. In Fig. 9.1, I present a benchmark with both bit-vectors operations and
mathematical functions. This benchmark can be solved efficiently with a combi-
nation of theory refinement and LB-CEGAR.
1 i n t main ( )
2 {
3 /∗ Compute modulus d i v i s i o n by (1 << s ) − 1 without a d i v i s i o n operator ∗/
4 unsigned i n t n = __VERIFIER_nondet_uint ( ) ; /∗ numerator ∗/
5 unsigned i n t s = __VERIFIER_nondet_uint ( ) ; /∗ s > 0 ∗/
6 unsigned i n t d ;
7 unsigned i n t m; /∗ n % d goes here . ∗/
8 __VERIFIER_assume( s < 32) ;
9 d = (1 << s ) − 1 ; /∗ so d i s e i t h e r 1 , 3 , 7 , 15 , 31 , . . . ) ∗/
10 i f (d > 0) {
11 m = n ;
12 whi le (n > d) {
13 m = 0 ;
14 whi le (n > 0) {
15 m += n & d ;
16 n = n >> s ;
17 }
18 n = m;
19 }
20 /∗ Now m i s a value from 0 to d , but s i n c e with modulus d i v i s i o n
21 ∗ we want m to be 0 when i t i s d . ∗/
22 i f (m == d) {
23 m = 0 ;
24 }
25 a s s e r t (m == n % d) ;
26 }
27 r e turn 0 ;
28 }
Figure 9.1: The benchmark modulus_false-no-overflow.c taken from SV-COMP
(bit-vectors set). The benchmark combines bit operations with mathematical
functions.
The first step I recognize in this research direction will be investigating the
connection and the communication between pairs of refinement techniques, which
we already have partially considered in Chap. 8 when using the refinement algo-
rithm between theories refinement (Chap. 8) and summary refinement (Chap. 4).
Once understanding better and formalising the communication between pairs of
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refinement techniques, we can think and reason how to apply a general mechanism
for allowing all the refinement techniques to communicate during verification of a
property, efficiently.
Theory refinement support for a combination of several theories. In
Chap. 7, we have described the combination of two theories via a binding formula
and demonstrated the process with UFP and BVP. As a first step, we shall think
and reason how to extend the binding formula support to other pairs of theories.
Then, we shall consider and identify which verification problems can benefit from
a theory combination between several theories in the context of bounded model
checking. Last, we will try to extend the current communication via a binding
formula to a general mechanism to communicate between several theories. We
still intend the communication in our theory combination mechanism to be via a
binding formula, but this formula will refer to the binding of equations of different
theories between the theories, instead of two.
Refinement heuristics for theory refinement. In the evaluation of the the-
ory refinement algorithm in Chap. 7, we examined the efficiency of 8 different
heuristics in the context of BMC. The algorithm has performed well for loop-
free programs. However, an evaluation with a random set of benchmarks with
mathematical functions (modulo and elementary operations) in Chap. 5, yielded
false results or an error. These were time-out, out-of-memory, and other related
errors for more than half of the set. Theses results usually resulted from the solv-
ing phase itself when the set of heuristics was not designed to solve an instance.
These errors could have been handled by adjusting the algorithm whenever being
introduced with an unexpected new case. We believe that a more general solution
should be applied.
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We will investigate the reason for these errors and performance issues and will
think and reason how to integrate new refinement heuristics. One of the problems
we have already observed is related to the order of refinement when we started
refining too early. We illustrate our early findings in a small crafted toy-example.
1 void main ( )
2 {
3 i n t a = 0 ;
4 whi le (1 ) ;
5 {
6 a = b % a ;
7 b = abs (b) + 1 ;
8 c = abs ( c ) + 1 ;
9 d = ( ( c+b) % a ) % d ;
10 a s s e r t ( ( a + b + c + d) > 1) ;
11 }
12 }
Figure 9.2: Code Example: Refine too early from the assignment of a, when only
b and c are needed.
The spurious counterexample can be {a = −500, b = 0, c = 0, d = −1000}.
The current heuristics in Chap. 7, would refine the assignment of a or d, hence
creating an expensive encoding (and gives nothing, since they are evaluated to
0 anyhow). For the assert statement in this example, it is actually enough to
refine the assignments of c and b which are simple (and both >= 1). None of
the heuristics presented in Chap. 7 could assist us in that case. That is the case
when we wish to refine only several instructions in between the entry point and
the assert.
We will consider computing real, correct executions to assist in finding a set of
statements to refine regardless of their order in the code. This solution will work
in general and not only in bounded model checking. We plan to try the following
process:
1. Get a spurious counterexample from the abstract model.
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2. Fix the counterexample using the bit-precise representation (that is, correct
the values in the assignments in the counterexample itself).
3. Return a concrete counterexample or repeat (2) for different concrete values.
Note that, we construct either a concrete counterexample or a concrete safe
execution in the previous step. If we have a concrete counterexample, we
will terminate the refinement and return this example.
In (2), we aim to find a minimal fix; however, we have not yet considered any
strategy of technique.
Here, instead of examining each of the program statements locally, we will
examine the assignment of each of the values in the counterexample and alter the
counterexample accordingly. Only then, we will think and reason which of the
statement to refine (not necessarily by the order of the statements in the loop-free
program).
Given an amended counterexample or a set of amended counterexamples, we
will consider the following strategies of refinement:
1. Fix all instructions that disagree.
2. Find the minimal set of All disagrees to fix.
3. Fix statistically all instructions that disagree.
4. Inner structure (e.g., a tree and fix all left siblings).
Each heuristic can be a combination of the heuristics presented in the evaluation
of Chap. 7 and strategies 2-4. We will consider any of the combinations and
examine the effect each of the new heuristics has on the performance and the
ability to solve previously unsolved mathematical and algebraic benchmarks.
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As the main contribution of this thesis is the lattice-based CEGAR approach,
I describe the research direction related to the application and improvement of
LB-CEGAR in more details.
Efficient counterexample feasibility check for SMT-based model check-
ing. In Chap. 5, we have observed that the use of counterexample feasibility
check in the experiments of LB-CEGAR-BMC had no positive effect of the perfor-
mance in comparison to a version of LB-CEGAR-BMC with this check disabled.
Moreover, in Chap. 6, we observed that LB-CEGAR outperformed the rest of
the approaches (unlike LB-CEGAR-BMC in the experiments) partially due to
implementation of lighter feasibility checks (via non-liner arithmetics instead of
bit-vectors). It encourages us to explore this direction further.
We plan to add new heuristics to identify the most efficient theory or theory
combination for a counterexample feasibility check (e.g., NRA for sin() and NIA
for % operation). In addition, we will examine satisfying assignments of false
results from the solver to check the possibility to use linear arithmetics instead
of non-linear arithmetics. With an interpretation for the variables or a partial
interpretation of uninterpreted functions and uninterpreted predicates in the case
of EUF, we believe counterexample feasibility check can be done more efficiently
for some of the library functions and operations we refine. However, we have
not yet examined these traces to come to any conclusion. The theory refinement
approach can also benefit from this study.
We view the programs with trigonometric functions as the primary domain
of application of LB-CEGAR; however, the standard decision problem in SMT
is undecidable for formulas over the Reals with transcendental functions. There-
fore, we consider removing the counterexample feasibility check with NRA and
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using instead SMT solver to decide δ-satisfiability or unsatisfiability formulas for
the counterexample feasibility checks. Note that, we will still use SMT solvers
to determine the satisfiability of formula during the refinement. The δ-decision
problem decides whether a formula is unsatisfiable or δ-satisfiable (δ is a positive
rational number). We will have to evaluate and examine the effect on the false
result of LB-CEGAR (the false-SAT rate) with δ-SAT as we describe here.
Additional heuristics for LB-CEGAR. The incremental solving mode in
LB-CEGAR implementation was used merely for improving the resource con-
sumption of the algorithm. After refining a spurious counterexample, we only
added a subset of guarded literals to the query between two different checks for
satisfiability. Since checking the satisfiability of a problem is more expensive (in
time and memory) than checking the feasibility of a counterexample, we can ben-
efit from controlling the number of guarded literals added after introduced with
spurious counterexamples. Currently, we added the smallest subset of guarded
literals required for refining a spurious counterexample.
We will try to find the right balance between the size of the query and the
number of feasibility checks of a counterexample between two different checks for
satisfiability, to avoid overly large queries and refinement of the same location in
the code over and over. Note that, large queries will at some point suffer from
the same problems that we observed in the evaluation of LB-CEGAR-BMC when
using UDS (or flat lattices), which we intend to avoid at all costs. On the other
hand, each cycle of LB-CEGAR does consume resources regardless of the size of
the subset of guarded literals recently added to the query.
We will learn the effect on the performance of LB-CEGAR by controlling the
following parameters:
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1. The number of counterexamples the solver produces each call to satisfiability
check of the problem, which is a positive integer x.
2. The stopping condition1 of traverseSAT method (e.g., traversing to upper
elements at most k times or until finding a subset of guarded literals which
refines y counterexamples out of x).
3. The number of variables (or expressions in its SMT summary) in the problem
which will be used in the interpretation of non-deterministic expressions in
the encoding of the guarded literals.
We also expect these parameters to affect the false results rate of LB-CEGAR
(in a positive way). Mainly, if each partition (the set of equation pushed to the
solver between two checks for satisfiability) will contain a subset of guarded literals
of different elements (of different lattices) when expressing dependence between
these elements is essential for solving the current verification problem. Thus the
results of this direction extend beyond performance improvements.
Last, we also consider the integration of LB-CEGAR with other solving ap-
proaches (in addition to SMT solving) for robotic benchmarks. However, we have
not yet examined a specific solving approach.
Over-approximate models via frontiers of satisfiability. At the end of a
successful refinement with LB-CEGAR, we construct a frontier of satisfiability
for all occurrences of library functions in the code (assuming each of the library
functions have a lattice). We can use these frontiers for
1. Constructing a set of assumptions under which this program is safe.
1Currently, it is when the current counterexample was refined or when no guarded literal can
refine the current counterexample.
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2. Creating an over-approximate model of the actual implementation of these
library functions.
3. Extracting of function summary per occurrence of a library function in in-
cremental verification approach (instead of using interpolation, as this set,
at that point, is given to as with no additional cost).
4. Given two programs X and Y , which are related or have some algorithmic
similarity, we can use the frontier of satisfiability of the former to speed-up
the verification process of the latter. That is, once we have verified program
X, we will use the frontier from X to verify Y . For example, this technique
can be useful in verification of real-time systems, security code with the
same basic functionality, or inner organisation code which shares the same
utilities with mathematical functions.
We would like to extend the discussion here regarding creating an over-
approximate model of the implementation of a library function.
Trigonometric and mathematical functions are common in control code for
geometric calculations (e.g., ROS and drone control). In order to verify such code,
we need a model or implementation of these functions. However, the relevant
standards (ISO-9899 [ERM97], IEEE-754 [MB16], etc.) give only a very loose
specification, such as special values evaluation (e.g., trigonometric tables as a
specification).
The actual implementations of these functions may vary in terms of accuracy
and will not be necessarily easy or possible to describe with simple parameters
such as error bounds. Moreover, sometimes the implementations of these func-
tions are not available (for example, these are depending on the compiler flag,
x86 architecture, the SSE implementation or a software implementation), mainly
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since the documentation of hardware and firmware implementation may not be
complete, clear, useful or even correct. However, even when implementations are
available, using them directly may cause significant performance overhead.
Finally, even if the exact implementation is available and tractable, it may not
be desirable to verify code using it. In the case of cyber-physical systems, the error
will likely swamp non-exceptional numerical errors. Especially when a control
system relies on computing trigonometric functions perfectly and accurately, this
will raise additional concerns regarding the behaviour of implementations and in
the real world.
We plan to use lattices of guarded literals for transcendental functions (or-
dered from the most stringent to the least stringent, which is likely to require
a semi-manual ranking for the transcendental functions). By using a frontier of
satisfiability, we will think and reason how to identify the least restrictive set of
guarded literals2 required to verify the desired specification of a system. We will
extract sets of frontiers by examples; we will consider the SMT-theories of the re-
als, integers and floating points (QF_FP ). We expect the method to be useful for
verifying a software or a system (that is, for checking the actual implementations
of these functions used in a specific architecture).
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